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
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MILITARY CHIEFS AND PRESIDENTIAL POLICY: THE PROBLEM OF DISSENT--ETC(U)
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MILITARY CHIEFS and PRESIDENTIAL POLICY;
THE PROBLEM OF DISSENT.

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A RESEARCH PAPER SUBMITTED TO THE
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In the past decade, senior American military officers have rarely criticized their country's defense policies. Those who did dissent in previous decades were usually rewarded for their outspokenness with early retirement or dismissal from key assignments. Such penalties, designed to mute or deter policy dissents by the professional military, are often viewed as necessary reaffirmations of the constitutional principle of civil control of the military. Yet a government which habitually views policy dissents by its military advisors as dangerous forms of criticism subversive of civil control may also discourage valuable, conscientious warnings from responsible military professionals who may be quick to recognize potentially fatal policy deficiencies that elected civil officials overlook or ignore as too impolitic to be discussed publicly.

This paper analyses the conflicts between the demands of bureaucratic loyalty, professional integrity, and constitutional principles of civil control that arise when senior military officers are faced with the dilemma of opposing presidential defense policies. At issue is the question of whether or not intensive bureaucratization of the American military since 1947 has undermined the officer corps' traditional sense of professional independence and political neutrality.

This question is approached through a detailed examination of recent historical illustrations which suggest three different interpretations of the problem of policy dissents by senior military leaders. The careers of Generals MacArthur, Ridgway and Taylor--three military chiefs who were confronted with the dilemma of dissenting from presidential defense policies they believed were militarily unsound--are analyzed in terms of 1) the constitutional design of American civil-military relations; 2) the contrasting concepts of administrative responsibility embodied in the "Whig" and the "Jacksonian" models of public administration; and 3) the "convergence-divergence" paradigm which influences the organizational relationship between the military and political sectors of the US government.

The paper comes to the conclusion that the MacArthur and Taylor examples illustrate a deleterious politicalization of the military profession, the distortion of objective professional standards, and a potential threat to the constitutional design of civil control of the military. Ridgway's case, on the other hand, it is posited, illustrates the traditional administrative and political neutrality of the American military officer, a conscientious sense of military professionalism, and a responsible form of policy dissent that is compatible with the principles of civil control and the ethic of professional integrity.

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INTRODUCTION

In June, 1964, nine months before the Johnson administration made its ominous decision to introduce US combat forces into the Vietnam War, the following exchange took place in an obscure Senate hearing. The testimony from this hearing is particularly interesting in view of the fact that President Johnson's decision less than a year later immediately received the carefully orchestrated public support of the nation's senior military advisors: despite their serious, and as events would indicate, well-founded professional misgivings about the wisdom of an administration plan which called for the piecemeal, gradual commitment of military forces in support of an ambiguous foreign policy objective. To a number of senior military officers who remembered all too vividly the frustrations of the Korean War, the Johnson decision was an unpleasant déjà vu.

Both Colonel Lincoln and Senator Jackson were highly knowledgeable on the subject of the military's role in government. They were also well-connected to the key military circles that made up the uniformed side of the Pentagon. Colonel George A. Lincoln, a distinguished military intellectual and brilliant staff officer, had been General Marshall's "talent scout" during World War II. In 1964, he was completing his 9th year as head of the Department of Social Sciences, US Military Academy. Lincoln had been a member of the permanent faculty at West Point since 1947.¹ Senator Henry Jackson, (D) Washington, was well known for his expertise in military legislation. He had virtually "majored" in defense matters since 1940. The subject of the hearings which were being held before Jackson's Subcommittee on National Security Staff and Operations was "The Administration of National Security."² In his prepared statement, Colonel Lincoln had noted the truth in the then-current cliché that, "there were no longer any purely military matters." In the complex world of the 1960's, the military professional

had to be fully conversant with all the non-military factors that affected national security and foreign policy. Yet Lincoln warned,

In this milieu it seems pertinent to recall a remark of Secretary of the Army Brucker who, while specifically recognizing the realities just mentioned, cautioned the 1956 graduating class of the USMA, '...you must guard with jealous care your most priceless possession--your soldier's soul. You are a fighting man'. Some military professionals may view the current trends in the profession with alarm and interpret Mr. Brucker's caution as a reminder of the sense of Hamlet's soliloquy:

"Thus conscience does make cowards of us all; and thus the native hue of resolution is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought; and enterprises of great pith and moment with this regard their currents turn awry, and lose the name of action."³

Having raised this discordant doubt, Lincoln quickly dropped it. Jackson, who entertained some quiet reservations about the manner and thrust of the US buildup in Vietnam, returned to the above quote in his questioning of Colonel Lincoln. Implying that perhaps some senior military leaders did not believe that Vietnam could be saved via piecemeal counterinsurgency measures that tended to fritter away the American military advantage, Jackson attempted to draw Lincoln out on the question of the military's true opinion of President Johnson's gradual military escalation in Vietnam. Lincoln deftly handled the dangerous question by emphasizing the complex interrelationship of the political and military issues that determined the Vietnam case and that rule out, for the time being, an American military response that went beyond the counterinsurgency/gradualism program that Johnson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) were publicly committed to. That perhaps, from a purely military perspective this piecemeal approach was ill-suited to the exigences of the Vietnam situation and the inherent capabilities of military force, was a possibility that Lincoln was not eager to discuss:

Lincoln: There is an implication in the statement you have made that we should jump this effort to another level and assume the responsibility, or primary responsibility, ourselves for creating order in Vietnam.

This opens up a whole book to write and to discuss which, frankly, I don't feel very competent to do.⁴

Agreeing with Colonel Lincoln that the military of the 1960's must be "acquainted with more than one discipline," Jackson suggested that such a broadening of the military perspective raised an old, and by implication current, problem.

Jackson: ...If this is to be done effectively and if he is to maximize his talents, what can be done to improve the opportunities for dissent within the profession?

After a brief historical sketch of the frequent involvement of American military officers in broad political-military problems (a sub-rosa military tradition which indicated that perhaps the current "need" for military officers to "broaden their perspective" was somewhat overdrawn)⁵, Lincoln came to the crux of Jackson's query:

Lincoln: Now, on the opportunity for dissent, that is a tough one...

In the first four years, when I was a cadet at the Military Academy, I recall times when I didn't have an opportunity to dissent, particularly during the first year there as a plebe.

But I don't recall any time since then when, in the end, I didn't have an opportunity for dissent if I felt my cause was just and it was important enough. This was particularly true, by the way, during the time I was General Marshall's planner. If you had a reason to believe a developing plan was not the best, and didn't dissent, you got fired.

Jackson: Does it depend alot on the individual, and how he goes about dissenting within the profession?

Lincoln: There is an element of the political in this, yes.

Jackson: It gets down to judgment?

Lincoln: It gets down to an element of judgment and also you need to be professionally competent in knowing how to put in the dissent. Dissent is a hard word. Perhaps more often than not, you are raising a question or asking that another view be considered.⁶

For the professional administrator operating within the ambiguous and often tortuous confines of a governmental bureaucracy, dissent from the established or proposed administration policy is indeed a hard task. For the military profession with its fundamental orientation to the needs of discipline and hierarchal loyalty, dissent can be a traumatic experience. Closely held values of duty and integrity are at stake; lifetime careers are often in the balance, the success or failure of critical national policies are at issue, and the ultimate questions of professional responsibility are raised. It is invariably a crucible of anxious and soul-searching thought. Consequently, the study of the manner, the method, and the nature of dissent by professionals within governmental bureaucracies can tell us much about the quality of governmental decisions and the character of those professional groups that help formulate policy decisions.

This paper focuses on the senior leaders of the American military and their dissents from presidential policy on professional grounds. A corollary issue of equal importance is the analysis of the professional dissent that is repressed within the highest circles of the American military establishment. The following examines the troublesome, and at times irreconcilable, conflict between the dictates of bureaucratic loyalty and the demands of professional integrity that has wracked the American military profession since the Korean War. To a large extent, both the institutional role and the political nature of the senior military leaders' participation in the national policy process

of the US government can be charted in light of this conflict. As a professional, or to be more specific, a semi-professional who strongly aspires to the greater privileges and autonomous standards of the true professional, and as a responsible bureaucrat loyally subordinate to the external direction of hierarchal superiors, the senior military officer seeks to fulfill a governmental role that is fundamentally dichotomous. The organizational and psychological tensions generated by this professional/bureaucratic dichotomy intensifies the pressures the senior military leader experiences when he is confronted with the dilemma of dissenting from presidential policy. It also makes the nature of his political participation in the policy process highly problematical.

On balance, the government as a whole probably benefits from the tensions which the senior military officer experiences in his attempt to reconcile the conflicting aspects of his governmental role. The tensions, while ever-present, are rarely acute. Only a very small percentage of the total number of presidential policies affecting the military are likely to generate a dissent by senior military leaders. Frequently, ill-advised plans that are potential triggers of dissent are routinely modified and easily compromised in a salutary spirit of cooperation that results in an improved policy. When a policy modification is unacceptable and a conflict is therefore unavoidable, the acute tensions that the senior military leader must confront, while personally unpleasant, can lead to a more thoughtful and rigorous analysis of the disputed policy, especially its military aspects. For the most part, his training and socialization normally cause the military leader to avoid making a dissent unless it involves a major issue of professional responsibility. Whether it be to overcome his professional doubts and thus support a questionable presidential policy, or to justify his professional misgivings and thus stand

in opposition to his superior's policy, the military leader must go over his case very carefully. An ill-prepared or superficial dissent cannot be justified on grounds of duty or honor and thus it exposes the military professional to the ominous charge of unwarranted insubordination, the penalty for which is, more often than not, a quick and unmourned exit from active duty. Whatever his final position, if he has fully and openly articulated the rationale for his decision within the appropriate councils of government (which, in the American political system, is properly understood to include both executive and legislative forums) the effect, while it certainly cannot guarantee the wisest policy decisions, can often improve the quality of those decisions.

However, the constant danger is that the salutary but difficult tensions generated by his dichotomous role may overwhelm the individual military chief. For lack of organizational support, because of a personal character flaw, or due to an honest but erroneous misperception of his proper governmental role, the senior military leader may resolve these unpleasant tensions by surrendering to the temptation to define his role solely in terms of either his bureaucratic or his professional responsibilities.

Such a narrowing of role reduces the military officer's perspective and sharply restricts his sense of duty. Eventually, both the quality of his professional advice and his instrumental value in the policy process declines. In place of the professional military leader whose independence of thought balances a judicious understanding of organizational responsibilities, the government is saddled with unimaginative military functionaries or dangerous military demagogues. As the latter is a more dramatic calamity, it is easily recognized and usually, in the American experience at least, quickly rectified. The former, however, because it is more ambiguous, more difficult to assess,

and because it reinforces certain fundamental prejudices of the American political system, is more subtle and pervasive in its operation. Therefore, it may be more difficult to correct or mitigate. Either alternative, however, may be equally destructive of both wise policy and the political form of the US government, i.e., a constitutional democratic republic based upon the separation of governmental powers.

In the post-World War II period, three senior Army leaders, Generals MacArthur, Ridgway and Taylor, had a significant but quite different influence on the evolution of the American military chief's administrative role and the nature of his political participation in the national policy process. The professional beliefs and the administrative behavior of these military chiefs illustrate three alternative models of senior civil-military relations and three irreconcilable interpretations of the senior military leader's proper administrative role and the scope of his political participation in the American government's national policy process:

1. General Douglas MacArthur - the military chief as political leader, pure charismatic leadership type, the dissent of personality, extreme "Whig" model of administration, and the radical convergence of the civil-military sectors through partisan politicalization.

2. General Matthew Ridgway - the military chief as professional leader, routinized charismatic leadership type, the dissent of profession, limited "Whig" model of administration, and moderate convergence of the civil-military sectors through non-partisan organizational politics.

3. General Maxwell Taylor - the military chief as presidential bureaucrat, classical bureaucratic leadership type, the sublimation of dissent, the "Jacksonian" model of administration, and the radical convergence of the civil-military sectors via institutional politicalization.

MacArthur's case suggests the threat to republican government and constitutional civil control of the military posed by the "man of destiny" syndrome, i.e., a popular, heroic military leader who disregards all partisan political interests while still on active duty and who consistently uses his public influence and professional office in a self-serving manner to advance both his ideological beliefs and personal political interests.

Ridgway's case illustrates the "traditional" model of the professional military advisor whose balanced perspective maintains the desired tension between his bureaucratic and professional obligations and thus avoids the destabilizing excess characteristic of the MacArthur and the Taylor cases.

Taylor's case, the most recent and perhaps the most influential in terms of current and future styles of senior-military leadership, represents a confused but definite tilt towards the military bureaucracy.

The relative importance of these three examples for an understanding of the post-1950 trends in senior American civil-military relations is unequal. The chronological continuity of the three cases illustrates a very important analytical cleavage. Ridgway's case, as noted above, represents a relatively traditional model of the role of the military chief in the American Republic. Both the MacArthur and Taylor cases represent radical departures from this traditional model. Despite the existence of a few scattered, historical precedents, the radical model of senior military leadership and administration epitomized in the MacArthur case does not constitute a viable alternative to Ridgway's traditional model. The essence of the MacArthur model, as explained below, is derived from the metaphor, i.e., the comet-like sweep of the "man of destiny." The military profession is foremost a social organization of extensive regularity. While MacArthur's example may be imitated, his model of leadership can never be institutionalized. It is far too personal in nature.

The traditional model evidenced in Ridgway's case is defined as traditional because it was the first dominant model of senior military leadership and administration to be institutionalized within the American military establishment. It is a model that gradually evolved in response to historical military-political conditions, particularly the constitutional design which divided civilian control of the military establishment between the executive and the legislature, thus giving the senior military advisor two, often competing, civilian masters to serve. By 1900, this model of senior military leadership and administration was firmly established in the psyche of the American professional military. With only minor modification, it remained the dominant model down to the 1950's. This traditional model was successfully institutionalized because it usually met the needs of the governmental system it served and yet reflected the training, experience and self-identity of the professional officers who rose to the highest military positions in that government.

Unlike the MacArthur example, the other radical model of military leadership and administration that begins to emerge in Taylor's case (and to a certain extent Taylor is best understood as a transitional figure) has virtually no significant precedent in American history. Yet it has a definite potential of being institutionalized, if indeed it has not already been so regularized and accepted within broad sectors of the professional officer corps. In this respect, the Taylor model constitutes a truly radical, viable and permanent alternative to the Ridgway model. It is developing in response to potentially permanent and relatively regularized changes in both the governmental system and the professional perspective of the military officer in the second half of the 20th Century. Therefore, it is defined as a systemic response as opposed to the discontinuous, personal response of the MacArthur model. Analyzed in

relation to one another, the models appear as follows: The more traditional Ridgway model is rapidly breaking down. A radical alternative, the Taylor model, which is well-suited to immediate and perhaps short-term needs of the American government but which embodies concepts that are inevitably destructive of the long-range interests and the fundamental principles of the American constitutional democracy, is replacing the traditional model and gaining widespread acceptance within the contemporary military establishment. The older radical model, embodied in MacArthur's case, is a "joker", i.e., it depends upon the incalculable chances of historical accident. It is important because of its potentially great destabilizing influence, but it is essentially secondary in comparison to the dominant long-run influences of the Taylor and Ridgway models. Thus, the MacArthur case is categorized as a prologue, or more accurately, as a critical sidelight in the evolution of senior American civil-military relations. The central portion of this paper is therefore devoted to an analysis of the struggle between the Ridgway and Taylor models for dominance within the American military's senior officer corps.

The thesis of this paper is that a contemporary problem of American civil-military relations which may pose both a potential threat to the constitutional design of civil control of the military and a more immediate threat to the functional basis of military professionalism is an organizational form of incipient ceasarism within certain segments of the military establishment. The extensive, quasi-political commitment of the senior military leaders to the office and policies of the chief executive as exemplified in Taylor's case suggests a fundamental and perhaps permanent shift away from a traditional model of the senior military leader's role in government, a model which has in the past proven to be compatible with both the constitutional principle of balanced civilian control of the military, and the practical administrative need for

judicious, professional military advice in the councils of government.

What long-run effects this change in the senior military leaders' traditional conception of their professional duties and administrative obligations will have on the future organizational development of the American military profession and its institutional role in the government's policy process is problematical. In the short run, at least in terms of the senior military leaders' contributions to the presidential policy decisions which precipitated US military intervention in the Indochina War during the 1960's, the effects of this transition from the Ridgway to the Taylor model of senior civil-military relations seems to have been highly negative.

CHAPTER 1

THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The MacArthur, Ridgway and Taylor cases examined below constitute a rough typology of the leadership and administration models which have characterized the senior ranks of the US military officer corps. The alternative models illustrated in this typology suggest the following questions:

- 1) Which of the three is most compatible with the American constitutional design of civil control of the military?
- 2) Which one best maximizes both administrative effectiveness and political responsiveness in the military bureaucracy?
- 3) Which one generates the most developed sense of professional responsibility and objective professional standards within the military establishment?
- 4) Of the three models, which one fosters the most judicious military policies in the national policy process?

In an attempt to approach these questions by way of historical illustrations which suggest possible answers, the MacArthur, Ridgway and Taylor cases are analyzed in terms of:

- 1) The constitutional design of American civil-military relations.
- 2) The contrasting theoretical concepts embodied in the "Whig" and "Jacksonian" models of public administration.
- 3) The "convergence-divergence" paradigm which influences the systemic relationship between the military and political sectors of the American government.

After a brief consideration of these three political, sociological concepts which structure the subsequent historical analyses, the MacArthur, Ridgway and Taylor cases will be examined in detail in chronological order.

In the latter half of the Twentieth Century, the military coup d'etat has become one of the most common means for effecting a change of regimes in many national political systems. While a small minority of these coups are carried out by the military on behalf of, or in the service of specific, well-organized, civilian factions, the majority lead to unalloyed military rule--a modern version of Roman praetorianism. Therefore, it is not surprising that the contemporary "problem" of civil-military relations is often defined as the ever-present danger that the professional military will usurp political power, eliminate all civilian factions from governmental roles, and establish a temporary or permanent military government. However, in 1787, the Founders of the American Constitution did not believe that the danger of a military coup was the primary threat to proper civil-military relations in a democratic republic. With their broad knowledge of the classical world, the Founders were certainly aware of the numerous incidents of praetorian rule and its fatal effect upon the ancient republican governments of Rome and Greece.¹ That the state's military force must be clearly and permanently subordinated to civilian rule was unquestioned. But the contemporary fear that the professional soldier would, on his own initiative, and acting in terms of his narrow vested interest, overthrow the republic and establish in its place a military dictatorship does not adequately explain the American constitutional design of civil-military relations. An important but frequently overlooked fact is that the US Constitution was written shortly before the modern professional military dictator appeared on the political stage. It is very doubtful that any of the Federalists or Anti-federalists, despite their constant references to the dangers of "standing armies," could have envisioned the political threat to republican government embodied in a Napoleon, a MacArthur, or a Twentieth Century military junta. For as Huntington notes, the Founders in their deliberations simply did not anticipate a separate class of professional military officers.²

In 1787, no nation was run by a purely military faction. Even in Prussia, the most militarized European state, the aristocratic military class ruled in tandem with a powerful civilian bureaucracy and inevitably sacrificed purely military values to longer-standing aristocratic interests.³ Prior to 1787, the last significant instances of a purely military thrust for political power had been: 1) Wallenstein's effort to use his position as a successful commander and powerful military entrepreneur of the Thirty Years War to challenge the Hapsburg Emperor, Ferdinand II, in 1633; and 2) the coups instigated against the Rump Parliament (1659-1660) by Cromwell's Major Generals following his sudden death. Both attempted military coup d'etats met with disaster for their military sponsors and ironically enhanced the political power of the civilian sovereigns they were designed to overthrow.

The Founders' understanding of military officership reflected the temporary nature of that occupation in America and the typical Eighteenth Century view that a military officer was identified by and gave primary allegiance to his social class, not his transitory occupation as a leader of soldiers.

They knew neither military profession nor separate military skills. Military officership was the attribute of any man of affairs. Many members of the Federal Constitution had held military rank during the Revolution; Washington was only the most obvious soldier-statesman.⁴

This Cincinnati theory of military leadership had been validated in the American War of Independence and it reflected a sound republican tradition which some of the Founders, i.e., the Federalists, thought America had successfully revived.

As for the military forces that would defend the state, the Founders rejected the preprofessional, aristocratic institution of a large standing army made up of lower-class enlisted men and placed their faith in an army

made up of citizen-soldiers, men who served their country not for pay, but out of a sense of political duty. This citizen militia expressed the republican principle that the appropriate reliance of a popular government for defense is in its general citizenry, not in a specific social or occupational class. Even George Washington, who had experienced the frequent and painful inadequacies of the citizen-soldier in combat, did not believe that any other form of military force was appropriate for a republican regime:

...passing by the Mercenary Armies which have at one time or another subverted the liberties of almost all countries they have been raised to defend, we might see with admiration the Freedom and Independence of Switzerland supported for centuries in the midst of powerful and jealous neighbours by means of a hardy and well-organized Militia...

It may be laid down as a primary position, and the basis of our system of government, that every citizen who enjoys the protection of a free Government owes not only a portion of his property, but even of his personal service to the defense of it.⁵

Others, particularly those who espoused the Anti-federalist position, were suspicious of civilian Cincinnati and a nationally organized militia which they feared would be easily converted into a standing army that could be used by certain anti-republican civilian factions to establish a monarchy and nobility supported by bayonets.⁶ Among a few disgruntled veterans of the Continental Army there was some talk in 1783, 1785 and 1787 of establishing a vague military or authoritarian dictatorship under Washington's leadership. Lacking any widespread significant support for such a radical action within the Army or the country and confronted with Washington's scornful rebuke, these half-baked plans for a military coup never got far beyond the discussion stage.⁷

What the Founders, both Federalists and Anti-federalist, feared most was the possibility that a single political faction or one branch of government

would usurp total control over the state's military force. It was not so much the military they feared, but rather their ambitious civilian peers who might attempt to gain control of the military and then use it as so many European civilian despots had to further their own personal interests. European history and their own experience in the American Revolution had impressed upon them the belief that in the matter of the state's military power, it was not simply an issue of civil vs. military control of the armed forces (Charles I, Cromwell, and King George III had, after all, been civilians, not professional soldiers), but rather the kind of civil control that mattered.

The Framers' concept of civilian control was to control the uses to which civilians might put military force rather than to control the military themselves. They were more afraid of military power in the hands of political officials than in the hands of military officers. Unable to visualize a distinct military class, they could not fear such a class. But there was need to fear the concentration of authority over the military in any single governmental institution.⁸

They did not fail to see, as many contemporary critics do, the critical distinction between civilian control of the military, and democratic government. In the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, the military was a powerful instrument which had propped up more despotic civilian governments than it had overthrown. As some form of military power was a sine qua non of any political state and, given the then relative political impotence or non-existence of a separate military class, the fundamental problem of civil-military relations which the Founders focused on in the Constitution was caesarism in which,

The armed forces do not constitute an autonomous, irresponsible force, making and unmaking governments according to the bloody whims of the military group, but are instead the tool of an autocrat or oligarchy to beat down opposition from the masses of citizens and keep in power a crushing despotism.⁹

Whether the legislature usurped military power as the English Parliamentarians under Cromwell had, or whether the executive, in imitation of European monarchs did, was beside the point. The central problem was to prevent either branch of the government from using the military to advance its own partisan, institutional interests at the expense of democratic rule and the public good.

The secondary threat posed by a purely military usurpation of political power would be countered by relegating the military establishment to relative political impotence through the most emphatic principle of absolute civilian control and other pragmatic political measures such as austere budgets.

To avoid the dangers of caesarism, the Founders skillfully divided the authority of civil control over the military among three primary political institutions: the Presidency, Congress, and the individual States.¹⁰ Under Article 1, Section 8, of the US Constitution, the national legislature was given the political authority to declare war, to raise an army, determine its size, appropriate necessary monies for its support (not to exceed a two-year limit), establish a navy, regulate the operation of the military, call up the States' militia for federal service, and govern them during such a "federal" period. Under the grant of Article 2, Section 2, the President was given command authority over the military in all its national operations, and the responsibility of appointing all military officers in the national army subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. Under Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 16, the authority the States reserved over the establishment and operation of their respective militia was acknowledged. Also, the States, rather than the President, appointed all officers in the militia.¹¹ When the Bill of Rights was added to the Constitution, a fourth obstacle to the usurpation of the military establishment by a single civilian group was

introduced, i.e., the Second Amendment, which in furtherance of the States' militia, granted to each citizen the right to maintain and bear arms.¹²

This tripartite division of civil control of the military hopefully insured that when ambition was pitted against ambition within the political system, the ensuing struggle would not result in one governmental branch or political faction gaining the trump card of total control over the military establishment. This was civil control by partition. It embodied the two central political principles which structured the Constitution: federalism, and the separation of powers doctrine.

The secondary problem of praetorianism, "the destruction of the civil government by the armed services who constitute themselves an autonomous and ruling element in society"¹³ was initially solved by placing primary reliance on the States' militia for national defense, and thus indirectly, but not unconsciously, relegating the national army to a minimal size. In addition, a permanent legal prohibition was placed against any action by the military which was not directed or authorized by elected civilian authorities.¹⁴ For their material support, the members of the national military were dependent on the civilian legislature; for their orders and direction they looked to the President, the elected civilian Commander-in-Chief. Moreover, the citizen in his individual person and as organized in the States' militia constituted an armed non-professional military force that ideally could be called in as a last resort to checkmate an unrestrained national military establishment which sought to impose a praetorian military coup d'etat.¹⁵ While the concept of relying on a civilian militia for primary defense against foreign military threats and as a final bulwark against a national military coup was illusory and completely refuted by historical experience,¹⁶ the legal principles of civilian control written into the Constitution became paramount in the ethical

code of the small American professional officer corps. This fundamental ideological acceptance of the principle of civilian control by the fledging officer corps,¹⁷ the federal government's policy of maintaining a relatively small national army that, with the exception of war-time increases, rarely exceeded a total strength of 17,000 to 1860, and 29,000 between 1871 and 1900,¹⁸ and the relative social and geographical isolation of the professional military throughout the first 150 years of the Republic, reinforced the political patterns of civilian control established in the US Constitution.¹⁹

The political barriers the Founders raised against unitary or monopolized civil control of the military rested upon the assumption that no political institution holding partial authority over the military establishment would allow its power to erode. Yet, since 1789, there has been a gradual, non-linear, definite trend towards centralized, unitary civil control of the American military establishment. On the other hand, despite the Founders rather casual and unprescient consideration of the potential threat to republican government posed by a praetorian usurpation of power, the overall principle of civilian control of the military took firm root almost immediately within the new Republic's military and political sectors.

During a period when emerging professional military forces were constantly challenging and, in many European cases, overthrowing the established principle of civil control of the military, within the American political system and its military establishment an alternative to civil control of the military was never seriously entertained. "In other words, the American system at the outset was a military system, not a militaristic system. It conceived of the army as an agency of the civil power, to be organized and disciplined with that purpose in view, and not as an end in itself."²⁰ The general disinclination of the professional military officer to play more than an instrumental role

in the political process reflected the constitutional design of absolute civilian control over the military. On the relatively rare occasions when American military leaders did essay a substantive political role, it was invariably via partisan connection with a civilian political party. However, when the American professional military officer entered politics, he left the military behind him. He could not count upon the support of his former comrades-in-arms in the course of his partisan political campaigns. As MacArthur discovered in 1951, one of the most bitter opponents of praetorian rule in America was the professional officer corps.²¹

For the national military establishment, the beneficial result of this divided form of civilian control was that it allowed the military to develop a non-partisan political identity and professional ethic as a quasi-independent governmental institution in service to the whole nation and the public interest. Subordinated to, but not exclusively dominated by, either one of the two centers of civilian authority that it looked to for direction, the national military establishment escaped the dysfunctional effects of institutional and partisan politics that had often politicized the military in other republics and brought on praetorian or caesaristic despotism.

The larger but weaker part of the American military establishment, the States' militia, met a different fate. From the inception of the American Republic, the militia had been identified with the State governments. Purely military changes of a technological and organizational nature which steadily decreased the relative value of a non-federalized militia, the almost universal failure of the States to maintain the most minimal standards of military effectiveness within their militia, and the declining political strength of the States vis a vis that of the national government, gradually eliminated the major substantive role of the States and their militia in American civil-military relations which the Founders had written into the US Constitution.

The dual control that the States and the national government had exercised over the militia in time of war (an arrangement that created havoc with military operations in the War of 1812²² and caused the federal government to bypass the States' militia in the Mexican, Civil and Spanish Wars through a resort to US volunteers who were under exclusive federal control) was resolved in favor of purely federal control in time of war. In 1903, the passage of the Dick Act greatly modified the original concept of State control of the militia in time of peace.²³ The federal government through the agency of the national Regular Army and with the influential political support of the powerful National Guard Association, took over from the States all responsibility for the equipment, the training, and the inspection of the militia which was henceforth transformed into a national reserve force for the Regular Army establishment.²⁴ This transformation of the constitutionally-prescribed States' military forces into a National Guard²⁵ ended the State governments' involvement in the political control of the US military. Whatever limited influence the individual States retained in civil-military matters henceforth depended upon the political power of their congressional delegations. The increased political power that has accrued to the National Guard since 1903, making it a powerful military lobby, has depended primarily upon its influence with Congress, not the States.²⁶ While its record in securing favorable legislation and generous appropriations from Congress is quite remarkable, the National Guard has nevertheless seen its influence in the formulation of national military policy steadily decline since the Korean War. In its desire to conduct military policy unhampered by "unnecessary" congressional interference, the executive has shown a strong disinclination to utilize the National Guard as an instrument of foreign policy. Although 34% of the Army National Guard was called to federal service in 1950-53,²⁷ so

vocal and politically influential were the public discontents registered by these citizen soldiers against the policies of the Truman administration, that in 1964-65, when President Johnson prepared the US for a second Asian war, the use of the politically volatile National Guard was carefully avoided. By then, even the organized Army Reserves, which had been originally created by the Regular Army to counteract the State, and later the congressional influence of the National Guard, had become a politically sensitive military organization. Yet, like the National Guard, the Reserves also could be outstepped by a shrewd administration that desired to conduct its military policies with a minimum of external influence.²⁸

Within the national government, the constitutional division of civil authority over the military between the executive and the legislative branches drew the professional military into institutional politics.²⁹ Although this involvement necessarily gave the professional soldier direct access to the highest governmental levels, so long as he maintained a respectful distance from purely partisan political interests and accomplished his professional duties without the intent of advancing the political interests of one branch of the national government at the expense of the other, the constitutional principle of divided civilian control of the military was not threatened. For the most part, the only permanent causes the senior military leaders advanced were their own organizational and professional interests. In their involvement in institutional politics, the professional military generally acted as a quasi-independent bureaucratic lobby willing to support or ally themselves with that governmental branch which was most favorable to their organizational interests. These political "alliances" were transitory, often contradictory, because they frequently reflected inter-service splits, and they usually varied with the military issues at stake.

The differing interests of Congress and the President thus determined the side which military officers supported. On issues of military strength, they were normally with the President, on organizational interests they were with Congress, on strategy they were divided, and on personnel issues, they followed their own best interests.³⁰

By 1900, the American officer corps had developed a professional ethic which stressed two fundamental obligations: 1) the inviolability of the constitutional principle of civilian control; and 2) a responsibility to carry out military duties in a professionally competent manner. It was a commitment to these two elements of their professional code that prevented the military from becoming the natural political ally of the executive or advocates of the "Jacksonian" model of administration.

There were, however, certain factors that undermined this quasi-independent professional orientation. The military with its traditional emphasis upon organizational discipline and the virtues of hierarchal loyalty found it difficult to resist the President in his role as Commander-in-Chief, even when his policies threatened the military's organizational interests or undermined professional norms. Not to support presidential policies or worse, to oppose them, cast into doubt the primary value of hierarchal loyalty. With few exceptions, an increase in presidential power (often in times of war) would, predictably, increase the organizational influence and power of the military. Prior to 1940, Congress generally cut military budgets while the President could be counted on to support budgetary increases for the military, or at least to support the status quo against further congressional reductions.³¹ Thus, it was usually difficult for the military to support its own budgetary interests without at the same time supporting presidential policies. On those occasions when the tables were turned, and the military found itself allied with congressional forces against presidential policies that threatened its organizational interests, the results were "explosive and dramatic."³² But

if the political activities of the military did coincide with the temporary partisan concerns of either the Congress or the administration in power, it was normally incidental to the professional and organizational interests of the military establishment.

Although he acknowledged hierarchal subordination to the President as Commander-in-Chief, the professional officer's commissioning oath required him to swear to uphold the Constitution;³³ consequently, the officer's organizational and operational subordination to the Commander-in-Chief's policies did not mean that the officer owed primary loyalty to an individual President. Rather, his constitutional oath meant that he was loyal to the nation and its sovereign--the people. If the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief attempted to use the authority of his office to usurp military power, the professional soldier's constitutional oath required him to help prevent such an attempted negation of balanced civilian control. The same constitutional oath, of course, inhibited the military from supporting a far less likely congressional usurpation of military power. Consequently, both his professional code and his fundamental legal obligations theoretically prevented the soldier from playing a publicly partisan role in support of either presidential or congressional policies.

If he did lend his support to or publicly endorsed the military policies proposed by either branch, the professional officer had a personal obligation to satisfy himself that the policy was not destructive of the Constitution and, secondly, that it did not violate professional military principles. There is a serious, perhaps unresolvable problem with this conception of the military's institutional role in government and its political participation in the national policy process. It gives the professional military an opportunity to exploit the separation of powers doctrine in its own organizational

interests.³⁴ Yet, it also constitutes a valuable restraint upon arbitrary civilian political power, particularly as it undercuts the natural organizational tendency of the military establishment to embrace an extreme "Jacksonian" model of administration. Therefore, the American military has traditionally followed a modified "Whig" model of administration.

As illustrated further on, the critical difference between the Jacksonian and Whig models of public administration is that the former embodied an ethic of responsibility that was fundamentally hierarchal and bureaucratic, while the latter involved an ethic of responsibility that was more compatible with the American military officer corps' evolving identity as professional rather than bureaucratic servants of the national government. These contrary models of public administration offered alternative, incompatible answers to the unresolved constitutional issue of whether an officer of the executive branch of the federal government was more than a presidential officer.³⁵

According to the Jacksonian or simple model of public administration, the US Constitution in Article 2 vests all political grants of executive power in the President. The chief executive is thus the chief administrator and he is personally and legally responsible for the entire operation of the executive branch of government. Subordinate executive officers, military and civilian, are to be understood as simple extensions of the President's will. Their function is to carry out the policies of the President just as the hands and arms carry out the directorial impulses emanating from the body's brain. These subordinate officials assist in the formulation of presidential policy within the councils of the executive, but they may not oppose a policy once it is endorsed by the President, or carry their policy dissents to the Congress or the public in an effort to change or revise administration policy. The penalty a subordinate executive official pays for such a public dissent is

dismissal from office. To insure their hierarchal subordination to the chief executive, the power of assignment and dismissal over all executive officials must be and, under the Constitution, is vested in the President.

Symbolically, this model of administration is usually depicted as a steep pyramid whose boundary encompasses the executive branch of government. Within that boundary, the President, as chief administrator, exercises full authority subject only to the restraint of his political discretion. Congress may not extend its political authority into the hierarchal pyramid in order to control the processes of executive administration. According to the Jacksonian model of administration, the political chain of dependence runs from the political sovereign--the people, to their direct representative--the President, and through him to the administrative officials in the executive branch. Through his unlimited constitutional authority to assign executive officials, remove them from office, and control their actions, the President translates his electoral mandate into effective administration. Within the Jacksonian pyramid, the chain of dependence, which constitutes an administrative chain of command, revolves around the personal confidence the President has in his executive officials.

The President must discharge his governmental duties through subordinate executive officials. If he can not place his personal confidence in these administrators, the President can not fulfill his constitutional duties or translate his electoral mandate into efficient administration. Therefore, once the President decides that he can no longer place his personal confidence in an official, that officer becomes an obstacle to efficient administration and good government and must be replaced. At all times, the primary responsibility of an executive officeholder is to maintain the President's confidence and thus support the administrative chain of dependence within the executive branch of government.

Moreover, because the President is responsible for the entire operation of the executive by virtue of his duty to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed," his power over subordinate officers is inviolate. The officers are solely instrumental aids to the President in the execution of the laws and, therefore, their actions must not be independent of presidential direction or inimical to presidential policy. Administrative authority within the Jacksonian pyramid flows from the top-down; it is simple, always hierarchal, it does not involve bargaining or power struggles, it is antithetical to subordinate autonomy or discretion, and it assumes goal consensus and clarity.

Although Congress and, to a lesser extent, the Judiciary, set certain political and legal limits that mark the boundary of the Jacksonian administrative pyramid, neither has a direct, routinized relationship with the administrative subordinates of the President. Whatever limited authority or control either branch exercises over the President's administrators, it is indirect and subordinate to that of the President so long as he does not violate the law.

The Jacksonian model, with its strong emphasis on "imperative control", stringency of discipline", "intensive efficiency", and "a particularly high degree of calculability of results for the heads of organizations", is conceptually similar to what Weber thought was the ultimate form of legal authority--the monocratic type of bureaucratic administration.³⁶ In its most developed form, the Jacksonian model fosters a "bureaucratic" type of administration that enhances the political power and administrative authority of the chief executive because it causes subordinate executive officials to orient themselves towards questions of policy means and administrative legitimacy.

The alternative Whig model of public administration emphasizes the substantive quasi-professional role that the executive official fulfills in the policy process. According to this view, public administration is not a simple process limited to the logical carrying out of rules and the execution of orders handed down by superiors through a hierarchal chain of command. Rather, public administration is a complex process that involves the assigning or delegation of some discretionary authority to responsible executive officials who, in turn, are expected to exercise their own expert or professional judgment in the implementation of the chief executive's policy. There is much less concern here with the requirements of administrative efficiency and the formal, hierarchal aspects of the executive order. While these factors are not ignored, they are partially discounted in the belief that sound public administration rests to a large extent upon the quality and the capacity for wise judgment of the subordinate administrative officials who serve the government.

The Whig model limits the scope of presidential responsibility for administration and rejects the Jacksonian notion that subordinate executive administrators are the simple, malleable instruments of a President's will. While the Jacksonian model defines the executive official's responsibility in terms of his instrumental and hierarchal relation to the President, the Whig model defines this responsibility in terms of the official's subordination to the law, his oath of office in which he swears to uphold the Constitution, and his administrative responsibility to the President. There is also a suggestion that the official conduct and administrative duty of a subordinate executive official must reflect the normative values and objective standards of the technical or professional expertise that he brings to his governmental role.

In a fundamental way, the responsibility of the executive official is broadened in the Whig model of administration. Whereas in the Jacksonian model the public administrator is viewed as a servant or agent of the President, in the Whig model he also becomes a servant or agent of the people (although in both cases this is qualified to some extent by the organizational parameters of the governmental institution the administrator represents). To the personal loyalty the executive officer owes to the President, is added a positive preeminent principle of loyalty to the country and responsibility to the public interest. The President is an important political and functional intermediary between the people--the political sovereign--and their public administrators. He is not, however, a substitute for that sovereign and, consequently, the public administrator does not owe the President final or absolute loyalty. Whenever a serious conflict arises between the personal, hierarchal loyalty he owes the President and the ultimate political loyalty he owes the people, the public administrator must, according to the Whig view, subordinate the former to the latter. When attacking President Jackson's 1835 assertion that all executive officials were directly and exclusively responsible to the President, Senator Daniel Webster, Massachusetts (Whig), put it thus. The problem is,

...that men in executive office have begun to think themselves mere agents and servants of the appointing power and not agents of the government or the country... It is necessary to bring back public officers to the conviction that they belong to the country, not to any administration, not to any one man. The army is the army of the country; the navy is the navy of the country; neither of them is the mere instrument of the administration for the time being; nor of him who is the head of it.³⁷

As a defense against the natural tendency in all governments towards executive tyranny and in order to preserve the constitutional divisions of

political power, it was necessary, Webster believed, to inculcate a sense of independent political responsibility in all public agents. If executive officials did not retain their freedom of opinion, their direct responsibility to the law, their official respectability, and a stout independence of character; if they became the mere instruments of presidential will, answerable for their actions only to the chief executive, not only would republican liberty be threatened, Webster warned, but also the quality of the government's policies would decline.

The consequence of all this is obvious. A competition ensues, not of patriotic labors; not of rough and severe toils for the public good; not of manliness, independence and public spirit; but of complaisance, of indiscriminate support of executive measures, of pliant subservency and gross adulation...³⁸

In order to avoid this corruption of wise republican government, the public official, Webster stated, should maintain his autonomy and act in his official capacity in such a way,

...that, in supporting or opposing men or measures, there will be a general prevalence of honest, intelligent judgment and manly independence.³⁹

The more complex Whig model of administration undercuts the unity of the executive, strengthens the congressional and judicial restraints on arbitrary executive authority, and enhances the political autonomy of the executive administrator. While it complicates and thus lengthens the government's policy process, it may, because of its more pluralistic character, enhance the judiciousness of policy decisions. Aside from its tendency to obstruct executive tyranny, this appears to be the most important virtue of the Whig model of administration.

In many respects, the Whig model imitates a judicial pattern of administration in which the force of a superior court's hierarchal directives and suggestions is balanced by the inferior judge's independent opinions

derived in part from his professional training and administrative position. The Whig model replaces the Jacksonian hierarchal pyramid with a series of "administrative squares" all influencing, but not directing, subordinate and adjacent squares of administrative authority within the executive branch. Moreover, the Whig model breaks the strict Jacksonian chain of administrative dependence and massively opens up the executive administration to other political influences. In the Jacksonian model, the public administration is placed under one source of direct political control--the President. By breaking the executive chain of dependence, the Whig model complicates the political control of the government administration. In this model, the President, Congress, the Judiciary, and the public vie with each other for control and influence over the permanent public administrators. In such a situation, the public administrator may be responsive to all four centers of political control (although the influence of Congress and the President will probably be paramount). But it may also maximize its autonomy by skillfully exploiting the political differences and interests of its four competing controllers. By exploiting the political differences and competing interests which divide the President, Congress, the public, and to a lesser extent, the Judiciary, the public administrator may be able to enhance his professional autonomy and organizational interests. For once the hierarchal chain of administrative dependence which links the President and his subordinate executive officials is broken, the latter frequently become quasi-autonomous government administrators whose removal from office is no longer a purely presidential decision. Other political forces, Congress in particular, can then be interjected into the processes of public administration and thus develop a direct influence on the assignments and the removal from office of executive officials.

Carried to its logical end, the political effect of this Whig model of administration in a constitutional democracy of separated powers is to make the public administration a veritable fourth arm of the government. With its emphasis on legal norms, the delegation of authority and discretion, technical and/or professional standards, the obedience of the official to an impersonal order rather than an individual, and specified spheres of competence for subordinate officials, the Whig model of administration mirrors Weber's concept of "legal authority with a bureaucratic administrative staff."⁴⁰ While it may open the policy process to wiser judgments and restrain arbitrary or ill-advised governmental action, the obvious danger posed by the Whig model, aside from the fourth arm of government syndrome, is that uncoordinated ranks of independent or autonomous administrators may so restrict and weaken the executive power, the primary "engine of government," that the political regime will lose its only unitary source of energy and direction. Alternatively, the Whig model may enhance the negative power of Congress to checkmate the President without improving Congress's ability to carry out the positive political actions which give direction, resolution, and energy to the national government.

Furthermore, while the Whig concept of subordinate pools of administrative jurisdiction and its corollary, professional discretion, may encourage the individual public administrator to function in a responsibly professional manner with his eye always on the public good, it may also encourage him to "degenerate into an isolated and arrogant bureaucrat" who thwarts democratic control and evades political accountability for his actions.⁴¹

The Jacksonian-Whig alternatives reflect the contemporary debate over the question of "bureaucratic responsibility." The advocates of strict accountability, scientific management, and minimal bureaucratic discretion are sympathetic to the need for a strong, unitary executive and the subordination of

administrative experts to effective political control.⁴² Like the Jacksonians, they reject the notion that subordinate executive administrators should, on the basis of their professional expertise, have a quasi-autonomous, substantive role in the formulation or implementation of public policy. They repudiate the Whig principle of subjective administrative responsibility because it violates the functional barrier which should be maintained between the superior part of government which represents the political will of the popular sovereign--elected public officials--and the subordinate part of government--the permanent, non-elected public officials, who are responsible only for the effective administrative execution of the elected officials' governmental policies. If non-elected public administrators are permitted or encouraged to exercise subjective responsibility when carrying out their official duties, they may become unwarranted intruders in the democratic political process.

In his essay, "Administrative Responsibility in Democratic Government," the British social scientist, Herman Finer, reflects the view that "subservience is the first commandment" of political responsibility for a democratic regime's permanent public servants:

A wise civil servant, careful to preserve his own usefulness and that of his colleagues, and not reckless in the face of the always imminent cry of bureaucracy and despotism would not urge a policy upon [a legislative assembly]. Still less would he use public advocacy to spur on his political chief or connive with reformist groups having a purposeful policy. He would rather confine himself to frank private demonstration of the alternatives and their advantages, to the political chief, or where the political system requires, to the committee of the assembly at their request.⁴³

Both the Jacksonian view of public administration and Finer's concept of "administrative responsibility" reject as untenable in a democratic political system the idea that non-elected administrators have a public duty to act as a check or restraint upon bad policy or the political excesses of "the democratic

impulse." As Finer writes, and doubtless as the Jacksonians would agree, "...I still am of the belief with Rousseau that the people can be unwise but cannot be wrong."⁴⁴

A second group whose views are sympathetic with the Whig model of administration believe that administrative political responsibility requires that the subordinate executive administrator be guided in his actions by his duty to uphold the constitutional division of powers. Thus they recognize, as many of the contemporary advocates of a Jacksonian model of administration do not, that democratic constitutionalism and the concomitant separation of governmental powers necessarily complicates the question of administrative accountability.⁴⁵ With the diffusion of political power among different, competing branches of government, the subordinate administrator becomes accountable to several different, often conflicting authorities and is thus drawn into the public policy process as an active political player.⁴⁶

If he is a de facto political actor, then the executive bureaucrat has a substantive role to fulfill in the policy process. Consequently, he must be allowed the exercise of significant professional discretion and subjective administrative responsibility in the conduct of his public duties. If such a public administrator is to fulfill his political, advisory and substantive role in the government's pluralistic policy process and in this way use his expertise to promote judicious governmental policies, he must not be discouraged or dissuaded from making his professional opinions known. Carl J. Friedrich writes,

While many cautious administrators will aver that an official should not discuss policy, it seems wiser, in a democracy, to avoid such a gag rule...A great deal depends upon the nature of the case. In matters of vital importance, the general public is entitled to the views of its permanent servants. Such views should be available not only to the executive but to the legislature and the public as well. Gag rules seek to insulate the specialist so that he is no longer heard. A large benefit is thus lost.⁴⁷

Moreover, it is suggested, the public administrator does have a moral and professional responsibility to address himself to the public good and, if necessary, to act to modify those aspects of the "democratic impulse" that are destructive of the public interest. The public and its elected political representatives can be both unwise and wrong. Therefore, in the long-run, they are best served by permanent public servants who are, to a substantial extent, "inwardly directed" by autonomous professional, political, and moral norms.

Neither the Jacksonian nor the Whig model of administration supplies an adequate solution to the problem of cultivating judicious and responsible public administration in a constitutional democracy. In their extreme or theoretically ideal forms, each is equally destructive of administrative responsibility and sound policies. The most advantageous model of public administration in a democratic regime is one that is based on a synthesis of elements drawn from both the Jacksonian and Whig models. It involves an uneasy tradeoff between two desirable but contradictory goals of responsible public administration, 1) the need to restrain arbitrary, irresponsible actions that are subversive of prudent policies and a constitutional separation of governmental powers; and 2) the corollary need to give requisite unity, direction, energy and efficiency to the political institutions of government and the public policies they choose.

The final analytical concept of senior civil-military relations addressed in this paper is the question of the convergence paradigm, i.e., to what extent and in what fashion should a subordinate social system and governmental institution like the professional military establishment be integrated with the structural institutions, objective standards, and normative values of the superior social-political system it serves. As Parsons has pointed out, there is

a relative interdependence, interpenetration, and autonomy between a large social system and its subsystems.⁴⁸ Some convergence is inevitable if a subsystem is to make an instrumental, functional contribution that is compatible with the institutional, objective and normative goals of the larger social system it serves, and from which it receives its material resources.

Complete divergence between a superior and subordinate social system, while possible, would likely be a highly unstable and temporary relationship because it would generate intolerable tensions destructive of the systematic relationship. On the one hand, the subsystem might act on its own in a designed revolutionary manner or in conjunction with other subsystems in an undesigned evolutionary manner to effect a radical sympathetic change in the higher social system. In such a case, e.g., the 1974 coup d'etat by the Portuguese armed forces, or the socio-political dominance of the military in Imperial Germany, the higher social system becomes dominated by the assertive subsystem(s) and thus comes to reflect the latter's norms and goals. Alternatively, the superior social system, if it is cohesive and continues to enjoy the support of other critical subsystems, will be able to draw upon its greater resources and relative superior power to pressure the lower subsystem into an acceptable degree of convergence, e.g., the Nazi's purge of the Wehrmacht general officer corps in 1938 and DeGaulle's reforms of the French Army after 1961. In this case, the subsystem's subordinate, instrumental role is forcefully reestablished and it becomes more reflective of the superior system's norms and standards.

Nevertheless, some element of divergence between the two social systems is required if the subsystem is to preserve that degree of "autonomy" which is essential to the maintenance of the unique, albeit instrumental, contribution it makes to the functional requirements of the superior social system.⁴⁹

Two types of systemic controls facilitate convergence--those external to the subordinate social-political system and those internal. In the American Republic, the constitutional design of the division of political power between three competing branches of government, the model of public administration cultivated in the executive branch, and public opinion are examples of external controls on the professional military subsystem. Within the military establishment, as within all public bureaucracies, there are two types of internal controls, objective and subjective, which influence the superior-subordinate convergence pattern.⁵⁰

These internal controls make up the subsystem's endogenous concept of responsibility. Objective or "functional" controls are those rational technical/professional standards which the members of the subsystem use to evaluate their own operational actions and the governmental policies proposed by their elected political supervisors. Subjective or "general" controls are the normative, personal principles of the subsystem's members--their social, political and moral values. These two categories of internal controls, objective and subjective, are usually distinct. However, as the character of the internal objective controls become more professional, they generate notions of "professional ethics" which suggest values and concerns usually associated with subjective controls. Thus, to the extent that the administrative subsystem defines its objective internal controls in terms of professionalism, interpenetration of its objective and subjective controls increases. In conjunction, the subsystem's external and internal controls are designed to facilitate a convergence pattern that fosters the political responsiveness of the public bureaucracy to its elected governmental masters without impairing its professional effectiveness.⁵¹

In the analysis of American civil-military relations, two classic alternative interpretations of the influence of internal controls on the military's behavior are those made by Huntington and Janowitz.⁵² The normative

values of the American civil society are liberal; the traditional values of the military subsystem are conservative, or to use Huntington's term, "conservative realism."⁵³ Within the American context, when a conservative institution such as the military converges with the larger liberal social system, it usually means that the conservative subsystem has reoriented either or both its objective and subjective internal controls in conformity, or at least in harmony, with the liberal values and institutions characteristic of the civilian society. In the case of the military, convergence of internal objective controls leads to a "civilianization" of the military's institutional structures and objective professional norms; convergence of internal subjective controls leads to an erosion of the military's subjective conservative values and their modification or replacement by the civilian society's liberal values. Both Huntington and Janowitz agree that in the post-World War II period, at least through the mid-sixties, civil-military convergence has lead to substantial "civilianization" of the military.⁵⁴

An important alternative view, which this paper does not consider, is expressed in Lasswell's famous "garrison state" hypothesis and C. Wright Mills' "power-elite thesis." It holds that civil-military convergence threatens or results in the subordination of liberal civilian values to the unwarrantedly bellicose, anti-progressive, and reactionary values of the military subsystem.⁵⁵ A serious weakness in this interpretation of convergence is that it negates the critical distinction between what Vagts called "militarism" and the "military way."⁵⁶ Moreover, the empirical evidence in the post-World War II development of American civil-military relations does not appear to support the thesis that convergence has lead to the dominance of the professional military in government or the "militarization" of civil society.⁵⁷

While Huntington and Janowitz agree that convergence fosters "civilianization" of the military, they disagree in their assessment of the

effects of "civilianization" on military professionalism. Huntington states that in its effort to enhance responsiveness and reinforce external control over the military, the civilian society has forced the military to drastically converge its internal subjective controls, i.e., its conservative, moral, social and political values, with the liberal values of the dominant civilian social system. This type of convergence enables the state to establish "subjective civilian control" over the military.⁵⁸ Such a transmutation of the military's internal subjective controls draws the military into politics as formulators and advocates of policy; corrupts the military officer's skeptical, realistic, conservative ethic; lessens the functional differentiation between military and political roles; and ultimately destroys the military's professionalism. Objective professionalism is impossible unless it is based upon the professional military ethic of "conservative realism."

Huntington presumes an almost total interpenetration of the professional military's internal objective and subjective controls. If the military resists the liberal transmutation of its internal subjective values, it will suffer the penalty of "extirpation." In previous years when the military resisted and when there was no pressing need for substantial military forces, the liberal American society virtually eliminated its military establishment. Given the contemporary military threats to national security, Huntington writes, "extirpation" is untenable. Consequently, the only way to ameliorate the negative effects of convergence and thus insure both political responsiveness and professional effectiveness in the military establishment is for the civilian society to replace its anti-military, liberal ideology with the military's "conservative realistic" world view. Once the civilian society has the appropriate ideological, i.e., conservative, values, a more extensive and salutary convergence between the military and the civilian sectors can occur.

It is doubtful that the interpenetration between the military subsystem's internal objective and subjective controls is as extensive or as critical to objective military professionalism as Huntington suggests. In addition, Huntington may have underestimated the extent to which external objective factors have directly affected the military profession and led to an inevitable, perhaps irreversible convergence of civil and military institutions.⁵⁹ Nor is it very probable that the political orientation and the normative values of the larger civil society, the superior system, will be voluntarily changed in order to accommodate the subjective professional ethic of a subordinate social system such as the military establishment. As one critic has noted, the solution proposed by Huntington to the civil-military convergence dilemma,

"would mean that the profession would shape the society reversing the dominant thrust of the interaction of profession and society..."⁶⁰

The model of civil-military convergence that Janowitz delineates in The Professional Soldier does not support the thesis advanced by Huntington that the military establishment's internal subjective controls determine the quality and effectiveness of objective military professionalism. Nor does Janowitz believe, as Huntington does, that objective military professionalism requires that the military adhere to a traditional subjective ethic of "conservative realism." While Huntington ascribes the growth and maintenance of military professionalism to the autonomous development of subjective internal controls and the ethic of "conservative realism," Janowitz sees objective professionalism as being influenced by both external and internal factors. According to his interpretation, "subjective civilian control," i.e., the full integration of the military's subjective values with those of the civil society, is necessary to insure the political responsiveness of the military. Such an integration/convergence is not incompatible with military

professionalism because the military's objective internal controls have also converged with the civilian society. To a large extent, the military is becoming increasingly similar to a large-scale civilian bureaucracy: (1) its organizational authority patterns are now based on non-traditional forms of manipulation, consensus and persuasion; (2) its organizational skill requirements are less differentiated from those of the civil society; (3) its leadership styles are changing from the traditional "heroic-warrior" model to the more civilian "managerial-technical" model; (4) its senior leaders are now trained to develop a broad professional perspective that includes the evaluation of social and political factors; and (5) it has developed a "political" ethos that involves senior military leaders more actively in the national policy process and enhances their judicious appreciation of the impact of military power in international politics.⁶¹

The simultaneous convergence of the military's internal subjective and objective controls with the larger social system will, hopefully, reorient the military profession to a fuller understanding of the need to tailor military force to the exigencies of political objectives. A new military "constabulary force" could become the instrument of a professional military doctrine that stresses the minimum use of force and the limitations of violence.⁶² Finally, because the military establishment is a semi-professional government bureaucracy in which automatic political responsiveness to the civilian authorities is the sine qua non of effective democratic civil control, the cultivation within the officers corps of a sense of professional autonomy should be avoided. Such an autonomous development of objective internal controls within the military subsystem could lead to dangerous organizational pathologies that are highly destructive of the external controls established by the civil society. These pathologies inherent in the military establishment are similar to what Merton

categorized as "the dysfunctions of bureaucracy" and what Janowitz defines as "overprofessionalization," i.e., trained incapacity, displacement of goals, syndicalism, elitism, and opportunism.⁶³

Janowitz does not ignore the possibility that the elimination or the radical, political subordination of the military's professional autonomy might, in the long run, be harmful to democratic political control and military effectiveness. He suggests that the pragmatic "military manager" will be able to integrate his subjective values with those of the civil society and accept a more extensive involvement of civilian authorities in the establishment and evaluation of the military's objective professional standards without denigrating his professional integrity. According to Janowitz's "constabulary" concept, the professional soldier will share a close partnership with his civilian superiors. It will make him "politically sensitive," but it will not result in the wholesale sublimation of the soldier's traditional military standards and values.

The professional soldier must develop more skills and orientations common to civilian administrators. Yet the effectiveness of the military establishment depends upon maintaining a proper balance between military technologists, heroic leaders, and military managers...The constabulary officer performs his duties, which include fighting, because he is a professional with a sense of self-esteem and moral worth...To deny or destroy the difference between the military and the civilian cannot produce similarity, but runs the risk of creating new forms of tension and un-anticipated militarism.⁶⁴

The convergence pattern which Janowitz envisages might result in military leaders who are non-partisan, discrete, politically integrated officers whose professional orientation reflects a pragmatic, political-military outlook. While their objective professional standards would be subordinated to civilian direction and their subjective normative values would be integrated with those of the civilian society, these "constabular" officers would consciously essay

an administratively neutral role in government that would safeguard their professional integrity while insuring their continued political responsiveness and functional effectiveness.

Unfortunately, Janowitz's hopes have not been realized. The convergence which has occurred since 1960 has many of the features of the "constabular model"--civilian political direction of professional military standards, a professional military outlook that is highly cognizant of "non-military" factors, severely restricted professional autonomy, and the "civilianization" of the military's subjective values. Janowitz's model of convergence has, however, lent itself to a distortion inherent in its tendency to discount the functional necessity of professional military autonomy. The convergence of the military's objective internal controls (professionalism) with the civil society's external political controls has been so extensive that the military subsystem has lost much of its traditional administrative neutrality and professional integrity. The political cooption of the military's objective internal controls--the designed reorientation of military professionalism by civil and military elites--has contributed to a significant "civilianization" and "politicalization" of the military's senior leaders. To a certain extent, this convergence has eroded the senior military leaders' professional detachment, organizational skepticism, unique military expertise and pragmatic political objectivity.

The post-1960 pattern of civil-military convergence, characterized in part by the military officer corps' sublimation of professional autonomy, has increased the military's political responsiveness to the chief executive, decreased its functional effectiveness, and encouraged latent aspects of "overprofessionalization."

For example, the concern of senior military officers with the social and political implications of military policies, particularly their impact on the

President's domestic political support, has in recent years become quite extensive. In the past decade, this over-identification with the President's political interests has frequently led the senior military leaders to publicly indorse administration policies which they had previously opposed within the executive branch on the grounds that the proposed policies were unsound in terms of the military's objective professional standards and operational requirements. As professional military advisors to the President and Congress, the Joint-Chiefs were in an excellent position, and some might add, they had an administrative responsibility, to openly question and thereby draw attention to the muddled military assumptions, the narrow institutional interests, and the poorly defined objectives that determined many of these ill-advised governmental policies. Unfortunately, because they had, to a substantial extent, been coopted by a form of civil-military convergence that facilitated political responsiveness at the expense of professional autonomy, these military leaders became apologists and architects of military policies that were not viable and which ultimately degraded both their profession and their country.

The documents in the Pentagon Papers and the incongruously optimistic public statements of the military's senior leaders during the Vietnam War strongly suggest that excessive convergence between the military profession's internal objective controls and the external controls imposed by the larger civil society undermines the minimal degree of civil-military divergence that is essential for the maintenance of objective professional standards within the military profession.

If the military's internal subjective controls are different from and incompatible with the social, moral and political values of the superior civil society, the military is liable to become a discordant, unsympathetic pressure group in the political process. This may cause the military to attempt to

play a substantive political role and use its organizational influence to help establish governmental policy goals which reflect the military's, not civil society's, internal subjective values. Adhering to subjective norms at odds with the dominant civilian socio-political values, such a military subsystem may easily come to believe that its exogenous values are superior to those of the larger system it serves. It may then attempt to isolate itself from the "inferior" normative values of the civil society as the US Army did between 1870 and 1910, or establish itself as the political master and moral teacher of a "corrupt" civil society as the Greek Colonels did in 1967, or align itself with those civilian political elements which appear to embody its internal subjective values as the French military did in 1958-1959. Consequently, in the interests of maintaining the military's political responsiveness and partisan neutrality, and in order to forestall the development of political hostility and dysfunctional tension between the military and its civilian masters, the military profession's internal subjective values probably should be integrated with those of the larger socio-political system it serves as Janowitz's convergence paradigm suggests.

However, if civil-military convergence should, for the sake of political stability, eliminate or substantially modify the subjective normative differences between the two sectors, it does not necessarily follow that the military's objective professional standards should be similarly integrated with or strictly oriented to the external controls of the civil society it serves. Some circumscribed sphere of autonomy within which the military may develop its internal organizational expertise and objective standards may be necessary for the furtherance of the military subsystem's continued functional effectiveness. What the political leaders want is important; what the objective facts allow is also important. If the military skews its internal objective controls in

such a way that the standards of professionalism are subordinated to the partisan or institutional political interest of the military's civilian superiors, there is a real danger that the military policy will be made in a vacuum.

While Janowitz recognizes the problem inherent in the civil-military convergence paradigm he proposes, his emphasis in The Professional Soldier on the need to integrate the military's internal subjective values with those of the civil society it serves leads him to underestimate the difficulty of maintaining within the military subsystem a salutary degree of objective professionalism. Certainly divergence between the military's internal subjective controls and the normative values of civil society is potentially one of the gravest threats to functional civil-military relations in any political system. Yet, in the current American political context, functional civil-military relations may be threatened by an excessive convergence between the military's objective professionalism and the civil society's external controls, particularly the political guidance that the government's executive branch exercises over the military's professional leaders.

In a recent paper, Janowitz notes that the erosion of the senior military leaders' independent professional judgment had tragic consequences for America's Vietnam policy. Prior to 1960, many military leaders, remembering the bitter frustrations of Korea, were strongly opposed to any deployment of American ground combat units to the Asian mainland. These military officers, members of the "never again club," initially resisted intervention in Southeast Asia. However, if the government ignored their advice and decided to commit US forces to Indochina, such a military intervention, if it was to have a minimal chance of success, would require, they declared, a US ground force of 1,000,000 to 1,200,000 combat troops. From a military perspective, anything less would not

be practicable. Yet, in 1965, those military leaders whose attitude towards a military intervention in Indochina had not changed, quietly went along with an administration policy that they had excellent reason to believe was militarily unsound.

It remains to be explained why the US military did not follow its own professional judgment. The appropriate form of dissent would have been a token resignation of the Chief of Staff, particularly the Chief of Staff of the ground forces, when he was assigned a task that he believed could obviously not be achieved with the resources placed at his disposal. The publication of the Pentagon Papers has probably postponed an analysis of the central issue since the answer lies not in examination of specific documents, but in the analysis of the workings of a military bureaucracy which in effect has become "overprofessionalized"--more prepared to follow orders than to exercise independent professional skill and judgment.⁶⁵

Thus, excessive congruency or convergence between the military establishment's internal objective controls and the external controls imposed by civil society may gradually undermine the minimal degree of civil-military divergence that is essential for the cultivation of a salutary sense of political detachment and professional responsibility in the state's senior military leaders. As the following case studies suggest, General Ridgway understood this dilemma and consequently opposed the extreme civil-military convergence syndrome; Generals MacArthur and Taylor, however, did not, and in their opposite ways may have facilitated it.

CHAPTER 2

GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR

World War II once again validated Hamilton's observation in the Federalist Papers that, "It is the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of legislative authority."¹ Unlike the traditional pattern of events that had occurred in all previous post-war periods--the reduction of the military establishment to or near its ante bellum strength, the re-assertion of congressional influence in the national policy process, and a general weakening of presidential power--the post-World War II period was quite different. The reason for this difference is attributed to the fact that America committed itself to the principle of international collective security on a permanent basis. Shortly thereafter, the US became the political, economic, and military leader of the multinational Western Bloc which confronted its nemesis, the Soviet Bloc, in an increasingly rigid bipolar international political system.²

This radical change in the orientation, the objectives, and the methods of American foreign policy had a massive effect upon the military policy process of the American government. In the post-war period it is posited that the following trends (some of which were not to be altered until the late 1960's) characterized the national defense policy process:

- 1) Presidential influence in the defense policy process increased at the expense of Congress' influence.
- 2) Congressional control over foreign and military policy generally declined, although there were occasional and temporary reversals of this trend (1951, 1958-1960).
- 3) The size and strength of the national military establishment was greatly increased, yet the substantive administrative influence of the

senior military chiefs in both the national and the executive policy process steadily declined, e.g., in 1954, General Ridgway exerted more influence over administration policy than his counterpart, General Johnson, did in 1965.

4) After an initial decline (1946-1948), the defense budget was sharply increased and thereafter, despite periods of retrenchment following the Korean and Vietnam Wars, remained a substantial portion of the national budget, frequently exceeding 50% of the total federal budget.³ From 1954 to 1972, defense expenditures fluctuated in a narrow range between 7% and 10% of the American GNP.

5) While both the President and Congress generally supported large defense budgets, the pre-1940 pattern which had found the President and the military in an alliance against annual congressional efforts to cut the military's budget, was occasionally reversed. In 1957, 1959, 1961, 1962, 1963 and 1967, Congress voted a larger defense budget than the President had requested.⁴

6) Most public dissents by senior military officers against administration policies were triggered by reductions in the military budgets ordered by the executive.

7) Attempts by the Joint Chiefs to use their political influence with Congress to oppose, offset, or modify an administration's military budget policy met with limited, and as the years progressed, declining success.

8) The rapid unification of the armed services and the centralization of administrative authority over the military establishment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) fostered a Jacksonian model of administration within the military profession. It also attenuated traditional congressional-military relations and political alliances.

9) The national defense policy process became an increasingly closed circle within the executive branch.

10) The politicalization of the senior military officer corps gradually undermined their administrative neutrality and professional integrity.

If one views the post-1945 pattern of American civil-military relations through the prism of the Truman-MacArthur controversy that racked the American political system in 1951, many of the developments cited above seem ludicrous. While they suggest a gradual trend towards a vague form of presidential caesarism, the MacArthur episode epitomized, at least superficially, the contrary threat to civil control--praetorianism. Yet this perspective is somewhat deceptive. In the long run MacArthur may have unwittingly enhanced the drift towards unbalanced, excessive presidential control of the military.

General Douglas MacArthur was a fiercely proud military professional, a soldier in the classic "heroic warrior" mode.⁵ However, unlike most other "heroic warrior" types such as Patton and Halsey, General MacArthur was a quasi-public partisan politician. For years prior to his public campaign against the Democratic President Truman, MacArthur had been identified with the Republican Party. Unlike the vast majority of his professional military peers, he took few pains to minimize his public identification with a partisan political group. An uncontrollable penchant to play a leading public role in domestic partisan politics propelled the General into his fatal clash with President Truman. His well-known and publicly vocal partisan beliefs underwrote his rather disingenuous assertion that the dramatic dissent he made from the Truman administration's established foreign policy in 1950-1951 was based on strictly non-political, professional military grounds.

Had he been only a professional soldier untainted by a publicly partisan identification--a Patton or a Pershing--or, as he put it so well and so falsely before Congress in 1951, "...an old soldier who tried to do his duty as God gave him the light to see that duty,"⁶ MacArthur may have had a more influential and perhaps beneficial effect upon the thrust of American civil-military relations and the developing administrative patterns that were slowly undermining the American military officer's traditional sense of professional responsibility.

MacArthur falls into that curious and relatively impotent group of professional military officers who lent their support to partisan political interests, usually to secure for themselves a presidential nomination, while still on active duty--Winfield Scott, George McClellan, Winfield Scott Hancock, and Leonard Wood.⁷ They were the generals who failed in their attempt to reach the Presidency. Like these officers (with the exception of Hancock who was a genuine anomaly), MacArthur's flamboyant antics flouted the norms of the military profession and earned him the bitter enmity of a substantial and influential segment of the military establishment.

Douglas MacArthur was a "political soldier," a phenomenon comparatively rare in American experience, though by no means previously unknown...MacArthur never had "the Army" (much less the Navy or the Marines) behind him; he never spoke for a military interest as such, even though many military men were to agree with his positions. From an early date he had taken a close interest in partisan politics; he was prepared to use his prestige as a soldier to influence civil policy decisions, and the arguments of military necessity to override the diplomatic or political objectives of his civilian superiors.⁸
[emphasis added]

When the JCS publicly endorsed Truman's Korean War policies and his stormy dismissal of MacArthur in April, 1951, Senator Robert Taft, Ohio (R), a staunch but wary supporter of MacArthur (he incorrectly feared that MacArthur might siphon off Taft delegates at the 1952 Republican Presidential Convention),

angrily accused the JCS of crass political subservience to the Truman Democratic administration.⁹ While there was some truth to this charge (General Bradley, Chairman of the JCS, gave a number of quasi-partisan speeches on behalf of the Truman administration),¹⁰ Taft completely underestimated the professional and personal ill-feelings that many senior military leaders held towards MacArthur. While they respected his erratic military genius (MacArthur, like most great captains of history, based his military strategy on intuition and an almost reckless willingness to take unusual risks, he won big and he lost big; the only anomaly is that his armies suffered surprisingly few casualties), the JCS had suffered through MacArthur's insulting insubordination for many months. They particularly despised the close-knit "Bataan" clique which constituted General MacArthur's surprisingly small personal/professional network. Within the military establishment, Truman Joint Chiefs (Collins, Bradley and Vandenburg at least) had been disciples of MacArthur's professional rival, General George C. Marshall. By April, 1951, they were uniformly fed up with MacArthur's habit of treating them as junior officers, which of course, in comparison with MacArthur, they were. When Bradley, the oldest member of the JCS, was a grammar school student in Missouri in 1906, Lieutenant MacArthur was serving in Washington, D. C. as President Theodore Roosevelt's aide-de-camp.¹¹

Ironically, for an individual who had played such a critical role in the US Army since 1918, the vast majority of MacArthur's followers and admirers were outside the military, frequently to be found in the right wing of the Republican Party. MacArthur had more extensive and influential political contacts with important civilian elites than any other officer of his era. In this respect, he was reminiscent of the powerful but unlucky General Leonard Wood.¹² Yet, his civilian political allies, despite their passionate devotion to his cause

were never able to accomplish much on MacArthur's behalf. If the military generally rejected MacArthur because of his disdain for professional norms, the American public, while it enthusiastically responded to MacArthur's well-crafted theatrics and deservedly heroic image, evidently felt that because he was clearly a vehicle of partisan political interests, he was unsuited for the presidency. Traditionally, the American electorate has responded favorably to the professional military hero's quest for the presidency so long as he has, like Taylor, Grant and Eisenhower, displayed no evident inclination for domestic politics prior to his maiden run for the highest office in the land. MacArthur's fatal political error was to prematurely shed the exalted aura of the great general who stands above politics. For all his numerous and long-standing political connections with influential Republicans, MacArthur was in many respects politically naive. While Eisenhower's adroit political maneuvering between 1947 and 1952 may have been somewhat disingenuous, it certainly was not naive. Evidently, the belief that a professional military leader should avoid the aura of partisan politics while on active duty is shared by both the professional officer corps and the public it serves.¹³

The General's ties with the Republican Party went back many years. His grandfather had been prominent in the Wisconsin Republican Party. MacArthur's father, an illustrious professional officer, was an admirer and favorite of President Theodore Roosevelt. He rose to the rank of Lieutenant General before retiring in 1909, shortly after completing a widely-praised tour of duty as Commanding Officer and Governor General of the Phillipines.¹⁴ During the two years he served as President Roosevelt's aide-de-camp (1906-1908), Douglas MacArthur learned a great deal about Washington politics and the heroic style of a popular leader. In his memoirs he wrote:

I greatly admired Theodore Roosevelt. His prophetic vision of Asian politics marked him a statesman of brilliant imagination...To an unprecedented degree, regardless of party, he had the support of the public. His vigor, courage, abounding vitality, his lack of presidential pomposity, his familiarity with all manner of men, even his loudness of action and utterance, stimulated all to raise themselves above the ordinary level.¹⁵

He came of age during the optimistic era of "Peace, Prosperity and Progress." Its cocksure values, strengths, and fallacies never left him. To a large extent this may explain the remarkably favorable response of the public to the returning hero in 1951. In the midst of confusing international and domestic political events that were frustrating, frightening, and fundamentally at odds with the traditional values, experiences and public self-images that many Americans held, MacArthur returned to the US not as a saviour on horseback, but as a quintessentially nostalgic figure who recalled or suggested to millions a golden age of heroic confidence and natural innocence. If this memory of an unrecoverable past contributed to MacArthur's public appeal, it also undercut his chances for the Presidency. However much they may have appreciated the old values, few Americans were prepared to return, as MacArthur advocated, to the social systems and political programs of Teddy Roosevelt's era. MacArthur's extraordinary popularity, like nostalgia, depended on distance to weave its effect. On closer examination, MacArthur was far less noble and the "good old days" far less desirable.¹⁶

The Army is a hybrid organization--a bureaucracy of professionals.¹⁷ This uneasy alliance of the bureaucratic and the professional world view generates constant but functional tensions within the officer corps. Conflicts revolving around this basic dichotomy and subsidiary issues that spin off from it (alternative strategies, functional roles, technical expertise, branch specializations) are endemic.¹⁸ The informal structures which characterize the officer corps reflect upon the organizational factions and the key personal

networks which arise in response to these conflicts. The personal networks and alliances are critical for they undermine (to the long-run benefit of the military) the homogeneous character of the officer corps. They are one of the central variables which make up what Janowitz calls, "group biography in an organizational setting."¹⁹

Frequently, those officers who rise to the top in the military are, at one time or another in their careers, the protégé of one or more of the half-dozen senior officers who give the profession its characteristic style and organizational direction at any particular time. Moreover, the young officers who will eventually become senior generals, the "comers," not only tend to identify with certain leading generals, but they often consciously carry on a specific "tradition" or factional perspective traceable back to the influence of a former senior military leader.²⁰ During World War II, for example, two network groups developed; the overwhelmingly dominate Marshall faction concentrated in the European Theater of Operations, and the much smaller and less influential network that collected around MacArthur. During the Vietnam era, Generals Lemnitzer, Harkins, Wheeler, Westmoreland, Depuy, Palmer and Kinnard were either close associates or protégés of General Maxwell Taylor.²¹ General Matthew Ridgway and General James Gavin, along with Taylor, constituted the famous "airborne" network that dominated the Army in the fifties and early sixties. All three were protégés of Marshall and Eisenhower. In his autobiography, Ridgway discusses the influence of personal networks in the officer corps:

In all my years in the service, I have never seen any evidence of an "Army clique," a small group within the service whose members protect each other and pass out the top jobs among themselves. There is though, definitely this mutual evaluation and assessment of an officer's talents and capabilities that goes on throughout the years of his service. And many an officer does get his big opportunities because some higher commanding

officer has known him for years and has confidence in him. In my own case, certainly, that door of opportunity opened to me because two magnificent soldiers, Generals Frank R. McCoy and George C. Marshall, had come to know and have faith in me.²²

Marshall, in turn, had distinguished himself as a brilliant staff officer in World War I and became a favorite of Pershing's.²³ Had it not been for the intercession of Generals McCoy and Pershing in the 1930's, it is unlikely that Franklin Roosevelt would have chosen Marshall to be Chief of Staff in 1939.²⁴ Thus, in the "old Army" at least, promotion to the senior military ranks depended upon the individual's demonstrated merit, his professional reputation, and his relationship to the factions and personal networks which structured the officer corps.

What is striking about MacArthur is that in his meteoric rise he had few, if any, important senior military patrons. On the contrary, MacArthur was personally disliked by many key senior officers. Throughout the first 28 years of service, his unbridled egotism, brilliance and innovative style amazed and irritated the Army's Old Guard. A probable exception was General Leonard Wood, one of Theodore Roosevelt's inner circle, Army Chief of Staff from 1910-1914, and an important figure in the Republican Party. MacArthur was hand-picked for Wood's General Staff in 1913 and, evidently, the two got on very well. There were 38 officers on the General Staff in 1913, and MacArthur was the youngest.²⁵

The antipathy between Wood and Pershing ran deep. Pershing, an austere, non-partisan, professional, believed that Wood had disgraced himself and the officer corps with his flamboyant attacks upon President Wilson's military policies and his unremitting involvement in partisan politics. Wood had little support in the Army's senior ranks. The leading commanders of World War I agreed with Pershing that Wood was a glory-seeking egomaniac and a dangerously

insubordinate "political general."²⁶ The attitude of Pershing and his associates towards Wood, and their role in Wood's downfall, bears a striking similarity to the struggle between Truman's Joint Chiefs and MacArthur in 1950-1951. However, unlike Truman, Wilson, in concert with Pershing, was able to isolate his potentially troublesome political general.

Pershing and other senior officers were not unaware of MacArthur's connection to Wood. However, MacArthur proved to be an unsurpassed commander and skillful publicity-seeker in World War I. While he never became close to Pershing, the A.E.F. Commander and the Old Guard had a high respect for MacArthur's battlefield courage and proven leadership abilities. On the strength of his remarkable war record and, no doubt, in part due to his budding political connections and his unmatched flair for publicity, MacArthur was assigned to West Point and became the youngest Superintendent (he was 39) that the Military Academy has ever had. In his abbreviated tour as Superintendent (1919-1921), MacArthur introduced a series of sensible reforms that had a salutary effect upon many aspects of the cadets' academic and military environment. His reforms brought the Military Academy up to date with the social, political and educational realities of the Twentieth Century. It is generally acknowledged that MacArthur was the most progressive and intelligent Superintendent the Academy has had to date, notwithstanding the brilliant accomplishments of Thayer, Lee and Taylor.²⁷ In many respects, his tour as Superintendent was a dress rehearsal for his "Overlordship" of Japan, where his methods and goals were quite the same and similarly effective. However, the much-needed reforms MacArthur forced upon an unreconstructed "Old Guard" faculty and a less-than-enthusiastic Army Staff generated intense opposition.

When the new Harding administration decided it was necessary, in the interests of "Normalcy," to make substantial cuts in the Army budget, Chief of Staff Pershing advised the President and Congress that this was an unwise move

because, "our present combat strength will be insufficient to fulfill the functions required by our national defense policy."²⁸ Having registered his mild protest in an appropriate forum, Pershing then accepted without further dissent the President's decision. MacArthur, however, in a manner uncomfortably reminiscent of Wood and Mahan, publicly railed against the cuts and attempted to use his influence in Congress to get more funds for West Point. While some of his political friends on Capitol Hill were receptive to his pleas, MacArthur had unwisely over-reached himself. With the support of the War Department and the silent applause of many senior generals, Pershing moved quickly to suppress MacArthur's outspokenness. In November, 1921, MacArthur's tour of duty as Superintendent was prematurely ended (a normal tour was four years). Much to his muffled dismay (no mention of this incident is made in his Reminiscences), MacArthur was exiled to the Phillipines.

But neither MacArthur's genius nor his popularity with the rising politicians in the Republican Party could be blocked indefinitely by the Old Guard's hostility. During his third tour in the Phillipines (1928-1930), MacArthur became a confidant of President Taft's last Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, who was then serving as Governor-General.²⁹ Stimson's high regard for MacArthur's abilities may have been a factor in President Hoover's surprising decision to elevate MacArthur to Army Chief of Staff in 1930. In 1929, the popular young general, who had always made excellent press copy, had been mentioned for the Republican presidential nomination.³⁰ As Huntington notes, MacArthur's ambition went well beyond the normal constraints of his military profession, "From the start, MacArthur had been a brilliant soldier, but always something more than a soldier: a controversial, ambitious, transcendent figure, too able, too assured, too talented to be confined within the limits of professional function and responsibility."³¹

Hoover's decision outraged the Army's senior officers. Pershing, whose extraordinary promotions, like MacArthur's, reflected some partisan political influence, supported General Fox T. Conners, a close associate (who, as Pershing's Chief of Operations in World War I had been Marshall's immediate superior) for the post.³² At the relatively junior age of 50, MacArthur was (and still is) the youngest officer ever appointed to the position of Army Chief of Staff.

In 1929, convinced that the military budgets were excessive, Hoover ordered the Army Staff to make a survey identifying those areas where cuts could be made without sacrificing essential functions and services. To the President's chagrin, the generals reported that their survey indicated substantial increases in the Army's budget were immediately needed. A year later, as the deepening Depression generated additional pressures for cuts in the military budgets, Hoover decided to shake up the Army General Staff and awaken them to the economic realities that dictated severe reductions in the Army's budget. The appointment of MacArthur had the desired effect. It began the close political and personal relationship that existed between Hoover and General MacArthur over the next 33 years. With his accession to Chief of Staff, MacArthur became a member of the Republican Party establishment.

During Hoover's Administration, General MacArthur worked closely with Secretary of War, Patrick Hurley, to squelch objections within the Army to the President's budget cuts. It was quite a reversal from his 1921 attitude towards presidential cuts in the military budget:

...he showed on numerous occasions that he placed the nation above the military services, particularly in supporting military spending cuts which appeared to be in the overall interest of the economy. Shortly after his appointment, he offered a refreshing contrast to the arrogant Air Corps officers who strenuously resisted any attempts to limit their funds...In late

1930, he testified that the military appropriations bill, down \$100,000,000 from the previous year to \$434,200,000, represented "the proper balance..between the financial structure of the Government and its provision for national defense".³³

During the campaign year of 1932, congressional Democrats led by the Chairman of the House Military Appropriations Subcommittee, Ross Collins, Miss. (D), attempted to reduce the administration's Army budget by cutting the officer corps from 12,000 to 10,000 and shifting a larger percentage of the Army budget to the exploitation of technological innovations, i.e., the tank and the airplane. A smaller, more technically intensive Army, it was argued, could use advanced military weapons to offset reductions in military manpower strength. The President, MacArthur, and most of the officer corps, opposed the plan. The Air Corps officers, who had been consistently opposed by the Chief of Staff in their zealous campaign to increase funding for the Air Corps, openly sided with Collins. Although a bill containing the Democratic recommendations passed the House, Hoover's threat of a veto and MacArthur's skillful lobbying on Capitol Hill led to the bill's defeat in the Senate.

MacArthur's control over his professional subordinates was unusually firm. Unlike their naval counterparts, who protested frequently and publicly against Hoover's budget reductions, few Army officers (outside of the Air Corps) were prepared to challenge both the President and the imperious Chief of Staff. Not until late 1932 did MacArthur begin to press for an increase in the Army's budget and then his complaints were directed against the Democratic Congress. The harmony that existed between MacArthur and Hoover reflected a convergence of political views just as the stormy relationships that developed between MacArthur and Hoover's Democratic successors reflected a sharp difference in political beliefs. The partisan element in MacArthur's actions is consistent and striking:

MacArthur's attitudes during the Hoover Administration do not suggest a progressive, innovative mind, but rather a fairly conservative mind, well capable of subordination to the conservative civilian leadership. Loyalty to Hoover precluded over-enthusiastic support for new Army programs...He served Hoover well as an administrator, organizer and leader. The degree of his support for economy within the Army to assist the nation's economic recovery was unusual for a military leader. The President regarded MacArthur very highly, perhaps in part because the General was so in tune with his political ideas.³⁴ [emphasis added]

MacArthur's last three years as Army Chief of Staff under Roosevelt were bitter and acrimonious. Unlike 1950-1951, however, there was not a strong, Republican congressional opposition that MacArthur could appeal to in his difficulties with the President. Although the gulf between MacArthur and Franklin Roosevelt was intensely personal and political, it was also institutional. For Roosevelt's plans to cut the Army's strength went well beyond Hoover's. Aside from his obvious partisan opposition to Roosevelt, MacArthur was genuinely concerned with protecting the military's organizational interests.³⁵ Partly in deference to MacArthur's strenuous objections, the fortuitous decision to use the Army in the CCC program, and rising international tensions, Roosevelt reduced the size of the planned cuts. While the strength of the officer corps declined slightly between 1933 and 1935 (MacArthur's last year as Chief of Staff), overall Army strength increased from 136,547 to 139,486.³⁶ The Army budget, however, declined from \$335,000,000 in 1932, to \$284,000,000 in 1935.³⁷

World War II revived MacArthur's fading military career and public popularity. It also rekindled his thinly veiled aspirations for the Presidency. To a certain extent, MacArthur was sidetracked in a low priority theater of operations, the Southwest Pacific, by the Roosevelt administration in order to deny him the military glory and national publicity he avidly sought. As usual,

the General made the very best of an unfavorable situation. Neither defeat nor grandiose theatrics dimmed MacArthur's unusual grip on the imagination of the American public. Throughout the duration of the four-sided war which he waged with consummate skill against the Japanese, the US Navy, the War Department, and the Democratic administration, MacArthur took careful pains to keep his domestic popularity high and his political connections with the Republican Party intact. Against the Japanese he used a brilliant "island-hopping" strategy; against the Democrats, Army Chief of Staff Marshall, and the Navy he used his numerous and artful press conferences. American newspapers, the majority of which were published by Republican sympathizers, were eager to trumpet the exploits of,

...a general with arch-Republican sympathies while at the same time, denigrating the role of the Democratic Commander-in-Chief, implying that he could have done more to win the war and bring the boys home quicker. MacArthur was in touch with Republican interests in the States. His political campaign was aimed over the heads of those in Washington...at the ultimate power base, the people.³⁸

MacArthur continually denounced the administration's policy of defeating Hitler first and relegating the Southwest Pacific Theater to a second-level priority. There was no significant domestic opposition to Roosevelt's war policies; consequently, MacArthur's well-publicized complaints never became an effective partisan issue for the Republican Party during the war. There was, however, a vague movement in the Republican Party as early as February, 1942, to "groom" MacArthur to plan McClellan to Roosevelt's Lincoln.³⁹ Senator Arthur Vandenberg, Mich. (R), (who was promoting MacArthur's name in Republican circles), the General, and Franklin Roosevelt were playing a very shrewd political game. The President fully understood the political threat to his own power base that MacArthur represented. It was not only to please the bitterly anti-MacArthur Admirals, Nimitz and King, that Roosevelt declined to

unify the Pacific Theater of Operations under MacArthur as Supreme Allied Commander. Throughout the war, Roosevelt kept his political opponent on a "short string" as much for political as strategic reasons.

While publicly denying his interest in the 1944 presidential race, MacArthur was pleased by the increasingly public efforts of Vandenberg, Hoover, Representative Hamilton Fish, N.Y. (R), Representative Claire Booth Luce, Conn. (R), the Hearst Press, The Chicago Tribune, and the Scripps-Howard papers to draft him for the Republican nomination. Despite Army regulations prohibiting "political activities" by active duty officers, MacArthur's steady political correspondence with the President's most bitter partisan opponents frequently "leaked" to the press.⁴⁰ One leak backfired and abruptly dampened the MacArthur boomlet. It was a prototype of the infamous 1951 MacArthur-Martin letter. Congressman A. L. Miller, Neb. (R), had written a letter to MacArthur in which he stated: "Unless the New Deal can be stopped this time, our American way of life is forever doomed." In his reply MacArthur wrote: "I do unreservedly agree with the complete wisdom and statesmanship of your comments."⁴¹ Henry Stimson, MacArthur's old patron, and now Roosevelt's Secretary of War, was outraged at what he regarded to be the General's effrontery to proper military discipline and the national war effort. He publicly reiterated Army regulations which banned all forms of political activity by professional officers.⁴² This led to a bitter internal party squabble between influential Republicans and caused MacArthur to publicly disavow any intent to undercut the President's authority during a period of national crisis.

In 1948, while MacArthur was occupying Japan as the American reformist Overlord, a second, but better organized, political effort was made by MacArthur's right-wing Republican supporters to draft him for the Presidency. Again, MacArthur disobeyed the spirit, at least, of military regulations which forbade

partisan political activity by Regular Army officers on active duty. During the immediate post-war years, Truman's initial conciliatory gestures to the Soviets had caused MacArthur, a fanatical anti-Communist ideologue (he died convinced that the 1932 Bonus Marchers were attempting a Communist revolution), to assume that Truman was a naive, inept leader who was over his head in the Presidency and surrounded by a cabal of influential appeasers. Truman and MacArthur sporadically clashed over Japanese occupation policy, but other than increasing MacArthur's distrust of the President, nothing of a serious nature developed.⁴³

1948 was again too premature for MacArthur's right-wing ideology. In a campaign dominated by domestic considerations, MacArthur was a distant and irrelevant candidate. Moreover, Senator Taft, Ohio (R), had cornered the Republican Party's right-wing as he did four years later. Again MacArthur lent his name to partisan political activities on his behalf while still declining to retire from the military profession and campaign actively as a private citizen. MacArthur was old-fashioned enough to believe that a "man of destiny" should be propelled by popular acclaim into high office; that to campaign in mufti at the level of an ordinary political candidate was demeaning to a man of his historic stature. Wisconsin, his "home state," was to be the jump-off point for a string of successful presidential primaries. Harold Stassen, who received the strong support of Wisconsin Senator Joseph A. McCarthy, won the primary. Of 27 possible delegates, MacArthur's candidates took a paltry eight. His candidacy immediately collapsed. At the national convention he received a humiliating 11 out of 1,094 votes on the first ballot.⁴⁴ In 1952, he vainly attempted to turn his triumphant return to the US, following his dismissal by Truman, into a vehicle for the Republican nomination. However much the Republicans were willing to exploit his popularity on behalf of their

partisan interests that year, they were not prepared to consider MacArthur for the presidential nomination. He was too old (72); too controversial (especially after the Senate hearings in the spring of 1951 revealed the extent to which MacArthur had actively sabotaged the administration's policy and disobeyed basic military orders), Taft had totally preempted the conservative Republican bloc, and now the Republicans had a genuine war hero whose popularity exceeded even that of MacArthur--Eisenhower.⁴⁵

Given MacArthur's long identification as a partisan of the Republican Party, his abortive efforts to challenge President Truman's Korean policies are not surprising. MacArthur's vituperative dissents which he claimed were non-political in nature, based solely upon his professional military judgment, and simply pointed to the fundamental requirements of "military necessity", were also motivated by his strong partisan prejudices and ideological beliefs. He was not only questioning and publicly rejecting the instrumental aspects of the government's military policy, but furthermore, he was going far beyond his administrative duties and professional expertise to openly challenge the administration's foreign policy methods and objectives. Ostensibly a subordinate theater commander charged solely with the execution of established policy, MacArthur was able to assert a substantive political role in the national policy process because of Truman's domestic political weakness and the hesitant supervision of the Joint Chiefs who had fallen into the dangerous habit of constantly deferring to the General's "experience, rank, and reputation, to his intense emotional involvement in the Far East, an involvement they did not share, and to his unmeasured but possibly dangerous political potency as a man cultivated and admired by the Republican party leaders."⁴⁶

MacArthur's call for a preventive air-sea war that would destroy China's war-making potential (he was consistently opposed to sending any US ground troops into the Asian mainland) reflected less the exigencies of the military

struggle in Korea than his long-standing ideological goal of using US military force in a global crusade to destroy Communism. It also ignored America's actual and potential military strength and totally overestimated the efficacy of US air power.⁴⁷ Moreover, as one of his many critics, the strategist, Bernard Brodie, has noted, MacArthur also,

...underrated the ability of the forces under his command to regain the upper hand despite the restrictions [Truman's decision not to use military force against the China mainland] that so irked him...he insisted for a month and a half that these restrictions probably made it impossible for him to realize even his minimal task of maintaining a bridgehead in Korea. He was chagrined and his public comments showed it, when Ridgway began to prove in late January, 1951 that he was able to take the offensive and succeed in it spectacularly despite those same restrictions.⁴⁸

The blatant, unscrupulous manner in which MacArthur registered his opposition to the President's established policies, e.g., the carefully pre-arranged political correspondence with House Speaker Martin, Mass. (R), his partisan-tinged statements to the VFW in September, 1950, and his unprecedented use of the world press to launch a verbal political barrage against the Truman administration, violated all professional military norms.⁴⁹ MacArthur was a zealous partisan politician who also happened to be a senior military officer. The General was simply using military prestige and office to advance personal and partisan interests. As Huntington points out, such a self-conceived, overtly partisan, ideological role which MacArthur essayed, separated him from the mainstream of the military officer corps;

The MacArthur ideology which evolved in the 1920's and 1930's was essentially religious, mystical and emotional, contrasted with the normally practical, realistic and materialistic approach of the professional soldier...In contrast to the professional stress on military force in being, he emphasized the moral and spiritual aspects of war and the importance of the citizen-soldier. In contrast to the bulk of the officer corps, MacArthur viewed the threats to the US as arising from

insidious political philosophies, rather than from other nation states of equal or superior material strength...The professional officer exists in a world of grays. MacArthur's universe was one of blacks and whites and loud and clashing colors. His articulate and varying views reflected a continuing quest for beliefs and policies which would satisfy his own ideological inclinations and at the same time inspire favorable popular response.⁵⁰

In his last dissent, MacArthur carried the Whig model of administration to its ultimate extreme. The subordinate executive official not only used his authority to influence and shape governmental policy, but further, he sought to subvert the policy previously established and replace it with one more in accord with his own personal and partisan interests. Such an extreme exercise of discretionary authority, while theoretically inherent in the Whig model, so distorts the concept of the subordinate administrator's professional responsibility that it transforms him from a quasi-independent actor in the political process into a dangerously partisan combatant. The inevitable result, as evidenced in MacArthur's case, is the corruption of professionalism and the subversion of the political policy process.

An extreme version of the Whig model of administration is highly compatible with a charismatic style of leadership.⁵¹ In both, the personal authority of the individual is emphasized. Through the successful amplification of personality, the subordinate executive official's political power is blown up out of all proportion to his functional role. It thus enables him to transcend the normal professional and bureaucratic limits of his governmental position. Because MacArthur's messianic, quasi-mystical belief in his special historic destiny led him to define honor and duty in personal rather than professional or bureaucratic terms, he was remarkably insensitive to the political limiting factors that circumscribed his subordinate administrative position in the executive branch.

Within his profession, MacArthur was an authentic original. His early career is remarkable for his lack of involvement in the important personal networks that connected the successive generations of Army officers.⁵² His identification with the unlucky Wood should have hurt MacArthur's career. It is a testimony to his personal brilliance and charisma that it did not. MacArthur had associates, subordinates, and admirers, but no peers. Unfortunately for MacArthur and the country, despite the unusual and inordinate broadening of his role which transformed him into a partisan political actor and undermined his proper professional functions, MacArthur chose to remain in uniform. The limits of his formal professional-bureaucratic role were too constraining for the partisan political objectives he essayed. The arrogance of certitude so characteristic of charismatic leaders blinded him to this obvious fact.

MacArthur established his own personal network in the military. It was quite similar to the special networks Weber theorized gathered around a charismatic leader.⁵³ The members of the General's "Bataan" clique which, after 1941, became his permanent staff, were united in a dependent, emotional relationship in which a highly personal notion of loyalty to MacArthur prevailed. The officers who remained in this network were an exceedingly mediocre lot. MacArthur demanded and received from his staff such extreme personal loyalty and obsequious deference, that few superior, independent-minded officers (those most likely to rise to the top of the profession) could tolerate the stultifying atmosphere of his "court."⁵⁴ Most personal networks in the military transmitted changing professional values and groomed future senior commanders to carry on the organizational influence of the network's founder. In contrast, MacArthur's network crossed professional boundaries to embrace political and public opinion leaders. Within the military, MacArthur's network lacked depth, cultivated unimaginative syncophants, and had virtually no long-run

effect upon future professional leadership. It is not surprising that within a few years of MacArthur's dismissal from active duty, it evaporated. Outside the mainstream of his profession during most of his career, MacArthur left little behind to build on.⁵⁵

MacArthur embraced a radical convergence or "fusionist" concept of civil-military relations in which the military and political sectors of the government and society share a common system of values, styles, standards and in some cases, functions.

MacArthur vainly attempted to bring about convergence between the military sector and a minority civilian sector--the political right wing. Throughout his career, he frequently subordinated professional values to his political ideology. He saw nothing objectionable in exploiting his military office and prestige in order to further certain partisan interests and ideological values. Because there is a gross, superficial similarity between the traditionally conservative values, styles, and beliefs of the military profession and the authoritarian right-wing political ideology MacArthur espoused, it has frequently and incorrectly been asserted that MacArthur was trying to infuse the civilian sector with military mores.⁵⁶ As his military peers knew only too well, MacArthur, the classic organizational maverick had little support within the officer corps, at least that segment which counted most. The General's most important allies were the civilians who shared his minority political views. Upon learning of MacArthur's dismissal, General Matthew Ridgway, MacArthur's subordinate Commander of the 8th Army in Korea, flew to Tokyo and assumed the UN Far East Command without comment. Senator William Jenner, Ind. (R), on the other hand, called for the President's impeachment.⁵⁷

As his service under Hoover and his actions in World War II and Korea indicate, MacArthur was primarily concerned with the political partisan bias

of civilian control rather than, as he so frequently claimed, the integrity of the military professional's role in government. Very few of his statements dealt solely with military policy.⁵⁸ It was partially MacArthur's radical convergence concept of civil-military relations that ultimately led him to challenge the President's authority, subvert the policy process, and thus threaten the constitutional balance of civilian control. As the MacArthur case demonstrates, a second dilemma of political-military convergence is, "To what, or more significantly, to whose, political ideas were the officers to adhere."⁵⁹

For those civilians whose ideas MacArthur expressed in 1951, radical civil-military convergence was quite proper. The conservative Republicans focused on the substantive content of MacArthur's dissent which benefited their partisan interests. They ignored the unprecedented manner of his dissent which subverted the structure of democratic civilian control, the constitutional chain of command, and the principles of professional responsibility.⁶⁰ The liberal Republicans and the Democrats, on the other hand, focused on the threatening manner of MacArthur's dissent and either ignored or skillfully distorted the substantive content of the policy proposals MacArthur advocated in public opposition to Truman's policies.⁶¹ It is ironic, if understandable, that the Truman Administration thought it necessary (as it was), to enlist the political support of senior military officers in a successful political counter-attack to undercut MacArthur. The MacArthur Hearings witnessed the then unusual spectacle of senior military officers publicly endorsing not only the military, but also the political soundness of the President's foreign policies. If the Truman Chiefs' public advocacy of specific civilian political policies was far more restrained than MacArthur's politicking, it was not completely devoid of partisan overtones.⁶² However, as its primary purpose was to reaffirm the political wisdom and necessity of maintaining constitutional civilian control

of the military rather than to further the personal interests of the JCS or promote the partisan advantage of one political party, it was justified as an extraordinary, emergency measure. Unfortunately, the Truman Chiefs' political advocacy of the administration's position during the MacArthur Hearings became a precedent for the assumption of pro-presidential political advocacy roles by the Joint Chiefs on a routine basis. There is a subtle implication in the quasi-politicalization of the Truman Chiefs that radical civil-military convergence is acceptable if the senior military officers support the politically dominant civilian ideology, eschew overt partisan identification, and subordinate themselves to the executive chain of dependence.

MacArthur's version of radical civil-military convergence was bitterly opposed and it eventually failed, not so much because it violated the principle of civil-military convergence, but rather because it reversed the normative direction of convergence. If radical civil-military convergence is to be established via non-revolutionary means, the impetus for it must come from the civilian sector and it must therefore reflect the dominant civilian ideology. Military leaders like MacArthur who attempt to convert the civilian sector to a minority civilian viewpoint, rarely succeed unless they resort to successful forms of political coercion. It was not the irresponsible subordination of his professional military ethic to partisan political interests that led to MacArthur's downfall, but rather the naive and threatening way he went about it.

After MacArthur, the trend in American civil-military relations was not to depoliticize the military through a reassertion of balanced civilian control, professional military autonomy, and moderate civil-military convergence. Instead, the military was further politicized in accordance with a radical form of civil-military convergence that integrated senior officers into the dominant

civilian-political outlook, encouraged the JCS to assume non-partisan political advocacy roles, undermined the military officer's sense of professional responsibility and autonomy, and ultimately intensified the military's administrative subordination to the political interests of the President.⁶³

CHAPTER 3

GENERAL MATTHEW RIDGWAY

In his confrontations with presidential policies, General Matthew B. Ridgway was what MacArthur claimed to be--a responsible military leader dissenting from presidential policy on professional grounds within the constitutional boundaries of political decorum. Unlike many of his peers on the JCS (Ridgway served as Army Chief of Staff from June, 1953 to June, 1955) and almost all of his successors, Ridgway did not believe that it was the duty of senior military officers to tailor their military advice in support of the partisan political interests of the administration they served. To do so, he believed, was a disservice to the administration, the military profession and ultimately, the country.

During his brief tour as Chief of Staff, Ridgway tried to protect the organizational interests of the Army, the professional integrity of the officer corps, and the principles of constitutional civil control. The advice he gave and the positions he took on proposed defense policies were never based on any considerations other than his professional military assessment. He did not ignore the impact of the many non-military factors which inevitably influence defense policies, nor did he suppose that military requirements alone should determine the policy selected. Ridgway argued, however, that it was outside the functional competence and the administrative responsibility of military leaders to evaluate economic and political factors in the process of formulating military advice. Until a presidential policy decision effecting the Army was made, Ridgway did everything he could legitimately do to influence it. After that, he swallowed his reservations and loyally carried out the executive's policy decision without further question. Nonetheless, he bitterly resented the continuous efforts of his civilian superiors to secure his public endorsement

of those military policies he had opposed within executive councils.

While on active duty, he studiously refrained from initiating public criticism of those governmental policies with which he disagreed. This sublimation of dissent, however, did not extend to the halls of Congress. For Ridgway believed that the appropriate committees of Congress had a legitimate right to hear his professional military opinions and to know, to some limited extent, the positions he had taken on policy proposals within the executive branch. His role, as he conceived it, was that of a professional expert charged with the effective implementation of military policy and equally answerable to Congress and the President for his professional advice and recommendations. The idea then developing, that a senior military officer's dissent from presidential policy should be restricted to the executive councils of government was, Ridgway believed, destructive of balanced civilian control. Moreover, it threatened the principle of professional integrity in that it committed senior military officers to publicly endorse political, often partisan, interests of the President. Once the military chief became the political agent of the President, he would probably lose the legitimate professional authority he enjoyed as an expert military advisor to the government's elected political leaders. The temptation to slant his professional advice in support of narrow political interest would be unavoidable. The quality of the military chief's professional advice would inevitably deteriorate, his functional role in government would become legitimately suspect, and the long-run interests of the nation would be seriously threatened.

Ridgway's efforts to reassert the professional independence and administrative neutrality of the military expert failed. His willingness to inform Congress about the professional doubts he held with regard to the administration's military policies and the positions he had taken during the executive policy

process led to his administrative and political isolation within the executive. Nevertheless, on at least two occasions, his candid, forceful dissent based upon a rigorous professional military assessment of the situation, helped to dissuade President Eisenhower from embarking on an ill-conceived policy of military intervention. Despite considerable political pressure from civilian superiors in the executive branch, Ridgway successfully maintained a salutary balance between the professional and bureaucratic aspects of his military role.

As a concession to Senator Taft who had never forgiven Bradley, Collins, and Vandenberg for their testimony against MacArthur in 1951, and in order to symbolize the "sweeping changes proposed for Washington by the new Administration," Eisenhower took the then unprecedented step of replacing every member of the carry-over JCS.¹ Moreover, the four-year term which had been the norm for members of the JCS was to be reduced to two years with the possibility of reappointment. In addition to removing the Joint Chiefs from the quicksands of partisan politics, it soon became evident that, under the plans of the new administration, the JCS were expected to play a relatively passive role in the defense policy process. Ideally, they would be "team members" who willingly endorsed the President's "New Look" military policies. Any misgivings they might have concerning the wisdom of the administration's military policies were not expected to "leak out" of executive circles. Besides, to criticize the administration's military policy was to criticize General Eisenhower's military judgment and that, it was pointed out, bordered on the ludicrous. The message to the incoming Joint Chiefs was clear--they were to assume and maintain a low profile if they wanted to keep their jobs, for unlike their predecessors, they would be highly expendable in the administration.²

The issue that placed the greatest pressure on the Joint Chiefs was the contradictory decision of the Eisenhower administration to increase US military commitments abroad through a series of bilateral defense treaties designed to contain Communism around the globe, while at the same time reducing overall US military strength. The high priority the administration gave to reinforcing and extending the military containment of the Communist Bloc was matched by its firm commitment to a balanced federal budget. This apparent imbalance between increased military responsibilities and decreased military resources was to be bridged by the New Look military policy.³

The New Look strategy, which was essentially the continuation and implementation of a force restructuring plan that had been formulated in the last years of the Truman administration, was designed to avoid a Korean type limited war and substantially reduce the size of the costly, conventional land forces. It placed primary reliance for US defense and deterrence upon the nuclear armed strategic forces of the air and naval services.⁴ It also promised a balanced budget. The traditional balanced force structure according to which the Department of Defense (DOD) budget was divided equally among the three services, gave way to a markedly reduced budget in which the premier service in the Eisenhower administration, the Air Force, received the lion's share of the military outlays. The strategic substitution of nuclear weapons for military manpower resulted in the following budgetary allocations:

	<u>FY 54</u>		<u>FY 55</u>	(in billions of dollars)
Army	14.2	Army	10.2	
Navy	11.3	Navy	10.5	
Air Force	15.6	Air Force	16.2	
Misc.	<u>.5</u>	Misc.	<u>.7</u>	
TOTAL	41.6		37.6 ⁵	

Ridgway objected to both the strategic assumptions of the New Look policy and the budgetary allocations it dictated. Certainly Ridgway's alarm was, to a substantial degree, based upon his concern with protecting the Army's narrow, organizational interests. Following the Korean Armistice, it was inevitable that the Army, as in all previous post-war periods, would be sharply contracted. Moreover, because of the continued Cold War, Army strength was maintained at a relatively high peacetime level. With the exception of FY 60, in which an 11,000-man increase was allowed, the Eisenhower administration reduced Army manpower each year. Yet, at its lowest level in FY 61, Army manpower stood at 858,622 which was roughly 300,000 more soldiers than it had in the 1948-1950 period. In his first year as Chief of Staff, Ridgway saw the Army cut from 1,404,598 to 1,109,296; the second year the President ordered a further cut to 1,026,000. Consequently, Ridgway was confronted with a total strength cut of roughly 27% during his two-year tour.⁶

A second organizational interest that was threatened by the President's military policies was the Army's mission. In the event a Korean style limited war broke out, tactical nuclear weapons, DOD suggested, would be quickly employed by all three services to offset the US's planned inferiority in conventional arms. Besides the fact that no one really knew how tactical nuclear weapons would be deployed, or what battlefield effect they would have on conventional troops, the Army suspected that it would be the mission of the naval and air services to handle them. Moreover, spokesmen for the administration soon began to focus exclusively on the doctrine of "massive retaliation" and the use of strategic nuclear weapons to counter even a limited Communist offensive.⁷ Many officers shared Ridgway's feelings that under the Eisenhower administration, the Army was in danger of becoming a superfluous institution.

The administration's slogan that now "machines would be substituted for men" with a substantial savings to the Treasury but no decrease in military security, struck Ridgway as an illusion that was either naive or disingenuous. Perhaps the New Look was the ultimate military panacea that would forestall both general and limited wars, avoid the unhappy recourse to the messy, bloody combat of the foot soldier, and thus enable the US to meet its burgeoning military commitments around the globe with a smaller and less costly force structure. To an old and wary infantryman like Ridgway, whose combat experience in World War II and Korea had impressed upon him the limitations as well as the capabilities of new weapons and new forces, it all seemed too pat, too glib, and too uncomfortably familiar.

As Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations in January, 1950, Ridgway had observed Truman's ambitious Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, assert repeatedly before Congressional committees that the great cuts being made in the defense budget would save the government 1 to 1.5 billion dollars annually without in any way reducing the combat effectiveness of American forces.⁸ President Truman, recalling the troublesome "Admiral's Revolt" of the previous summer, had made it clear that all members of the JCS were to muffle their reservations or endorse Secretary Johnson's proposed cuts in their congressional testimony. Despite serious misgivings, Army Chief of Staff Collins endorsed the defense reductions which, among other things, led to the skeletonization of combat units in Japan (infantry regiments were reduced in strength by 1/3, artillery battalions lost one of their three batteries, and medium tanks were removed from all regiments and divisions). While Collins admitted that these cuts would, contrary to Johnson's belief, have a negative impact on Army combat capabilities, he thought the overall impact could be minimized.⁹ He was quite wrong.

Despite a sharp increase in the Soviet-Communist Chinese military threat, and a general deterioration in the political-military situation in Europe, China and Southeast Asia, President Truman had decided that in the critical election year of 1950, it was politically inexpedient for the Democrats to go into the campaign on a platform of higher taxes necessitated by an increased defense budget. The carefully orchestrated endorsements of the defense reductions by the JCS would, it was expected, quiet any fears or charges of military unpreparedness that the Republicans might raise.

The loyal acquiescence of the Joint Chiefs to the President's political opportunism and the Defense Secretary's thoughtless arrogance resulted in a dangerous oversimplification of the facts. The Defense "economies" constituted a very serious, calculated risk. At the very least, the Truman administration had a political responsibility to point out to the nation the risks involved in the defense cuts. Congress, however, evidenced no inclination to dig out the truth and the Democrats looked to the fall elections with more confidence.

Ridgway was still at the Pentagon when the first casualty reports of the Korean War came in a few months later. The thinned-out, under-equipped, poorly-trained Army units that were rushed from Japan to the crumbling Korean front paid an inordinate price for the Truman-Johnson defense "economies." Against a Soviet T-34 tank that was obsolete in 1944, the most powerful weapon the American's could deploy in the retreat to Pusan was a 4.2" mortar. Consequently, many American soldiers died needlessly during the first months in Korea. Ridgway, for all his glamour as a tough, demanding paratroop commander, was a very humane officer. The lives of soldiers were never a necessary abstraction to him. They were valued comrades, individuals who mattered much in the balance of things. His affinity for, and his sense of identification

with the individual soldier was manifest throughout Ridgway's long career. To a large extent, Ridgway's pronounced sense of professional integrity was based upon his fundamental commitment to the well-being of the individual soldiers whose lives were not to be wasted. In his memoirs published in 1956, he wrote:

To my way of thinking, no great battle commander in all history has ever reached the heights he might have reached if he did not feel the love for his men, and a profound respect for them, and for the jobs they had to do...In my opinion, the commander who in the confusion and the excitement of battle forgets that he is dealing with men's lives, and who through callousness or stupidity sacrifices them needlessly, is more butcher than battle leader. He is a fool and not a guiltless one...

All lives are equal on the battlefield, and a dead rifleman is as great a loss, in the sight of God, as a dead general. The dignity which attaches to the individual is the basis of Western civilization and that fact should be remembered by every commander, platoon or army.¹⁰

Ridgway did not miss the connection between the political logrolling over the Johnson defense economies and the long casualty lists that such "economies" led to a few months later, "We were, in short, in a state of shameful unreadiness when the Korean war broke out, and there was absolutely no excuse for it...The state of our Army in Japan was inexcusable."¹¹ If Eisenhower was anxious to enjoy the political benefits of similar defense "economies," Ridgway was unwilling to paper over any gaps that arose between the Army's assigned mission and its overall military effectiveness.

Neither the strategic nuclear deterrence nor the combination of air and naval power had been an adequate or relevant solution to the Korean Conflict. For all the hortatory claims about "surgical strikes and push-button warfare" made by defense publicists, scientists, admirals, and air force generals in the 1945-1950 period, Korea was a dirty, foot soldier's war. Who among them in 1949 would have predicted that in 1951-1953, two large, predominantly infantry armies would lock themselves into a stalemated war of attrition across the Korean peninsula; a hard, frustrating war of trenches and massive artillery barrages that was in many ways an unpleasant return to the military conditions

that had characterized the Western Front in World War I. While his peers on the JCS had been supervising the SAC bombers and the naval flotillas, Ridgway, as Commander of the 8th Army in Korea (1951-1952), had to concern himself with the humble but critical infantry patrols that were sent across no man's land day after day.¹² Intuition, born of experience and training, suggested to Ridgway that the next war would see another involvement of US ground forces. It was his job to insure that they were prepared for their mission. As for the technological and nuclear revolution in warfare, it seemed probable that combat under tactical nuclear conditions, would require more, not fewer, troops.¹³

Instead of analyzing the uncomfortable truths of Korea, that limited conventional war imposed novel, perhaps inescapable, restraints upon the exercise of military force, the administration and Congress (which accepted the New Look strategy without serious debate) regarded Korea as an aberration to be ignored. In terms of the old cliché "that those who forget the past are condemned to repeat it," a new record was being set.

Despite Ridgway's professional misgivings, he was initially reluctant to oppose the administration's military policy. Congress was tired of exhaustive debates over military policy. Other than making a few scattered cuts in the executive's proposed defense budget, the legislature simply accepted the politically popular assumptions embodied in the New Look strategy. Secretary of Defense Wilson and Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey had gained Eisenhower's full support in their plan to achieve a balanced budget through a "bigger [and cheaper] bang for the buck." A war-weary public was eager to turn over the defense problem to the Air Forces' Strategic Air Command (SAC) and it was very receptive to Eisenhower's promises of prosperity, normalcy and tax cuts. There was also the problem of Eisenhower's military reputation. To many, it would seem ludicrous for any Army general to question a military policy that had the

endorsement of General of the Army Eisenhower. Nor was Eisenhower hesitant to counter dissenters in uniform with a quick reference to his own professional experience in military matters.

Moreover, within the organizational structure of the Defense Department, the gradual centralization of power under the OSD tended to undermine what limited administrative authority a military Chief of Staff had. In June, 1953, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was given appointing power over the Joint Staff, a 210-man military group that was the administrative arm of the JCS. The Director of the Joint Chiefs' Staff, a most critical and influential figure, was placed under the personal control of the Chairman. He became the Chairman's "right-hand man" and enhanced the ability of the Chairman (and thus the Secretary of Defense) to dominate the Joint Chiefs. Lest the Chairman of the JCS drift away from the Defense Secretary's orbit, a provision was inserted in the reorganization plan of the Joint Staff that made the Director's appointment subject to the approval of the Secretary of Defense.¹⁴ Within the JCS debates, Chairman Radford, despite his previous reputation as an outspoken military dissenter, was an able, articulate, and vigorous advocate of the President's policies. He was very unhappy with individual Chiefs who expressed their opposition to presidential policies, and especially resentful if a "team member" aired doubts outside the executive branch.¹⁵

During the fall of 1953, the Joint Chiefs were directed to formulate a military force structure which reflected the fiscal interests of the administration. The New Look policy, to which their recommended force structure would apply, was to be phased in during a three-year period beginning with the FY 55 budget. After Wilson submitted the JCS's recommendations in December, 1953, Treasury Secretary Humphrey and others in the administration who were pushing hard for a balanced budget, convinced Eisenhower that additional defense cuts

could be made faster than had originally been planned. In response to these suggestions, Wilson, at the direction of the President, ordered an additional 10% reduction in the proposed defense budget which reduced it from \$35.9 to \$31.0 billion dollars. While Ridgway had been uneasy with the thrust of the New Look strategy, he was prepared to go along with it as a dutiful "team member." However, much to his chagrin, the additional 10% cut was to come primarily out of the Army's budget. Ridgway incorrectly and perhaps naively presumed that the final force levels would be based upon the strategic objectives and assumptions of the New Look strategy.¹⁶ Initially at least, Ridgway misunderstood the role and influence of Treasury Secretary Humphrey in the defense policy process. As he notes in his memoirs, his initiation into the political rules of the game was abrupt:

The real situation then dawned on me. The military budget was not based so much on military requirements, or on what the economy of the country could stand, as on political considerations.

The fact that 76% of the proposed reduction was to be made in Army funds indicated to me also that we were in danger of again falling into that serious error that had placed us at such a grave disadvantage against an inferior foe in the first few months of the Korean War. We were subject again to the same dangerous delusions, the misty hope that air power, armed with the fission or fusion bomb, could save us in time of trouble.

To my mind this country could not adopt a more dangerous doctrine, nor one more likely to lead us down the path to war.¹⁷

A month later, President Eisenhower presented the revised New Look defense budget to Congress in his 1954 State of the Union message. Although Eisenhower, unlike Truman, certainly did not need the public endorsements of the JCS, he stated in his message that the JCS had unanimously approved all of the provisions of the FY 55 Defense Budget. The President may not have given much thought to the implications of this purported "unanimous endorsement "

by the JCS, however, Ridgway did. It appeared to him that the President was arbitrarily and unwarrantedly forcing upon a non-concurring member of the JCS the role of political supporter of presidential policy. Ridgway did not object to carrying out a policy he though incorrect and foolish, but he resented being identified as an enthusiastic supporter of that policy. It seemed doubtful that the reservations Ridgway held on the New Look policy and his objections to the additional manpower cuts ordered in December would surface outside the executive branch after the President announced to the country that his policies enjoyed the unanimous support of his military advisors.

Ridgway's opposition to the cuts in the Army directed by the FY 55 budget was well known in the DOD. Secretary of Defense Wilson had pressured Ridgway repeatedly to volunteer additional cuts for the sake of economy and to maintain publicly that, in light of the New Look policy, such cuts would not alter America's military strength. Unsuccessful in forestalling the cuts, Ridgway adamantly refused to publicly endorse them. Moreover, he believed that the administration's public assertion that the proposed national defense budget would not lower US military security was dangerously misleading. It resembled the ignorant and politically expedient methods of Louis Johnson. The public and Congress were being told what they wanted to hear--that substantial reductions in military manpower, a sharp cut in the national defense budget, and lower taxes would improve and actually increase America's military security. Add to this Dulles' mania for bilateral treaties that increased US military obligations and the potential of direct American military involvement abroad, and ominous gaps of logic began to appear in the administration's rationale.

Knowing that few in the administration shared his apprehension, Ridgway was content to make his dissent in-house and then to implement the policy as best he could. Wilson suggested that Ridgway's opinions were disconcerting and

disruptive of a proper defense "team spirit." In one instance, after he had failed to gain Ridgway's concurrence to his suggestion (which he claimed came directly from Eisenhower) that combat divisions be reduced to 85% of their normal manpower levels (a suggestion which appalled Ridgway who vividly remembered the skeletonized units that had been hastily committed to Korea in June, 1950), Wilson bluntly and pointedly reminded the Army Chief of Staff that he was putting himself in the ludicrous position of resisting a wise "suggestion" concerning Army divisions that came from General Eisenhower who had considerable knowledge in those matters. Such opposition by Ridgway "would not be good" Wilson concluded. Ridgway was unimpressed by Wilson's heavy-handed attempt to threaten him with Eisenhower's illustrious military reputation:

I told Mr. Wilson that I had profound respect for the President's military judgment. And I would hope that my views on military matters would always be in accord with his. However, I added, if my deep convictions led me to take an opposite view, I would adhere to that judgment until purely military arguments proved me wrong. I would not be swayed by arguments that what I advocated would be politically unacceptable, or that its cost was greater than the administration felt we could afford.¹⁸

Although he never spoke directly to Eisenhower on the subject, Ridgway presumed that Wilson had conveyed his objections to the President. Even if he had not, Eisenhower would certainly have been made aware of the Army's disgruntlement over the New Look through his old service contacts. Consequently, when the President announced that the JCS had unanimously endorsed the proposed defense cuts for the FY 55 budget, Ridgway was outraged. Eisenhower's statement made Ridgway a public party to a policy that he opposed and which he felt conveyed, intentionally or not, false impressions to the public for the sake of narrow, domestic political considerations. It appeared to Ridgway that civilian leaders in the executive were willfully jeopardizing his professional integrity.

As a combat soldier I have been shot at from ambush, and bombed by planes which I thought to be friendly, both of which are experiences that are momentarily unsettling. I do not recall, however, that I ever felt a greater sense of surprise and shock than when I read [the President's 1954 State of the Union Message]...As one member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who most emphatically had not concurred in the 1955 military program as it was presented to the people, I was nonplused by this statement.¹⁹

When the above statement appeared in print for the first time in a series of articles in the Saturday Evening Post in January, 1956 criticizing the Eisenhower military policies, it caused a minor furor. Angered and embarrassed by Ridgway's charges (Ridgway had retired the previous summer) Eisenhower stated in a press conference that the 1954 State of the Union Message had been sent to each executive department to be checked out prior to its delivery. It was an unconvincing explanation and did little to rebut Ridgway's claim that the administration had tried to use the JCS for its own partisan purposes. Hansen Baldwin, military correspondent of the New York Times, was privy to the details of the flap:

All the facts available to newspapermen throughout this period suggest that in this contention General Ridgway is right. Certainly he objected time and again privately and in congressional testimony [after the publication of the 1954 State of the Union Message] to the reductions in the Army.

He made the point repeatedly that the Army's commitments had been increased, while its capabilities of carrying out these commitments had been reduced. In other words, General Ridgway feels that the '55 budget and subsequent budgets were not based on the new strategic concepts of the "New Look" which he apparently did endorse, but as he says, on economic and political considerations.²⁰

It was necessary, so the administration believed, to depict Ridgway as an enthusiastic supporter of presidential policy, or at the very least, restrict his airing of professional dissents to executive councils lest partisan adversaries of the President use Ridgway's dissents to attack and possibly

discredit executive policy.²¹ Thus, the strictly non-partisan tenet of Ridgway's professional creed which impelled him to evaluate a proposed policy on the basis of its validity from a professional military viewpoint, injected Ridgway into the institutional political process that structures congressional-presidential relations. However embarrassing to "efficient" executive administration, and however agonizing to an officer like Ridgway who risks the accusation of "disloyalty" by questioning the validity of his superior's military policy, this conflict between an officer's professional and bureaucratic responsibilities can be beneficial to the government as a whole. As Gene Lyons has noted in this regard, "...it is very often the military who put defense policy to the test of political accountability by exposing the basis for decisions to Congressional and public inquiry."²²

Ridgway was vainly trying to retain a traditional element of professional discretion for the Chief of Staff in a Defense Department that was increasingly intolerant of anything less than a wholehearted public endorsement of the President's policies. Eisenhower, like his successors, wanted only yes-men on the JCS.²³ If the military chiefs were to be uniformed cheerleaders of administration policy, their roles had to be restructured so that primary emphasis would be placed on their bureaucratic responsibilities. That this might necessitate a more malleable sense of professional integrity was overlooked by those who urged a greater degree of unification in the DOD. As the JCS reoriented their administrative role and professional advice to White House specifications, their value to the government as a whole declined.

There were many sound reasons for increasing the centralization of authority and the unification of functions in the Defense Department: the complexity of modern war, technological innovation in weaponry, the sheer size of the contemporary defense establishment, the need to realize budget

savings and reduce wasteful service duplications, and the exploitation of modern managerial methods. Every amendment to the 1947 Defense Act furthered the trend towards organizational unification and centralization of administrative authority in the OSD.²⁴ The ease with which the executive's proposals to advance defense centralization cleared Congress in the fifties and sixties seems remarkable when contrasted with the stubborn opposition and judicious caution that characterized congressional response to presidential bills for defense unification and centralization in the late forties. Once the initial, limited concept of armed services unification became a reality, it developed an increasing momentum.

With all the obvious practical advantages to be gained from extensive Defense unification, few considered the more subtle political costs involved. The idea of a senior admiral or general criticizing an administration policy or the programs of a sister service before a congressional committee irritated the advocates of defense centralization. It violated the principles of sound managerial science, it was awkward and embarrassing for civilian political appointees who were inevitably caught in the crossfire, and it always seemed so unnecessary. That service rivalry viewed from another perspective might be a healthy form of pluralism and a valuable information pipeline for congressional committees was not mentioned. As one critic of the defense unifiers noted,

It is at least curious that a politique which goes to some length--some think not far enough--to preserve competition among organizations which are doing the same thing (such as General Motors, Ford and Chrysler) holds similarly parallel activities in the Department of Defense as rivalry and duplication.²⁵

In the rush for logistical efficiency and bureaucratic clarity in the DOD, the problem of increasing the judiciousness of policy decisions got swept aside.

As the Secretary of Defense increased his authority over the Joint Chiefs and gradually restricted the permissible limits of their professional autonomy, the value of the military perspective that the JCS introduced into policy deliberations was weakened. Over time the emphasis switched from an attitude which stressed the necessity of telling their civilian superiors what the military facts indicated, to an attitude which stressed the wisdom of telling their superiors what they wanted to hear. A cautious, skeptical, detached outlook came to be replaced by an optimistic, vacuous "can-do" mentality. As the political environment of the executive branch moved the military chiefs into an advocacy political role, they tended to adjust their professional military views too quickly to anticipated civilian objectives and desires.²⁶

The independent perspective and professional experience that the military chiefs ought to bring to the councils of government can improve the quality of policy decisions by causing relevant, if impolitic, facts to be raised. All governmental policies involve some partisan consideration and there is an inevitable danger that the policy process will be corrupted and certain unpleasant facts ignored or discounted by the pressures of misplaced partisanship. Obviously, the corollary danger is that the military advisors may skew their data and advice in order to safeguard narrow service interests and obstruct policy proposals that are not unwise but only threaten these interests. However, if the policymaker can discount that advice which is self-serving while heeding that which is honest and accurate, his perception of reality may be improved.

In a way, the senior leader's professional advice should hold the policymaker's feet to the fire, i.e., compel him to consider the probable costs and impolitic facts that may restrain misguided thinking. It is a problem of

presenting unpleasant realities to political leaders who are often pressed to the wall by diverse, unrelenting political pressures and who, in their moments of anger and desperation are dangerously susceptible to the delusionary allures of the "quick fix," the facile solution that, in the long-run, only aggravates their dilemma. While the bearers of unpleasant, contrary advice constitute an invaluable bureaucratic "loyal opposition," they are often castigated by their hassled superiors as narrow-minded bureaucrats or disloyal, recalcitrant subordinates who do not understand what it is to be a "team player." Yet, skeptical, independent-minded advisors who are not intimidated by the unpleasantness which often follows the presentation of an unvarnished and unsympathetic professional opinion, are the most valuable "team members" a policymaker can have. Such advisors are an essential ballast in any government; it is a sign of political maturity and wisdom if the organizational environment is conducive to their cultivation.²⁷

While the politicalization of the military chiefs within an increasingly rigid bureaucratic pyramid reduced the quality and range of their professional contributions to executive policy, it also threatened to abrogate Congress' legitimate access to uncompromised, professional military advice. Throughout the fifties and the sixties, the extension of the authority of the Secretary of Defense over the military, the conversion of the JCS from professional advisors to political advocates, and the failure of Congress to effectively resist these trends, predictably diminished the influence which Congress exercised over the military.

In comparison with the executive branch, Congress had a relatively passive, negative role in the formulation of military policy. It had neither the staff resources, the political inclination, nor the organizational consensus to mount its own military policy alternatives. At best, it could play a

judicious balancing role in the formulation of a national defense policy. Congress needed the assistance of professional military experts who could provide the legislators with the countervailing professional opinions and information that could be used to open up military policy debates to greater public scrutiny. By drawing the President out on these matters, and forcing him to explain and defend in detail his military policies and strategies, Congress was able to expose some of the subtle contradictions and false assumptions that frequently lay hidden within these policies.

Interservice rivalry, the bane of those presidential agents who wished to restrict military policy debates within the confines of a symmetrical and immaculate model of executive decision-making, was an invaluable source of military information for congressional critics. "What we need," said one congressman, "is more interservice squabbling. When the military falls out, then and only then can the Congress find out." Another voiced a similar appraisal of the informative value of "service rivalry," to congressional observers, "...it seems to me that if everything goes smoothly, nobody ever knows what's going on, neither Congress nor anybody. But when some one of the forces gets into trouble or gets riled up, then we hear about it and learn a lot."²⁸

In the 1949 National Security Act which elevated the Secretary of Defense from the role of mediator between the President and the services to undisputed political boss of the new Defense Department, Congress, recognizing the potential threat the Secretary now posed to its unfettered access to the military chiefs, wrote in a provision that was designed to safeguard Congress' independent role in civil-military relations. According to Section 202(c)(6) of the Act, a member of the JCS was permitted to present to Congress "on his own initiative, after first informing the Secretary of Defense, any recommendations relating to the Department of Defense that he may deem proper."²⁹

To a limited extent, this provision made the JCS the military advisors of Congress as well as the President. It certainly gave the military chief a legal loophole that allowed him to criticize any presidential policy before a congressional committee. The act did not, however, safeguard the JCS from the political power of the executive. Consequently, those military dissenters who availed themselves of this congressionally-mandated opportunity to express their professional opinions, did so at the risk of their careers. Following the dismissal of a dissenting military chief by an outraged President, Congress might pass an angry counter-resolution, as they did after Admiral Denfield's precipitate retirement, warning the President against further political "intimidations" of military witnesses. But such resolutions had little permanent effect. The Joint Chiefs would get the message. They could testify, but in the end, the President had the trump card and their careers in his hand. Congress' demonstrated inability to defend the Chiefs against presidential anger negated much of the intended effect of Section 202. Congressional inquisitors were usually sensitive to the exposed positions the Joint Chiefs placed themselves in when testifying before congressional committees and, consequently, they were reluctant to draw-out or press a military leader who intimated some displeasure with presidential policies. For many military chiefs, their annual appearance before Congress constituted something of a psychic crisis.³⁰ They could criticize an administration policy, but only within circumscribed limits. Throughout the fifties and sixties, the limits of acceptable criticism were increasingly narrowed as the President successfully sought to rein in his military advisors.

There was, until 1972, no fixed tour of duty for members of the JCS. In that year, over the strenuous objections of President Nixon, Congress set the tour of duty at four years. This gave the JCS a much-needed degree of

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
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
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stability and made it less susceptible to periodic presidential purges. In 1954, Eisenhower introduced the unofficial idea of a two-year term for JCS members with the possibility of extension.³¹ As Table 1 indicates, the average tour for service Chiefs of Staff was 3.3 years. The Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs, who served an average of 5.7 years on the JCS overall, averaged 3.6 years in their tours. Admiral Radford was the only Chairman who had not previously served as a service Chief of Staff. With the exception of those Chiefs who died on active duty (Sherman and Abrams), all members of the Joint Chiefs who served a single two-year tour and were not reappointed (Fechteler, Ridgway, Carney, Decker and Anderson) were virtually "fired" by the President. White and LeMay, two outspoken Air Force Chiefs whose SAC credentials helped them to develop unusual congressional support, were reappointed despite presidential misgivings. Overall, however, the service chiefs increasingly towed the presidential line and were rewarded with longer tours.

The most turbulent periods were 1953, 1955, and 1961-1963. The 1953-1963 decade saw the most widespread criticisms of presidential policies by dissenting military chiefs. Ridgway, Carney, Taylor, Burke, White, LeMay and Anderson were, in varying degrees, openly opposed to different presidential policies. Often their most vigorous and valuable criticisms were directed at their sister services. Their testimony sparked some of Congress' most informative investigations into defense policy. Although American military leaders are not in the habit of retiring or resigning on a matter of principle, during these stormy years when major segments of the officer corps were still resisting the erosion of its professional autonomy, a couple of service chiefs came very close to retiring on an issue of principle. Ridgway was one. While he "won wide public and professional admiration for having retired on principle," Ridgway's example did not, unfortunately establish a

Bradely (1)(4)
 Vandenburg (5)
 Collins (4)
 Sherman * (2)
 Fechteler (2)
Radford (4)
 Ridgway (2)
 Carney (2)
Twining (4)(3)
Taylor (4)(2)
 Burke (6)
 White (4)
Lemnitzer (1)(2)
 Decker (2)
 LeMay (5)
 Anderson (2)
Wheeler (2)(6)
 McDonald (4)
 Johnson (4)
 McConnel (4)
 Moorer (3)(4)
 Westmoreland (4)
 Ryan (4)
 Zumwalt (4)
 Abrams * (2)
Brown (1)()
 Jones ()
 Holloway ()
 Weyand ()

1. Heavy line indicates Chairman of the JCS.

2. x indicates individual had no further government service.

3. * indicates individual died during tour of duty.

Secretary of Defense Forrestal

Lovett
 Marshall
 Johnson

Wilson

McElroy

Gates

McNamara

Clifford

Laird

Secretary of Defense
 Schlesinger
 Richardson

1948

Truman

55

Eisenhower

57

61

JFK

64

Johnson

69

Nixon

74

Table 1: US Joint Chiefs of Staff-Terms of Office (1948-1975)

tradition setting precedent.³² If anything, Ridgway's "dismissal" only served to remind his peers of their vulnerability. While some were prepared to cross swords with the administration over military policy, few were willing to press the issue to an open break with their Commander-in-Chief or terminate their careers on a matter of professional integrity.

From 1963 on, the military chiefs assumed an increasingly quiescent attitude towards presidential policies. Open dissent in congressional forums became increasingly rare and their public testimony was overwhelmingly supportive of the presidential party line. There were a lot of reasons for Vietnam; this was one of them.

During the congressional hearings on the administration's FY 55 New Look budget held in the spring of 1954, Ridgway voiced his first public opposition to the proposed cuts in the Army's strength. The Republican-controlled Congress was not interested in criticizing a Republican President's budget, and the Democrats were not eager to challenge executive policies that offered the lure of tax cuts during an election year. Only a handful of congressmen were prepared to use Ridgway's testimony to reveal the tenuous assumptions underlying the New Look strategy. While Ridgway stressed in his testimony that he accepted the proposed budget cuts, he declined to support Secretary Wilson's assertion that the New Look would improve the military's capabilities. In a hearing on the budget conducted before the House Subcommittee on Army Appropriations, the following exchange took place (Representative Sikes, Florida (D), was a Reserve Army General and an early and perceptive critic of the New Look strategy):

Rep. Sikes: Do you feel under the budget that you have presented, where it proposed to reduce the number of men in the Military Establishment, that the Army will be able to maintain or to increase combat effectiveness above the present level?

Gen. Ridgway: No, sir. I would not think we can increase combat effectiveness. I think all the improvements that are going on all the time will increase the relative combat effectiveness unit-for-unit, but a reduction in the order of magnitude that we are making will certainly, when completed, leave us less combat effectiveness than we had when we started.³³

By denying, as he did in his testimony, that tactical nuclear weapons were a valid and acceptable substitution for manpower, Ridgway was challenging a pet administration thesis. Ridgway had set up a special research and development team to analyze the parameters of atomic warfare and project Army requirements for the 1960-1970 period. One of their studies indicated that the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons to the battlefield would require widely dispersed and highly mobile ground units. The concentrated striking power of tactical nuclear weapons would extend the width and the depth of the nuclear battlefield. World War II battle zones averaged 25 miles in depth; tactical nuclear weapons were expected to increase this figure to 200 miles. In addition, the complex logistical system that would be required to support such sophisticated, costly weapons and their atomic ammunition would place an additional strain on manpower resources. These factors convinced Ridgway that tactical nuclear weapons, rather than being a facile, cheap substitute for manpower would, ironically, require higher manpower levels in the Army of the future.³⁴

As the senior American commander of airborne units in World War II, Ridgway understood the capabilities and limitations of this revolutionary new weapon. One of his most persistent problems was dissuading superiors from their tendency to ignore the airborne's limitations.³⁵ Now the "magic key" was tactical nuclear weapons, and Ridgway felt equally obliged to point out their unpleasant drawbacks and long-run costs to superiors who were looking for defense savings and strategic short-cuts. Neither Eisenhower nor Wilson were

pleased by Ridgway's suggestion that tactical nuclear weapons would complicate rather than simplify military manpower problems.

During the Senate hearings on the Defense Appropriations Bill, Ridgway reiterated his acceptance of the administration program. Senator Maybank, S.C. (D), asked Ridgway if he had not joined a unanimous JCS in recommending to the President the New Look proposals contained in the administration's budget. The reference to Eisenhower's State of the Union Message was obvious. Ridgway was prepared to inform the Senate of the basic differences that existed between the Army's position and the administration's, however, he did not want his remarks construed as a direct attack on the President's statement, nor was he anxious to make headlines as a public dissenter from a supposedly "unanimous JCS" recommendation. He reminded the Senator that he accepted the administration budget, but that he would be glad to expand his remarks in executive session. The Senator, however, not wishing to challenge Eisenhower's military reputation or the politically attractive benefits of the New Look policy, declined Ridgway's suggestion for an executive session and the matter was dropped.³⁶

A few months later, Ridgway opposed a proposal to "test" the New Look strategy in Indochina. In the course of a very effective dissent that helped dissuade President Eisenhower from intervening unilaterally in Indochina, Ridgway undercut a number of the central New Look arguments and revealed the dangerous, foolish illusions that the strategy was based on. Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a fervent anti-Communist, and a strong believer in the efficacy of air power, had been one of the chief architects and advocates of the New Look strategy and the doctrine of massive retaliation. He was a very opinionated, outspoken Chairman who tried and failed to dominate the Joint Chiefs. Unlike Ridgway, who essayed a more autonomous professional

role, Radford felt that his primary responsibility was to act as the President's agent and sell his policies to Congress and the military establishment.³⁷ Radford was the prototype of the senior military leader as presidential bureaucrat. A strong ally of Secretary Wilson, Radford attempted to convert the JCS to his belief that their military opinions and recommendations should be trimmed and tailored in such a way that they reflected the administration's economic and political priorities. A few of the chiefs (Twining, Burke, and to a lesser extent, Carney) adapted themselves to this "guidance." To Ridgway, however, such a line of reasoning was anathema for he believed it violated the basic tenets of professional military integrity and undermined the proper relationship that should exist between the soldier and his civilian superior. As he relates in his memoirs, Ridgway expressed his viewpoints on this sensitive subject during his swearing in as Chief of Staff in 1953. Once the civilian leaders have stated the mission, i.e., the national policy to be implemented, it is the responsibility of the military chief to analyze that policy and determine what military resources will be required to carry it out:

...the professional soldier should never pull his punches, should never let himself for one moment be dissuaded from stating the honest estimates his own military experience and judgment tell him will be needed to do the job required of him. No factor of political motivation could excuse, no reason of "party" or political expediency could explain such an action.

If the objective the statesman wishes to achieve is a costly one, that is not the soldier's business. If it is greater than the political leaders wish to support or think the economy of the country can bear, that is not his business. It is the constitutional responsibility of the civilian authority to decide these questions...[the military man] should scrupulously eschew any opinion as to whether the cost is beyond the reach of the national purse or not. He is without competence in that field. If civilian authority finds the cost to be greater than the country can bear, then either the objectives themselves should be modified, or the responsibility for the risks involved should be forthrightly accepted. Under no circumstances, regardless of pressure from whatever source or motive, should the professional military man yield or compromise his judgment for other than convincing military reasons. To do otherwise would be to destroy his usefulness.³⁸ [emphasis added]

Ridgway's experiences in World War II convinced him that senior leaders have a natural tendency to underestimate the risks and probable costs involved in military operations. Capitalizing on its speed, mobility, and the element of surprise, the airborne division was a powerful strike force. However, its lack of artillery and armor support made it a peculiarly vulnerable unit. When airborne operations succeeded, they did so in a spectacular fashion; when they failed, casualties were unusually high. Consequently, a successful airborne commander had to be able to assess the risks and costs involved in a planned operation with a high degree of accuracy. He simply did not have the margin of safety available to other combat commanders. When Ridgway was convinced that his immediate superiors had underestimated the probable costs of an airborne operation, and if he was unable to persuade them to reconsider or cancel the operation, he did not hesitate to take action that was designed to reveal the true costs of the operation in more accurate detail. At some risk to his career, and in one instance almost to the point of resisting orders, Ridgway worked to dispell the delusions that often marred his superiors' concept of airborne operations.

In one harrowing case which foreshadowed his actions during the 1954 Indochina crises, Ridgway became convinced that a planned airborne assault upon Rome was doomed to failure. The plan called for the 82nd Airborne Division to be dropped in the vicinity of Rome which was surrounded by six German divisions. Until the Allied Army, pushing from the south, linked-up with the 82nd in Rome--an operation that was expected to take five days--the paratroopers would be dependent upon the support that the Italians, under Marshall Badoglio, had promised. Conversations with Italian military representatives in Sicily persuaded Ridgway that their fear of the Germans might, at the critical moment, be more influential than their promised commitments to the Allies.

He also doubted that the ground forces would be able to close on Rome in a period of five days given the sizable German forces in the area.

Unable to get the operation cancelled, Ridgway wrangled permission from Field Marshall Alexander to send two officers on a secret mission to rendezvous with the Italians in Rome and make a first-hand assessment of the situation. One of these officers was Ridgway's trusted lieutenant, Colonel Maxwell Taylor. Badoglio's evasive answers to his queries and the Italians' obvious fear that if they assisted the Allies, the German's would level their beloved Rome, convinced Taylor that the Italians would be unable to furnish the required support. The 82nd's 12,000 men were loaded aboard transport planes all set for take-off when the word was flashed that the operation was scrubbed. As for the ground forces, the "five day" push to Rome eventually took seven months and thousands of casualties.³⁹ The aborted Rome operation made a lasting impression on Ridgway. He derived more satisfaction, he said, from the lives he saved by opposing that operation than from the many honors that came his way for victory in battle. Moreover, as he notes in his memoirs, the sort of decisions that were involved in the Rome operation are the most difficult and important a military officer must face.

...the hard decisions are not the ones you make in the heat of battle. Far harder to make are those involved in speaking your mind about some hare-brained scheme which proposes to commit troops to action under conditions where failure is almost certain and the only result will be the needless sacrifice of priceless lives. When all is said and done, the most precious asset any nation has is its youth, and for a battle commander ever to condone the needless sacrifice of his men is absolutely inexcusable. In any action, you must balance the inevitable cost in lives against the objectives you seek to obtain. Unless, beyond any reasonable doubt, the results reasonably to be expected can justify the estimated loss of life the action involves, then for my part I want none of it.⁴⁰

In his memoirs, General Taylor, who risked his life to get Ridgway the critical information that saved so many GI's, reveals a different attitude towards the aborted Rome operation: "So our trip to Rome was not wasted, although a mistake avoided brings none of the satisfaction of a feat achieved."⁴¹

Ridgway and Radford were professional opposites and within the councils of the executive branch frequent adversaries. Thus, in the spring of 1954, when Radford was blithely advocating a dramatic aerial "surgical strike" to rescue the beleaguered French garrison at Dienbienphu, Ridgway, who had not forgotten the limited effectiveness of air power in Korea, suspected that he was facing another Rome operation, i.e., a hare-brained scheme based on unwarranted optimism and gossamer delusions of omnipotence. Radford, a Cold War ideologue who was extremely eager to halt the spread of Communism and validate the "inexpensive" but "effective" new Look strategy, claimed (after a most cursory review of the situation) that through air power alone, the US could rout the Vietminh and save the hapless French without running the unacceptable political risk of becoming involved in another land war in Asia. Vice President Nixon seconded Radford's ambitious proposal. Secretary of State Dulles was sympathetic. The other members of the JCS, Carney and Twining, endorsed the plan.⁴²

Ridgway was not insensitive to the gallant defense the French were putting up, but as he noted, it was the mercenaries of the Foreign Legion, not drafted sons of France, who were opposing the Vietminh. Unlike Carney, Twining and Radford, Ridgway was an old-fashioned soldier who did not measure US interests in terms of an open-ended ideological crusade against global Communism. In 1950, when he was serving as Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, he had opposed a State Department effort to persuade the Pentagon to increase the level of military aid being sent to the French forces in Indochina. It was,

he thought, a stupid waste of money and against the security interests of the US to support the French in what was, for all practical purposes, a peripheral colonial war. Moreover, he doubted that the communists would be able to extend their control over all the diverse nationalities that made up the Indochina Peninsula. It was a perceptive assessment. Ridgway was one of a handful of senior government leaders of the period who never exchanged their professional skepticism for the inflexibilities of a Cold War mentality. Not even his illustrious and much better known successor, General Maxwell Taylor, the reputed military intellectual of his age, could make such a claim.⁴³

In this respect, Ridgway reflected a traditional professional military outlook which, according to Huntington, stresses "the restriction of commitments and the avoidance of war":

The military man [ideally] has no concern with the desirability or undesirability of political goals as such. He is, however, concerned with the relations between political goals and military means since this directly affects the security of the state. The politician must beware of overcommitting the nation beyond the strength of its military capabilities. Grand political designs and sweeping political goals are to be avoided, not because they are undesirable, but because they are impractical. The military security of the state must come first. Moral aims and ideological ends should not be pursued at the expense of security...The statesman furnishes the dynamic, purposive element to state policy. The military man represents the passive, instrumental means. It is his function to warn the statesman when his purposes are beyond his means.⁴⁴

Ridgway thought that Radford's aerial "surgical strikes" would eventually backfire and involve the US in a costly ground war against the Vietminh and their Chinese allies. Such an intervention as Radford proposed would be quite risky and perhaps wrong in terms of US security interests, but it certainly would not be cheap--Korea, as all foot soldiers knew, had proved that. At the very least, Ridgway felt, he had a professional responsibility to inform the President what the true costs of an Indochina intervention would involve.

It was evident that none of the presidential advisors who were eager for military intervention had considered this question in detail. Radford, for example, did not explain what would happen if the air strikes failed to halt the Vietminh.

Eisenhower was receptive to Radford's plan for the use of carrier based US Navy planes to rescue the French garrison at Dienbienphu, but he did not want to act without substantial domestic and international political backing. Dulles' efforts to secure the support of the British failed and Congress, after some delicate political maneuvering, declined to give the President a bipartisan resolution endorsing US military intervention.⁴⁵ In early April, during the JCS deliberations over the plan for a naval air strike, Ridgway vigorously opposed the majority view which supported Radford. His "split paper," reflecting the only non-concurring opinion on the JCS to the air strike, was forwarded to Eisenhower. At about the same time, the President received the negative replies to his request for support from the British government and the US Congress. The proposal for an air strike was turned down by the President in mid-April.

On May 8, 1954, the day after the fall of Dienbienphu, the French signed an abrupt armistice agreement with the Vietminh representatives at Geneva. The sudden collapse of the French shocked the Pentagon and the pressures for a unilateral US military intervention to overturn the Communist successes built up again. A contingency proposal to land US forces on the Red River delta and quickly seize Hanoi before the Communists moved in was circulated. Again as in April, Radford pushed hard for some form of military intervention.

Unlike Radford, Ridgway was a cautious officer who was not given to making cursory assessments of serious situations. Eisenhower's hesitation afforded him the time he needed to gather some first-hand, current information

on the Indochina theater of operations. As he had done in the earlier Korean operation, Ridgway hand-picked a team of military officers, experts in every facet of military operations, and sent them to Indochina to make an in-depth survey of the military parameters that would govern a ground force intervention in that area. They covered everything of importance from the adequacy of the road net to the problem of native tropical diseases that would threaten US combat forces. Upon their return, a report was prepared (under the supervision of Lieutenant General James Gavin, Ridgway's Deputy Chief of Plans).

When completed, the report was stark, chilling, and in light of the Vietnam War 11 years later, ominously accurate. If the US decided to defeat the Vietminh, the military costs would be very heavy. Whereas the situation had been sufficient in Korea, Indochina would require between five and ten combat divisions and, because of the primitive logistical facilities, 25 engineering battalions. This translated into an invasion force that would range between 500,000 and 1,000,000 men. This, in turn, would have necessitated, it was suggested, monthly draft calls of 100,000, the call-up of the National Guard and the Army Reserves, and a full-scale national emergency mobilization that would be more extensive than that which had been required to support the Korean War. The economic and fiscal costs of the war would be extremely high, e.g., substantial tax increases, wage and price controls and rationing. Between the lines of the report loomed the Republicans' notorious large budget deficits. In short, it would be a long, bloody, and tremendously expensive operation.⁴⁶

However, Radford, Carney and Twining were not dissuaded by the deep report. According to Gavin,

Admiral Radford was emphatically in favor of landing a force in the Haiphong-Hanoi area, even if it meant risking war with Red China. In this he was fully supported by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the Chief of Naval Operations. In my opinion, such an operation meant a great risk of war. Just southeast of Haiphong harbor is the island of Hainan, which is part of Red China. The Navy was unwilling to risk their ships in the Haiphong area without first invading and capturing the island. Admiral Radford and the Chiefs of the Navy and the Air Force felt that, faced with our overwhelming power, the Red Chinese would not react to this violation of their sovereignty. General Ridgway and I had grave doubts about the validity of this reasoning.⁴⁷

Once the Army report was in, however, it was a difficult document to ignore. Nor was it easy for the advocates of intervention to challenge Ridgway's interpretations of the probable costs of intervention. Against their theories he stacked his combat experience as a Korean War field commander, first-hand data on the Indochina parameters, and a thoroughly researched professional estimate of the probable long-run military costs of intervention. Moreover, if the US intervened with the expectation of gaining a quick and cheap victory in accordance with the principles of the New Look strategy and failed, and if the Ridgway Report then "leaked," the domestic political situation of the administration would be very difficult. Ridgway was holding everybody's feet to the fire and it was a painful experience for many. After briefing the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of Defense on his survey team's report, Ridgway briefed the President on May 11, 1954. As an expert military logistician, Eisenhower clearly understood the implications and evidently appreciated the accuracy of the report. Intervention became a dead issue for the time being. The costs as laid out in detail by Ridgway were simply too high.

Within the councils of the executive branch, Ridgway's unflinching, unordered analysis of the real military costs of intervention proved decisive in dispelling the self-serving illusions that were corrupting the government's

policy process. While other military advisors were keeping a low profile or concentrating on the political and partisan issues at stake, Ridgway limited himself to a straightforward, untailed military assessment of the situation. In doing so, he gave the country and the President "a base of expertise and old-fashioned integrity" that served them well.⁴⁸ Ridgway's actions in the 1954 Indochina Crisis validated his fundamental belief that a military advisor serves his country best when he essays a strictly professional role and adheres to an independent military judgment in the councils of government.

I view the military advisory role of a member of the JCS as follows: He should give his competent professional advice on the military aspects of the problem referred to him, based on his fearless, honest, objective estimate of the national interest, and regardless of administration policy at any particular time. He should confine his advice to the essentially military aspects.⁴⁹

This interpretation of the military advisor's role became increasingly suspect and eventually untenable.

A few months after exposing Radford's vacuous plans for a "surgical strike" in Indochina, Ridgway again was the odd man out on a JCS proposal that urged US military intervention in support of the Nationalist Chinese who were occupying the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu against an expected Communist assault. Again Admiral Radford, Admiral Carney and General Twining claimed that air and sea power would be sufficient to halt any communist military offensive. The US, Radford, argued, had a political and moral obligation to safeguard the harrassed Nationalists from Communist aggression. Ridgway was unimpressed. Looking at the problem from a military perspective, he pointed out that Quemoy and Matsu were within artillery range of the mainland, they had no military value for they were too close to the mainland to be used as offensive based for an invasion of China, they contributed nothing to the

military defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores (which he felt the US should defend), that in all probability the so-called offensive provocations of the Communists, i.e., their shelling of the islands, was designed to forestall any possible invasion of the mainland that the Nationalists were contemplating, and finally, from the available intelligence reports, there was no indication that the Communists were massing ground forces opposite the islands which they would have to do prior to an attempted invasion of Quemoy and Matsu.

He also disbelieved Radford's confident claim that the US could defeat an invasion of the offshore islands with air and sea power alone. At a minimum, Ridgway said, the defense of these islands against an amphibious invasion from the mainland would require the US to commit a division to Quemoy and a reinforced regimental combat team to Matsu.⁵⁰ As for Radford's latent argument that it was in the long-run interest of the US to use the shelling of Quemoy and Matsu as a pretext to begin a war that would enable the Americans and their Nationalist Allies to defeat Communist China while she was still relatively weak and vulnerable, Ridgway thought it was naive. The Army Chief of Staff did not doubt that the US could conquer China if it was willing to pay the terrible price required. But, he speculated, where would that leave US interests:

But I challenge any thesis that destroying the military might of Red China would be in our own long-range interest. We could create there, by military means, a great power vacuum. Then we would have to go in there with hundreds of thousands of men to fill that vacuum--which would bring us face to face with Russia along a seven thousand-mile frontier. If we failed to go in, then Russia herself would fill it, and the threat to our own security would not have abated one iota.⁵¹

He also rejected as dangerously provocative a Radford-Twining-Carney proposal that the US should assist the Nationalists⁶ in bombing the mainland in retaliation for the Communist shelling. For a second time, Eisenhower

bought Ridgway's minority viewpoint. However, Ridgway had made his anti-Radford brief not only within the executive branch debates, but also before the Armed Services Committee of Congress in September, 1954. This may account for Eisenhower's rather petulant account in his memoirs of Ridgway's dissent on the Quemoy-Matus issue:

Though the majority of the JCS concluded that the offshore islands were not militarily necessary to the defense of Formosa, all but one recognized the overriding fact that the islands' loss would have had possibly disastrous psychological effects. Therefore they believed we should defend them. Only General Ridgway, then Army Chief of Staff, refused to concur; the US, he said, should not commit any forces to hold the island. The Joint Chiefs, he went on, should not take upon themselves the non-military job of judging the islands' political and psychological value. What he was setting aside was the effect of their possible loss on the morale of Chiang's main forces.⁵²

His last dissent and the one which finally convinced Eisenhower that Ridgway should not be reappointed to the Joint Chiefs, concerned the FY 56 budget. Despite the fact that foreign policy developments in 1954 had negated many of the assumptions upon which the New Look policy was based, Eisenhower decided to speed up the phased reduction in the defense budget and to accelerate the planned cuts in military manpower. In December, 1954, Eisenhower met with the JCS and advised them that the long-term security interests of the US required a balanced budget as well as a strong military establishment. For FY 56, military expenditures were to be set at \$35.8 billion, a less than one percent increase over the previous year's budget. The Air Force and Navy budgets would receive a slight increase, but the Army budget was to be cut by approximately \$200 million. Moreover, the Army, whose manpower strength had been reduced by 100,000 the previous year, would lose an additional 225,000 men in the planned force levels for FY 56. Ridgway strongly objected to the size of the Army cut (he had been led to believe it would be

in the neighborhood of a 25,000 man reduction). He told Eisenhower that if the US hoped to deter a Soviet conventional offensive in Europe, or in the event of war support the five US divisions stationed in Germany, a minimum force of ten divisions should be deployed in the US, ready and equipped to move on a moment's notice. In any major future war, conventional or nuclear, he stated, the only forces that would be decisive would be those in being at the outbreak of combat. There simply would not be time for the US to rely upon its reserves and mobilization plans to make up initial shortfalls. That being the case, the presently deployed Army strength in the US was inadequate and should be built up or, at the very least stabilized, not reduced, by another 225,000 as the administration proposed.

Eisenhower quickly rejected Ridgway's plea telling him that if the Soviets attacked in Europe, the US would immediately respond with a SAC nuclear attack on the USSR. Moreover, he went on, Ridgway's suggestion that the US keep 10 divisions fully manned and deployed on American soil would constitute a temptation to become embroiled in future Korean-style conflicts and it would turn the US into an armed camp.⁵³

During the congressional hearings held on the administration's defense budget in the spring of 1955, the Democrats who now controlled Congress were attentive to possible weaknesses in the New Look policy. Some of the more skeptical members who feared that Eisenhower was cutting the conventional forces beyond a level that was prudent in light of the Soviet buildup of ground forces in Europe during 1954-1955, suspected that the driving force behind the new military budget was not the desire to streamline military forces and improve their effectiveness, but rather Treasury Secretary Humphrey's desire for a balanced budget. Therefore, when Ridgway voiced his reservations about the depth of the cuts and the harmful effect he thought they would have on national security, he received a sympathetic hearing in Congress.

In April, Ridgway appeared before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on DOD Appropriations. Under Secretary of the Army Fincune had defended the planned strength cut in the Army that would reduce it from 1,270,000 to 1,027,000 men by June, 1956. Such a force level, he said, would be quite adequate for any brush fire war, it satisfied budgetary requirements, and it reflected the force strength levels endorsed by the JCS and the National Security Council (NSC). Senator Smith, Me. (R), wanted to know who in the Department of the Army supported the cuts. Fincune replied that he did not recall them by name, but he supposed that it was only natural for any military man to be opposed to cuts in his own organization. Senator Symington, Mo. (D), noted that the Army's budget had been reduced from \$12.8 billion in FY 54 to a proposed \$7.1 billion in FY 56. In view of the Soviet buildup to nuclear parity (an assumption which was widely believed in 1955, but wholly inaccurate), he thought the cuts in the Army budget went too far.

After presenting his prepared statement in which he detailed the Army's programs and structure for the coming years, Ridgway opened his testimony by assuring the Senators that, "In spite of this reduction in strength, the Army continues to take every possible measure to maintain the maximum combat potential with the forces available."⁵⁴ Senator Chavez, N.M. (D), tried to draw Ridgway out. He asked him if the Army should have more forces. At first Ridgway demurred and told Chavez that inasmuch as the budget had received a careful, thorough analysis within the executive branch and because the President and his civilian advisors had made their decisions on what the force structure ought to be, it would be inappropriate for him to "reiterate views which I did present at the time this decision was in the making."⁵⁵

Chavez backed off and Ridgway went on to expound his thesis that in future wars advanced weapons technology would require more, not less men in

ground combat operations. This gave Chavez a convenient opening and he steered Ridgway back to the subject of the administration's manpower cuts:

...We would like to know from you as a military man whether or not in view of the fact that future wars will require more men, not less men, that the recommended reduction is sound.⁵⁶

Ridgway now revealed his criticism of the administration's budget and the position he had taken on the cuts in December. There was a real danger that the Democrats would use his "dissent" in their attack on Eisenhower's budget when it reached the floor of the Senate. Yet Ridgway did have a constitutional and professional obligation to give Congress his straight-forward opinion on military matters no matter how potentially embarrassing it was to the administration's partisan interest.

When the decision was in the making, when it was perfectly proper and in fact a duty to express my views, I strongly recommended a very substantially higher figure than that included in the present budget, sir.⁵⁷

Senator Thye, Minn. (R), a staunch supporter of President Eisenhower, came to the administration's defense. He advised Ridgway that both the JCS and the NSC had, as Mr. Fincune pointed out, approved the force levels. But, he went on, if he was incorrect in that supposition, then certainly Ridgway should so inform him. Moreover, if Ridgway, the Army Chief of Staff, the man "that is responsible for our strength in foot soldiers" felt that the numbers advocated by the administration for the Army were inadequate for the dangers faced, that he had a responsibility to say so.⁵⁸ Ridgway replied to Senator Thye's charge and invitation:

I feel impelled to make two comments. Twice, I think you have said that this represented the wisdom of several agencies, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These figures were not approved by the JCS.

And the other observation I will make is that at the time when this decision was in the making I expressed my opinion that a substantially higher figure should be the one approved.

Sen. Thye: Then am I to understand that the JCS did not concur in this manpower strength?

Gen. Ridgway: These figures were not recommended by the JCS, sir.

Sen. Thye: ...But did they concur? When the final decision came to a focal point, did they concur?

Gen. Ridgway: When a decision is announced by civil authority, sir, authority superior to the JCS, that question never arises. It is accepted with wholehearted loyalty, and we do our utmost to carry it out.⁵⁹

After establishing who in the administration had originally supported the force cuts, Thye told Ridgway that it appeared to him that although the military accepted the President's cuts, they evidently were uneasy and perhaps uncertain about the reductions. Again Ridgway explained the basis of his dissent:

...My recommendations, submitted when this was in the debate stage, were of course, made from the military point of view. They were made from the standpoint of conscientious reasoned judgment at that time, and I hope and pray God that they will all be so, as I assure you that they will.

I will never make a recommendation from any other basis. I recognize fully that the civil authorities of our government who make the final decisions have many factors besides the military to equate, to coordinate, and to evaluate, and it was their judgment which produced the figures you have before you.⁶⁰

Senator Stennis asked Ridgway exactly what figure he had recommended and was told 1.3 million men. He then asked Ridgway if the international conditions had deteriorated in the four months that had lapsed since Ridgway recommended an Army force level of 1.3 million. Ridgway agreed that they had deteriorated and that he had no professional reason to alter his December estimate of the Army's needs.⁶¹

Eisenhower wanted "team players," military advisors who factored into their recommendations the economic and political perspectives which governed administration policy. Such men, he believed, were free of the petty "parochial biases" that lessened the value of a military chief and justifiably neutralized the influence of the JCS as a corporate body. In his two years as Chief of Staff, Ridgway had earned the unenviable reputation as the "principal split paper man" on the JCS, i.e., the service chief who most frequently challenged the administration's policy proposals. While Ridgway's dissents were statistically few in number, they were politically and professionally significant. He voiced his reservations with considerable restraint and always justified them on well-researched professional grounds.

He may have over-estimated the risks the country ran by cutting the Army down to a million men and relying primarily on the SAC for its defense. But his misgivings about the efficacy of "massive retaliation" to deter conventional threats to US interests proved prophetic. As the Soviets increased their nuclear military strength, and as a rough nuclear "balance of terror" led to a military stalemate between the two superpowers, the US discovered that its atrophied conventional forces constituted a serious handicap to America's international flexibility. If today, in the hindsight of the Vietnam War, arguments on behalf of conventional forces and "flexible response" appear to be invitations to disaster, one should consider the beneficial limiting role played by conventional forces in the Korean War, the Arab-Israeli Wars, the 1961 Berlin Crisis, the 1962 Missile Crisis, and the 1970 Jordanian Crisis. That conventional forces and a strategy of "flexible response" can be misused and misapplied does not invalidate their inherent worth. In the exhaustion of the post-Korean War period, when many were looking for easy panaceas to the complex problems of national security, and when many

senior government officials glossed over the tenuous assumptions that lay behind their policies with catchy but vacuous slogans--"the great equation," "massive retaliation," a "bigger bang for the buck"--Ridgway retained his professional skepticism and thus constituted an important balancing force in the councils of government, especially in the JCS.

General Ridgway tried to maintain the legitimate professional autonomy of the military sector in government. For this reason, he opposed the radical concept of political-military convergence advocated by Radford and Eisenhower. As he would not use his military office, personal prestige, or professional views to support the partisan interests of the President's political foes, neither would he tailor his governmental role or professional opinions to conform to the partisan interests of the White House. Once the executive had made a final policy decision, Ridgway scrupulously carried it out without question or complaint. But his sense of professional integrity compelled him to refuse to appear before the public as the author of policies which he had opposed in the councils of government or in which he had little professional confidence. He believed that if the civilian leaders ever succeeded in their attempts to force a senior officer to make his reasoned military judgment conform to a political "party line," they would destroy the integrity and the value of that officer's professional opinions. In the long run, such military advisors would inevitably and unavoidably mislead their civilian superiors.

Ridgway's routinized-charismatic leadership style was compatible with the moderate Whig model of administration he essayed. As a famous battlefied commander of World War II and Korea, Ridgway had developed considerable personal prestige. However, he carefully constrained this heroic image by accepting the

pragmatic, routinized, limiting conditions of his profession. His authority was derived from both a personal and organizational base.⁶² Although he was innovative and displayed a strongly independent mind in the councils of government, his dissents were not designed to advance his personal interests. The realistic, pragmatic approach that he took to his duties was enhanced by a simplicity and straightfowardness of personal manner that had an uncommonly dramatic effect upon his subordinates. To a significant extent, his leadership style combined the diverse characteristics of the "military manager" and the "heroic warrior" leader. As Janowitz has noted, "Ridgway epitomized the fighter spirit and sought to keep it alive for organizational ends, rather than for personal honor."⁶³

Within the military profession, Ridgway was greatly admired. His interest and concern for the individual soldier was obvious and unpretentious. As Commander of the 8th Army and later as Chief of Staff, his sincere personal interest in the soldiers' fears, difficulties and problems were easily and widely communicated. In both instances Ridgway's courageous and concerned leadership lifted a depressed and troubled military organization out of its despair and left it with the beginnings of a confident sense of morale. One Korean War correspondent who observed Ridgway's efforts to resurrect the fighting spirit and the morale of the 8th Army following its retreat from North Korea in the winter of 1951 described him as,

...a warm, direct, plausible person with human emotions as well as a soldier's view. There is no purple in his talk. The plight of the Korean refugees has visibly affected him as have the conditions under which the GIs fight, and just as he is no shadow to the men he leads, so he gives you the feeling that each one of his men--officers and GIs--are supremely important.⁶⁴

Because of his acute recognition of the human costs of war, Ridgway resisted those policies that he believed either overestimated the capabilities

of military force to effect a cheap, easy solution to complex international problems, or underestimated the underlying, long-run military expenses involved in ground combat operations. If the civilian leaders were going to alter the composition of the country's military forces, or if they planned to commit US forces to war, they should at the very least, Ridgway believed, be fully aware of the probable risks and the eventual military costs involved in their actions. It was the professional responsibility of the military chief to analyze and explain these military risks and costs as he saw them, no matter how impolitic his information might be.

Prior to his retirement in June, 1955, Ridgway wrote a long, detailed letter to Secretary Wilson in which he set forth his concept of the role of the military advisor in government, defended his obligation to maintain the military's professional autonomy, reiterated his reservations about the administration's military policies, and stated what he thought the Army's needs in manpower and equipment were. It was the summation of his professional dissent from the administration's policies. Before sending the letter to Wilson, he had it reviewed by the Army Staff to insure that it contained no classified information. Secretary Wilson returned the letter without comment and ordered that it be classified "top secret." Fifteen days after Ridgway's retirement a junior officer on the Army General Staff "leaked" a copy of the letter to the New York Times.⁶⁵

It was a harsh critique of the government's defense policy coming from an officer whose reputation for integrity and non-partisanship was widely known in Washington. Eisenhower and Wilson were visibly angered. Shortly thereafter, the President publicly castigated Ridgway as a narrow-minded officer who had an exceedingly parochial view of the nation's military requirements. Wilson released his copy of the letter to the press and advised them that it was

"not very important." The publication of the letter boosted the morale of many military officers who were dismayed by Eisenhower's apparent indifference to the plight of the Army. It also gave the Democrats some political ammunition in their lethargic opposition to the New Look policy.

Many were sorry to see Ridgway depart. Hanson Baldwin considered him to have been the best Army Chief of Staff since Marshall and, while he acknowledged the youth, attractiveness, brilliance and ability of his successor, General Maxwell Taylor, Baldwin thought that Taylor would, "find it hard to fill--in the morale sphere--General Ridgway's shoes."⁶⁶ As events would indicate, Baldwin was quite right.

CHAPTER 4

GENERAL MAXWELL TAYLOR

Ridgway and Admiral Carney were not reappointed to the JCS because they had, against Eisenhower's wishes, publicly criticized the proposed FY 55 defense budget which reduced the strength of the surface forces and placed primary reliance for military security on strategic air power. The administration was reinforcing a "code of required conformity", a code the Joint Chiefs could violate only at the risk of their careers.

Why Eisenhower chose Taylor, who was known to be sympathetic to Ridgway's views, to be his next Army Chief of Staff is difficult to determine. A relatively young officer at 54, Taylor was very ambitious and, under normal circumstances, he could have expected to serve another six years. Fifty was the statutory retirement age for general officers, although the President had the authority to extend a handful of senior officers beyond that cutoff. Consequently, Taylor had an excellent chance to become Chairman of the JCS after a four year tour as Army Chief of Staff. Eisenhower may have recognized that Taylor's ambition could be used to check any tendency on his part to criticize administration policy. If this was Eisenhower's reasoning, he was partially correct. As one critic has noted, Taylor, "was always a great survivor; he had a capacity to meet a crisis head-on and survive."¹ Before he was nominated, Wilson and Eisenhower queried Taylor regarding his unqualified willingness to subordinate himself to civilian superiors. In his answer, Taylor professes some surprise at this questioning, but in light of what was happening between the administration and Ridgway, it is obvious that Wilson and Eisenhower were giving Taylor a not-too-subtle message about the ground rules that he was expected to observe as Army Chief of Staff.

A cardinal rule was to keep his opinions to himself unless they supported

the President's defense policy. Throughout his four-year tour as Army Chief of Staff (1955-1959), Taylor sporadically fought a losing battle within executive councils to prevent a further attrition of the Army's manpower and conventional strength. At times, no doubt, the relations between the President, who was bored and irritated by the continued complaints that he was weakening the Army, and Taylor, who was the author of many of these complaints, was strained and towards the end it was clearly cool. But if Taylor was a disappointment to Eisenhower, he was never the threat to the President's political interests that Eisenhower evidently believed Ridgway was.

A serious problem that confronted the new Army Chief of Staff in his first year was the so-called "Colonel's Revolt." Little has been written about this internal bureaucratic struggle within the Army General Staff, yet it may have had very important long-range effects upon the professional attitudes of the senior officers who led the Army during the Vietnam Era.² As noted above, Ridgway had set up an informal "think-tank" of young colonels on the General Staff to evaluate the future needs of the Army. By the time he left the government, it had evolved into a more formal organization known as the Coordinating Group. In 1955, in addition to analyzing future Army problems, this staff element evaluated the future needs and missions of the Navy and Air Force. Ostensibly, the expanded functions of the Coordinating Group were necessitated by the requirement, in an era of complex interdependent military roles, to "coordinate" the Army's future plans and operations with those of its sister services. Additionally, the evaluation of Navy and Air Force plans would give the Army an insight into the errors, weaknesses and gaps in these proposals. This was valuable information which the Army could use to safeguard its mission interests and discredit the more vulnerable Navy and Air Force proposals--especially those that threatened to expropriate traditional Army functions such as anti-aircraft defense.

The colonels of the Coordinating Group were convinced that the Eisenhower administration's policy of "massive retaliation" ignored the high probability that, given the inevitable "nuclear balance of terror," the Communists would find it convenient to nibble away at US national interests through limited or "brush fire" wars. Eisenhower's continuing program to reduce the military's conventional capabilities and his suggestion that further reductions in the Army's budget and manpower would be required in FY 56 and FY 57, alarmed many of the colonels. It appeared that the Army was losing an important part of its mission to a service, the Air Force, which would not be able to effectively counter the Communists in a limited war situation. Moreover, the ongoing reductions in the Army's budget were having such a debilitating effect on the Army's morale and operational capabilities that it was doubtful whether the Army would be able to perform effectively if it was committed to combat. Many of these officers had served in Korea and, like Ridgway, they vividly recalled the hapless condition of the Army units that were chewed up by North Koreans armed with obsolete Soviet weapons in the first few months of the war.

In the summer of 1955, the colonels began to put position papers together outlining their apprehensions, their case for a change in military strategy, and the need to reorient the nation's military in such a way that conventional capabilities were given a higher priority and more of the budgetary resources that were being lavished on nuclear strategic forces. These astute, polemical papers were circulated throughout the Army Staff. Younger staff officers (majors, lieutenant colonels and colonels) generally agreed with the thesis of the Coordinating Group and felt that their arguments should be made to the President, Congress and the public. On the other hand, the senior officers, although they agreed with the thrust of the colonels' complaints, were reluctant to support a full-scale challenge^{to}/administration defense policies. Few of the generals were ready to follow Ridgway into retirement over a policy dispute

with President Eisenhower.

However, one general, one of the Army's brightest stars and Ridgway's favorite protege, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Lieutenant General James Gavin, "listened to them, encouraged them, and served in an unofficial way as their advisor, using them as his own sounding board."³ Gavin, Taylor, and Ridgway formed a complex and interesting elite military triumvirate. During World War II their daring, innovative leadership of the Army's new airborne units had made them famous battle heroes and earned them considerable renown within the military. They became the core of the post-war "Airborne clique" that figured prominently in the Army's senior leadership circles.

All three were West Pointers (Ridgway--class of 1917, Taylor--class of 1922, and Gavin--class of 1927). In the 1950s, while serving at the highest levels of the Army, they opposed many of Eisenhower's military policies on the grounds that they violated professional military standards, weakened national security, and unwisely downgraded the Army's conventional capabilities. Eventually, each retired in frustration and anger at the President's continued refusal to change his defense policies. Following their return to private life, each general published a book in which he bitterly criticized the Eisenhower administration for its obsession with the delusionary military strategy of "massive retaliation" and its corollary--small Army budgets. Their celebrated "dissents" received a favorable hearing from ambitious Democratic congressmen, like Lyndon Johnson and John Kennedy, who were sympathetic to the Army's plight, highly critical of Eisenhower's military policies, and looking for a viable campaign issue to use against the Republicans (when Kennedy and then Johnson took control of the executive in the 1960s, they based a great deal of their administrations' military policies upon the Ridgway-Gavin-Taylor critiques that they had used with such good effect in the Senate to attack Eisenhower's

military policies and promote their own political interests in the late fifties.)

Taylor and Gavin were often viewed as the linear descendants of Ridgway. However, Gavin was considerably closer to Ridgway than Taylor was (in his autobiography Ridgway mentions Taylor with respect; he is effusive about Gavin's abilities). Between Taylor and Gavin there was a long-standing professional and intensely personal rivalry. During Taylor's second tour as Chief of Staff (1957-1959), his relationship with Gavin became increasingly strained. Years later during the Vietnam War, Taylor and Gavin were on opposite sides of a bitter debate over the conduct of the war. Ridgway publicly endorsed Gavin's "dovish" position in 1966 and criticized those "hawks" in the Johnson administration, who, in pressing for an increase in the bombing campaign against North Vietnam (NVN), ignored the moral factor in military planning and pursued the panacea of achieving a 100% air interdiction of the enemy's logistical network--a military will o' the wisp that the Korean War had thoroughly debunked.⁴

In 1968 when he was called to the White House as a member of a prestigious group of elder statesmen who were invited to advise President Johnson on what he should do in the aftermath of the Tet Offensive, Ridgway, much to Taylor's dismay (Taylor, as always, was pushing for increased bombing), sided with those who advised Johnson to cut his losses and get out.⁵ When Kennedy recruited Gavin and Taylor to his administration in 1961 (Gavin briefly served as Ambassador to France), he may have been unaware of the antipathy that existed between the two. According to Halberstam,

Kennedy also assumed that all good generals liked one another, and thus that General James Gavin, similarly a good general, a romantic Airborne figure who had written books and also shortened a brilliant career in protest over Ike's policies, and who had supported Kennedy against Nixon--a prime test for a good general--must be a friend of Taylor's. "Jim, Jim," Kennedy had once yelled to a departing Gavin in the White House, "Max is here!, Max is here!", imagining that the two were

close friends but drawing from Gavin the coldest look imaginable.⁶

Taylor had been thinking along the same lines as the colonels in the Coordinating Group. Observing Ridgway's struggles at a distance (he was the US Commander of Far Eastern Forces before he became Chief of Staff), Taylor had drawn up his own brief for a "flexible response strategy" and a military policy that would start a crash program to improve America's deteriorating conventional military forces. He entitled his paper "A National Military Policy." Later it became the basis for his 1960 book, The Uncertain Trumpet. When Taylor met with the colonels and showed them his paper and expressed his support for their efforts, it appeared that he was prepared to take up their and Ridgway's struggle. More papers were written and additional policy meetings were held in the Pentagon to map out the Army's bureaucratic strategy for the upcoming debates on the FY 57 defense budget.

In December , 1955, the Eisenhower administration ordered a complete reassessment of national defense policy in order to create a military program that would carry the government through FY 60. It seemed an opportune time for Taylor to present his suggestions for a new Army program to the administration. Early in 1956, at the urging of the colonels, Taylor passed his paper to the other members of the JCS for comment. Their reaction was decidedly negative. Taylor evidently had expected some support from his peers for what he felt was an honest and objective program, but the other Chiefs saw it as a threat to their portion of the budget. About the same time, Ridgway, now in retirement, began publishing excerpts from his forthcoming memoirs in a six-part series that appeared in the Saturday Evening Post. The first article was entitled "Keep the Military out of Politics."⁷ This was more fuel for the Army's in-house campaign to change the administration's defense policies. However, it was politically embarrassing to the President when Democrats in

Congress took up the same cause.

At the same time the Air Force and Navy Chiefs began to press Wilson for more funds for their services. Both Ridgway and Taylor, in testimony before the HASC, called for a sizeable increase in the active Army, the modernization of conventional combat equipment, the acceleration of a program that would develop guided missiles for tactical use, a radical improvement in the Air Force's tactical air support oriented towards the Army's needs, and an intensive effort on the part of the Air Force and Navy to enhance the airlift and sealift support they provided the Army.⁸ The administration, fearing that the reassessment of defense policy might get out of hand, lead to fiscal overruns in an important election year, and also give the Democrats the initiative on the issue of national security in the fall presidential election, quickly began to backpedal.

A special meeting between the JCS and Secretary Wilson was held in March, the outcome of which was an agreement by the Joint Chiefs, "that no increase in military personnel was necessary and that no substantial shift in emphasis among military programs was desirable."⁹ In return for their public endorsement of the administration position, Wilson advised the JCS that it was inevitable that their budgets would be increased to some extent. Shortly thereafter, Taylor's request to publish his plan for "A National Military Policy" as an article in Foreign Affairs was turned down after the State and Defense Departments registered their objections with the President.¹⁰ When the administration's budget was finalized, most of the original Army requests for improvements in its conventional capabilities were turned down. At this point, "The Army did not join the issue."¹¹

However, in April 1956, Senator Symington, Mo. (D), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), Subcommittee on the Air Force, opened hearings entitled "A Study of Airpower." Retired Air Force Chief of Staff Carl Spaatz

and the SAC Commanding General Le May denounced the President's FY 57 budget as wholly inadequate to the needs of the Air Force. Le May went far out on a limb and stated that the austere budget limits imposed by the administration were seriously hampering SAC operations. While the Air Force warhorses dominated the hearing, Taylor did appear at one session to make a further plea for Congress to enlarge the reduced Army budget. The hearings turned into something of a partisan circus, but they did reveal the deep splits that existed between the administration and the Joint Chiefs. Admiral Radford and Secretary Wilson testified against the "parochial" views of the military chiefs and reiterated the administration view that the US could not afford to support military forces for all contingencies, that strategic air power was paramount, and that if Congress increased the defense budget it would be making a dangerous, foolish sacrifice of economic strength for an unneeded increase in military forces.¹² While Congress increased the Air Force budget, it declined to add anything to the Army's.

Impressed by the effectiveness of Air Force's budget campaign and disarrayed at the continued failure of the Army to secure additional funds, the colonels of the Coordinating Group went to Taylor during the course of the Symington hearings and told him that something drastic should be done to convince Congress that Eisenhower's military budget was inadequate for the country's long-range national security needs. They proposed a plan which imitated the methods and techniques of the 1949 "Admiral's Revolt". Army staff papers, critical of the President's defence policies and advocating an increased military budget designed to improve the nation's conventional military capabilities, would be "leaked" to the press and friendly congressional contacts. Senator Henry Jackson would be approached and urged to conduct hearings on the status of the ground forces and the problem of limited wars. Various members of the Coordinating Group would travel around the country making speeches on behalf of the Army's

new program before sympathetic audiences. It would be an extensive, carefully orchestrated campaign designed to inform the press, the public and Congress of the Army's desperate plight and thereby bring political pressure on the President or Congress to reexamine national military policy and hopefully increase the Army budget.

Taylor was interested in the plan, had a memo drawn up on it, signed it, and thus committed himself to a dangerous public dissent from the administration's defense policies. Brigadier General Lyal Metheny, head of the Coordinating Group, or the secretariat as it was also known, worked closely with Brigadier General William C. Westmoreland, the Secretary of the Army General Staff (and a prominent Taylor protege), in setting up the colonels' speaking schedule and other details of the program. One of the colonels in the secretariat, Colonel William Depuy, was unhappy with the plan for a public dissent because he thought (quite correctly) that it would bring down the wrath of Eisenhower and Wilson on the Army Staff.¹³

In late April and early May, 1956, the Army's campaign began. Articles were written and circulated throughout the Pentagon and Washington. Speakers from the Army General Staff began to spread the message before influential Army audiences at service schools and Army posts throughout the country. A critical press contact was Anthony Leviero, the Pentagon correspondent of the New York Times, who had been an important conduit of information for the Navy admirals in 1949.¹⁴ Donovan Yeuell, an outspoken leader of the "Colonel's Revolt," was the brother-in-law of Wallace Carroll, news editor of the New York Times Washington Bureau. Carroll advised Yeuell that the Times would not push the colonels' story unless it was sure that the Army leaks had the backing of the Army high command. That meant the support of general officers. A series of meetings were then set up in which a handful of generals from the

Army Staff assured the representatives of the Times that the program to inform the public of the Army's needs had the full backing of the Army high command.¹⁵

Shortly thereafter, staff papers detailing the Army's case were passed to Carroll. From these "leaked documents" and interviews with "Pentagon sources," Leviero wrote a series of articles on the inter-service rivalry that was breaking out in the Defense Department over the administration's budget cuts. The articles, which were given front-page treatment, came out at a time when the Eisenhower Administration was scrambling to defend itself from the political charges of defense mismanagement and military weakness that were being raised daily in the explosive Symington hearings.

"In certain sections of the Army General Staff," Leviero wrote, "there exists a strong but repressed undercurrent of resentment over the subordination of ground forces to air power."¹⁶ He then went on to detail the Army's many grievances. On May 19, Leviero reported that the inter-services disputes reflected not just the usual inter-service bickerings over the budget, but rather serious doctrinal problems about fundamental strategic concepts, service missions, and weaponry. The Symington hearings had surfaced some of these problems,

but the polite, carefully-hedged public statements [by the service chiefs] are only superficial manifestations of profound conflicts...The Army is vigorously opposing primary reliance on nuclear airpower although this concept is national policy. It is understood that the Army will insist on a reappraisal before the main outlines of the New Look Defense program for 58, 59 and 60 are crystallized this fall.¹⁷

Leviero then quoted in full an Army staff paper entitled, "A Great New Debate--Problems of National Security." After pointing out numerous weaknesses in the strategies of the Navy and the Air Force, and the thesis of "Massive

Retaliation," the paper concluded with a sharp but accurate criticism of the administration's military policies:

What this all means is that the US is grossly unprepared to deal with the communist threat. We have violated the first principle of strategy by failing to shape our military strength to meet the likely dangers.

Unless there is an immediate revision of our military strategy, it is probable that the international position of the US may disintegrate to a point where we shall be forced into either total war or subjugation.¹⁸

Another staff paper which predicted that future wars would be limited and local in nature appeared a few days later. In retaliation, the Air Force began to release their "staff papers" to Leviero and their side of the story turned up on the front pages of the New York Times. All in all, the public, to the dismay of the President, was being treated to one of the most intensive, informative, but politically explosive, public debates over national military policy that it had witnessed since the late forties.

The Secretary of Defense, Charles Wilson, was outraged by the public airing of a policy dispute between the Air Force and the Army that the administration had been trying, with limited success, to keep "in-house." On May 20 he termed the Leviero revelations, "a most unfortunate business" and promised the reporters that he would personally look into the matter. The services, he said, "don't have to try their differences in public and in the press on a propaganda basis...they don't have to practice psychological warfare on each other...There's a bunch of eager beavers down in the Army Staff, and if they stick their necks out again, I'll chop them off."¹⁹

Congressional views on the Army-Air Force dispute were divided. Senator Chavez, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations, was angered. The services, he said, "ought to quit being prima donnas and work

for our common purpose--the defense of the country," (which was precisely what the colonels thought they were doing). Senator Henry Jackson, Washington (D), criticized Wilson for not settling the inter-services' differences on an equitable basis and said the administration had imposed unreasonable ceilings on the military budgets. Senator Francis Case, South Dakota (R), however, did not feel that the public airing of service differences was such a bad thing for the country, "It doesn't worry me because a certain amount of such rivalry is healthy. If we don't have pride and competition, the boys might get a bit sloppy. It helps to keep them on their toes."²⁰ Senator Kefauver, Tenn. (D), argued that the dispute pointed out the need for a proper balance between the priorities and funds allocated to the three services. Representative George Mahon, Tex. (D), Chairman of the powerful House Military Appropriations Subcommittee, stated that the conflict, "has been brewing under the surface and it's now out in the open; it should have been here before; it should be kept here until the issue is resolved."²¹

On the 22nd of May Secretary Wilson called an unexpected news conference at the Pentagon. The assembled JCS flanked Wilson, sitting glumly by as he read an opening statement (a couple of the officers, Taylor among them, were wearing their dress white--they had been attending a White House function when Wilson preemptorily ordered them to the Pentagon for the press briefing). The problem was, Wilson began, that,

Army, Navy and Air Force differences over weapons, money and missiles had taken on an exaggerated importance when "eager beaver" service partisans slipped confidential staff papers to the press...There will always be some difference of opinion within and between the services in connection with military operations. Honest differences and reasonable competition...are healthy and will result in a stronger defense establishment.

It is not good for the country, however, to have these differences, some of which are set forth in conference papers, aired on the basis of service partisanship without giving the proper responsible officers [i.e., the JCS] the opportunity to weigh all the factors involved.²²

Wilson then gave each of the military leaders an opportunity to recant the leaks. They responded appropriately and gave a determined impression of unity, disavowing any intention to slight the contribution of their sister services. On his turn at this public "mea culpa," Taylor said he wanted to nail down one vital point, "There is no mutiny or revolt in the Army." He then disavowed as representing "the views of the Army" one of the Army documents published by the Times which had suggested that the inordinate emphasis on air power would lead to national disaster. However, a few minutes later, he reversed himself by saying, "I don't disavow anything that has been published."

Taylor was a meticulous man who always did his homework and was usually prepared. But in this instance he was caught off-guard and he fumbled.

Reporter: General Taylor, since there seems to be so much harmony and only some few ruffles of dissent, can you explain, sir, why some of your colonels--I have good reason to believe that they were in that category--saw fit last week to disseminate documents which they purported to be official documents representing Army views which are contrary to the accepted views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Wilson: I will take a little flip at it first. I think the eager beavers are gnawing down some of the wrong trees.

Taylor: First, I would like to know who the colonels are.

Reporter: Who was ready to shield the colonels if their boss was not? I don't know, sir.

Taylor: Number two, let me make a very sharp distinction between the views you can get in the halls of the Pentagon. You can probably get 1,000 views. They are not official. They are not the views of the Army unless I recommend them and the Secretary approves them. Hence, I could say with only a cursory glance at the papers I have been reading, that I disavow they are the views of the Army.

To a later question concerning the adequacy of the Army's air support, Taylor replied that he thought it could be improved, but that he supported the present budget which disallowed such increases.²³

A few days before the Wilson press conferences, major changes had occurred in the Army's staff. The colonels' Coordinating Group was disbanded, their files burned, and they were ordered to take a vacation. A number of in-house "investigations" were conducted to put an end to the leaks and appease Wilson. Many of the officers were quietly transferred out of the Pentagon. According to Halberstam, Westmoreland acted as Taylor's agent: "Within the Army command, the colonels were told that Westmoreland, who was halfway in and halfway out of the cabal, had assured Taylor that he would take care of the colonels for him and clean it all out."²⁴ Of those involved in the "Colonels' Revolt," only the names of Taylor, Westmoreland and Depuy are familiar--they survived and went on to other matters in the Vietnam War.

Taylor's instinct for survival had saved him from Ridgway's and Denfield's fate, but the cost was high. His initial decision to support the colonel's ill-advised public relations campaign was poorly thought out. As Ridgway had demonstrated in his tour as Army Chief of Staff, a senior officer had sufficient congressional and executive forums in which to make his professional case, if in doing so, he was willing to put his career on the line. However, once having given the colonels the green light, to have repudiated them under political pressure as Taylor did was a terrible blow to the officer corps' sense of professional integrity and morale.²⁵ The message was clear--an officer's public statements were to reflect his support of administration policies. The controversy had flared out in part because of the inordinate, self-serving desire of the administration for quiescent "teamwork" among the military services. Gradually, the value of "going along" with the political party line and repressing troublesome professional doubts would assert itself in the outlook of most senior officers. As James Reston noted in a prophetic column on the controversy, "teamwork" and "going along" do not necessarily lead to sound policy decisions.

...more emphasis on explaining the nature of the complexities and anxieties now facing the government and less emphasis on "teamwork" for the sake of "teamwork" might have produced more public controversy, but at the same time they might also have produced more solutions and a far wider public understanding of what is going on here.²⁶

During his three remaining years as Chief of Staff, Taylor walked a careful line trying to balance the Army's needs and its morale against administration demands that the Joint Chiefs refrain from criticizing presidential policies. He kept a relatively low profile and tried, through quiet diplomacy and careful circumspection, to influence Eisenhower and the JCS towards policies that were more favorable to the Army's interests. When the Democrats took an active interest in military preparedness as a campaign issue in 1958, Taylor's half-hearted attempts to get the government to think about the problem of limited wars and modernize its conventional military forces failed. In 1957, Taylor tried to get more funds for the Army by embracing the administration's hobby horse, atomic power. Army units were reorganized, with much fanfare, into Battle Groups and Pentomic Divisions. The Army's ever-decreasing manpower strength would in theory be offset by greater mobility and widespread use of tactical nuclear weapons. But in the face of continued presidential and congressional opposition to an increase in the Army's budget, Taylor's plan to use the new atomic army as bait for more funds failed. While Taylor still championed the cause of "flexible response" and the "need for conventional weapons," the constant setbacks he encountered in his lobbying efforts and a strong disinclination to avoid a direct confrontation with the executive over military policy caused him to temporize and placate the Army's roiling dissatisfaction as best he could.

While Taylor would testify to the Army's reservations about the efficacy of atomic weapons and the continued need for conventional weapons, his reservations were

increasingly guarded, mute, or oblique. The negative reaction of Congress and the President probably convinced him it was a useless exercise to keep pressing for weapons they weren't going to get.²⁷

Gavin was disturbed by Taylor's apparent acceptance of the status quo. In December, 1957, in testimony before the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee, Gavin urged that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be abolished and replaced by a "competent career staff of top-notch military officers to provide the Secretary of Defense better military advice." "At present," he went on, "the Secretary of Defense is getting inadequate professional military advice." Although his comments were a veiled criticism of Taylor's conduct as Army Chief of Staff (Gavin believed that his rival had "caved-in" to political pressure from the executive and was therefore not pressing the Army's case with sufficient vigor), he emphasized in subsequent questioning that he did not mean to reflect on any present or past military leaders.²⁸

Three weeks later, on January 5, 1958, Gavin abruptly announced his retirement. Eisenhower and a number of Gavin's peers felt that his retirement was a self-serving ploy to garner a fourth star. Gavin's supporters feared that his retirement was being forced because of his repeated refusal to rein in his outspoken criticism of administration policies. During the initial reaction to Gavin's decision to retire, Taylor stayed in the background. He did not want to give any credence to the false rumor then circulating that he had engineered Gavin's departure.

Gavin was a peculiar maverick with a stubborn sense of professional integrity; however, he lacked Taylor's charm, polish, and suaveness. A driven, intense officer, his passionate convictions often lead him to overstate his case. While Taylor was no doubt relieved to see Gavin depart, he realized full well the adverse effect Gavin's resignation would have on Army morale,

especially among those officers who felt that Taylor was too much of a "politician." There is no evidence whatsoever to indicate that Taylor was responsible for Gavin's early retirement, although it is probable that Taylor was a factor in Gavin's decision. Most likely the Army Staff was just too small for their competing egos. Before he left, however, Gavin vented his spleen and directed some sharp words at his superiors. They reveal the internal strains and pressures that were troubling the Army Staff and creating morale problems for Taylor.

In announcing his retirement, Gavin reemphasized his concern over the steady deterioration in the Army and the indifference of the administration to the Army's problem. The frustration he felt over the inability of the Army to achieve adequate funding was generated in part by his fear that the USSR was in a position to surpass the US in the development of ICBMs (at the time the Army and the Air Force shared the US guided missile program). A Soviet superiority in these weapons, Gavin stated, would probably encourage the Communists to risk peripheral limited wars.

Senator Lyndon Johnson asked Gavin to reappear as a witness before his Subcommittee on Military Preparedness. It was an unusual request, and it proved highly embarrassing to the administration. In the course of questioning, Gavin told the Subcommittee that he was retiring because he was, "no longer being considered for promotion and assignment to a more responsible position." In the current atmosphere pervading the Pentagon, Gavin claimed, it "did not help a man's career to be 'frank and straightforward' in testimony to Congress."²⁹

The next day Secretary of the Army Brucker publicly offered Gavin a fourth star and command of the 7th Army in Germany. It was a remarkable and unprecedented form of political bargaining. Gavin was surprised by the offer and told the Secretary he would reconsider his decision to retire. However,

when he appeared before Johnson's committee to testify a second day, he informed the Senators that his decision to retire was final and that it had nothing to do with a desire for promotion. Gavin had excellent prospects of employment in the civilian community. The assignment offered was very similar to the one he had requested and been turned down for in the fall. Brucker's offer may have been a shrewd ploy designed to discredit Gavin and undercut the political impact of his anti-administration testimony before the Preparedness Subcommittee. Throughout the weeks his name was in the headlines, Gavin was under intense psychological pressure and reporters noted that he appeared to be emotionally exhausted.

During the hearings, Gavin said that he had been severely taken to task by his superiors (whom he left unidentified) for his testimony before Congress which bluntly criticized the administration's failure to arrest the deteriorating condition of the Army.

I didn't want to go through another session of Congress if I couldn't testify freely...I would not go through another session and be silent listening to inaccurate testimony...I was taught as a cadet that a soldier's duty is to seek out danger...I did that in the war, and I was determined I was going to do it in Washington.³⁰

Following his retirement, Gavin wrote a harsh critique of Eisenhower's military policies in a book entitled War and Peace in the Space Age. It was a sweeping indictment of President Eisenhower's technological shortsightedness and obsession with fiscal "restraint." He stated that in future limited wars, mobility would be the key to success and therefore the Army should begin an intensive development of the helicopter for a new "sky cavalry" concept. Many of the technological and tactical ideas delineated in the book were realized in the Vietnam War.³¹

Gavin's bitter exit eliminated one of the most significant links to the Ridgway years. In the last year of his tour, Taylor, looking forward to

retirement and realizing that he would not, after all, become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, went public with his dissent. He received considerable encouragement and political support from Senators Johnson and Kennedy and other Democratic congressmen who were fastening on to "flexible response," the "missile gap," and "military preparedness" as issues for the upcoming 1960 presidential race. Taylor's outspokenness in 1958-1959 rose with the tide of congressional criticism that the Democrats orchestrated against Eisenhower's military policies. In March, 1959, testifying on the FY 60 Army budget before Johnson's Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, Taylor said flatly that the Army was unprepared to confront the Communists in a conventional war.³² That same month the three service chiefs sent a critical memo to Senator Johnson in which they detailed their objections to the administration's FY 60 defense budget. As the powerful Senate Majority Leader, Johnson's patronage of the Joint Chiefs encouraged an unusual outspokenness on their part. Ironically, the informal Johnson-JCS alliance against the President's FY 60 budget soon fell apart. In their testimony before Johnson's committee, the military chiefs spent more time criticizing each other's strategic programs than they did objecting to the fiscal limits imposed by Eisenhower. The focus of Johnson's preparedness campaign was dissipated. Other congressmen began to voice their concern over the lack of unanimity among the JCS.³³ Congressman Mahon's complaint was typical:

Upon whom can we rely? There is no one to whom the Congress can turn with complete assurance that we can get the right story.³⁴

In vain Taylor sought to convince the critical legislators that unanimity amongst the JCS was not an inherent good:

I think it is a mistake to judge effectiveness by unanimity of opinion... I think these fundamental questions [of military policy and strategy] must be

brought out, the pros and cons, and a vigorous analysis made so any broad-minded and intelligent man at the level of Secretary of Defense can see where the right course of action lies.

In other words, many times it is not unanimity of opinion but rather a clear, accurate definition of the issue which is the greatest contribution these chiefs can make.³⁵

It was an interesting comment in part because it contradicted Taylor's long-standing argument for a single military chief for all the services who would be able to bring a harmony and unity to the Joint Chiefs' conflicting views. Whether Taylor realized it or not, it was a short step from JCS unanimity to a single "military party line" that would certainly weaken inter-service competition, stifle independent professional judgments, and encourage a bureaucracy of military yes-men.

By the time Taylor was finally elevated to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in October, 1962, the JCS were well on their way to being transformed into presidential agents. While Kennedy as a congressman had praised military dissenters, as President he was quick to demand that the Chiefs subordinate their professional opinions to administration guidelines.³⁶ Kennedy was determined that the military chiefs should not use the press or congressional forums as a sounding board for military opinions or recommendations that conflicted with administration policies or provided his partisan foes with political issues. Kennedy solved one potential motivation to military dissent by greatly enlarging the defense budget pie and insuring that the three services received relatively equal shares. In a period of economic plenty, the Joint Chiefs found it relatively easy to harmonize their differences with each other and the executive. A second factor that lowered the volume and level of the military chief's dissents and their influence was the "McNamara Revolution" in which computers, systems analysis, and a brilliant,

aggressive, and arrogant Secretary of Defense steam-rolled old-fashioned military judgment.³⁷ McNamara's managerial and political innovations in the Department of Defense helped eliminate unnecessary waste, costly duplications, professional skepticism, and political wisdom. Professional military intuition gave way before the certainties of calculated rationalism. After a shaky start, the "McNamara Revolution" worked brilliantly, achieving one smooth success after another until it all came apart under the pressures of Vietnam--a problem it had not predicted and could not quantify.

Finally, with the exception of Curtis LeMay, the officers promoted to the senior officer levels represented a new breed of military professionals. They had reached the top by following a standard, prescribed career pattern. Unable to claim that special distinction and personal authority which is the hallmark of a great battlefield commander, they almost had to be "organization men" who dutifully reflected the dominant values and characteristics of the military establishment they were running. It was an increasingly unified and centralized system that stressed technical, administrative competence and devotion to the will of the President and his chief civilian advisor, the Secretary of Defense. The concepts that Ridgway and his generation of officers had stressed--professional responsibility, the public interest, and a sense of duty to one's subordinates as well as one's superiors--were still present but no longer paramount.³⁸ Senior military officers who were traditionally susceptible to the mystique of the "Commander-in-Chief" became increasingly dominated by it. Where once they had been professional experts jealously guarding their political independence and professional autonomy, they now were forced to become (by circumstances and systemic changes in their own military institutions) political agents and advocates of presidential policies.

The senior military leaders and, ironically, the civilian superiors who advocated changes in the military advisor's role, were both victims of a subtle form of politicalization. These modifications, which led to greater convergence between the executive's external controls and the military's professional standards, were expected to enhance civilian control and improve the defense policy process. While they facilitated increased presidential control of the military at the expense of congressional access to independent professional military views and inter-service policy debates, they also saddled the President with military policies that were tailored to his prejudices but which ignored political and professional military realities.

There were a handful of senior officers (Ridgway, Gavin, Shoup, Taylor, Burke) whom Kennedy admired for their personal qualities or because they impressed him as unusually imaginative representatives of their profession. But by and large, he thought the "brass" were a rather dull, narrow-minded group who would give him many political headaches if they were not carefully guided. After the Bay of Pigs, his skepticism turned into a thinly veiled distrust.³⁹ At the time, the Chairman of the JCS was General Lennitzer, a careful, earnest, but essentially bland staff officer. He had replaced Taylor as Army Chief of Staff in 1959. He got on relatively well with Eisenhower, authored no books nor ventured any public dissent against administration policies. In one year he made it to Chairman. The Kennedy team was totally unimpressed with Lennitzer's cautious, passive manner. In the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs he and the rest of the JCS were treated in a rather shabby fashion. Simply put, the administration used them as convenient scapegoats.⁴⁰ The military chiefs retaliated with their own leaks and were criticized in the Senate by Symington as "sneaks in uniform." Senator Gore, Tenn. (D), called for the JCS's replacement by "new, wiser and abler men."⁴¹

Kennedy was also irritated by the advice of the JCS during the April, 1961 debate over a possible US military intervention in Laos. Some of the President's civilian advisors thought Laos would be a splendid place to demonstrate the new administration's toughness in the face of Communist aggression. There was talk of a "surgical strike" (against what no one said), an airborne landing, or bombing. Decker, Army Chief of Staff, and Lemnitzer, with their memories of Korea still fresh, advised caution, or if the US did go in, to go in with everything all at once--tactical nuclear weapons, a 250,000 invasion force, and strategic nuclear bombing if the Chinese came in. When asked about the feasibility of a smaller airborne landing, Lemnitzer said, "We can get them in there, all right, it's getting them out that worries me."⁴² The price the Chiefs suggested was too high and Kennedy's political instincts lead him to believe that a Laos intervention was untenable.

Kennedy decided that he could no longer trust the JCS's professional judgment or their political loyalty to his administration (the only exception was the Marine Corps Commandant, General David Shoup, who did retain the President's confidence). McNamara's political authority over the JCS was increased and their role as presidential advisors was informally downgraded: "The President's relations with other professional military men [outside of Taylor and Gavin] remained at best cool, distant and wary. For practical purposes, Kennedy received military advice only as it filtered to him through the civilian Secretary of Defense."⁴³ It was decided that the four carry-over Chiefs (Lemnitzer, Decker, White and Burke) would have to be replaced as soon as it was politically feasible. In the interim, Maxwell Taylor was recalled from retirement and installed in the White House as the President's special military advisor. Until Kennedy finally eased Lemnitzer out and replaced him as Chairman with Taylor, Taylor acted as a de facto single Defense Chief.

One way the JCS could be made more compatible with the President's thinking, his White House aides told Kennedy, was to persuade the Joint Chiefs to "broaden" their perspective. At Taylor's suggestion, Kennedy met with the Chiefs in May, 1961 and informed them that they were not simply military specialists, that they were or should aspire to be "soldier-statesmen" whose advice must reflect much more than a narrow military perspective. Henceforth Kennedy said, he expected the Chiefs to structure their military advice in such a way that it incorporated a judicious evaluation of broadgauged economic and political factors. Kennedy was advising the Chiefs that they could no longer fall back upon Ridgway's concept of military professionalism as an excuse for giving military advice and opinions that were not in line with administration thinking.

The Kennedy defense group rejected both the Eisenhower view of permitting the military to set down its requirements within stated budgetary limits and Ridgway's conception of military professionalism that demanded exemption from the task of having to consider economic and political factors in deciding military policy.⁴⁴

The broad conceptualization of the JCS's advisory role that Kennedy demanded had profound political implications. As the JCS came to accept this presidential directive, their professional autonomy declined. Those who resisted this principle of extreme civil-military convergence were accused of advocating the discredited MacArthur doctrine that purely military considerations should determine national security policy. Although this charge misrepresented MacArthur's true views,⁴⁵ it was a clever strawman that effectively distorted the traditional position of those military officers who continued to believe that, although the military man should be fully cognizant of the political and economic factors affecting national security, it was beyond his competence to evaluate them; that this was the special administrative

responsibility of his civilian superiors; and that if the senior military chief modified his professional opinions in the light of non-military factors, the objective military risks and costs involved in a proposed defense policy would be obscured.⁴⁶ A political breadth of view, they feared, would replace a professional depth of knowledge. If the Joint Chiefs took the "broad view" they would be far less likely to dissent from administration policy on objective professional grounds.

When Admiral Burke and Air Force Chief of Staff White retired in 1961, they were replaced by Admiral Anderson and General LeMay. Both were outspoken, independent officers who fiercely rejected Kennedy's concept of the JCS role in government. As witnesses before congressional committees, they did not hesitate to oppose administration policy. Unfortunately, both officers were zealous cold-war ideologues, particularly LeMay, and their "dissents" were often marred by partisan prejudices. LeMay continued to enjoy the strong political support of the congressional "Air Force Lobby" and Kennedy found it easier to handle LeMay by simply impounding Air Force funds appropriated by Congress which he considered excessive, rather than by silencing or replacing the irascible Air Force hero.⁴⁷

Anderson, however, did not have LeMay's political contacts or his prestige. He opposed McNamara's tight centralization of the Defense Department, and he bitterly resented the increasing tendency of civilian Defense officials to intervene in the details of military operations. The Admiral also complained that the administration ignored the professional opinions and downgraded the professional expertise of their military leaders. Although he constantly sought congressional support for his dissents, Anderson felt that Congress was becoming "the forgotten partner in civilian control" and that therefore, military chiefs who publicly opposed administration policies would

be subject to increasingly severe political reprisals by the executive.⁴⁸ He was quite right. After a stormy two-year tour, Anderson was abruptly dropped from the JCS in 1963. He was sent off to Portugal as Ambassador in the hope that his continued association with the administration would muffle his criticisms. However, he continued to make speeches in which he warned that the overcentralization of authority in the OSD and the pernicious tendency of the executive "to discredit the voices of military dissent" threatened the constitutional system of checks and balances.⁴⁹

With the appointment of Wheeler as Army Chief of Staff and Taylor as Chairman in October, 1962, Kennedy had two military advisors who fully accepted his concept of executive civil-military relations. McNamara continued his centralization program, establishing functional and geographic unified military commands and DOD level intelligence, supply, and audit agencies which reported directly to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The organizational authority of the service chiefs was undercut and circumvented while the relationship between the military and Congress was weakened.⁵⁰ McNamara's goal was to resolve all policy disputes within the councils of the executive branch before they reached Congress and gave administration critics political ammunition to use against the President's policies. Conflicting views between the services were allowed, and in some instances, encouraged as long as they did not surface in congressional hearings.

Representative Carl Vinson, Georgia (D), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) was convinced that McNamara's policies were threatening the independence of the military services and eroding Congress' authority over the defense establishment. In August, 1962, one of the subcommittees of the HASC released a report which criticized the overcentralization of authority in the OSD. It warned that as more and more defense decisions were taken over

by the Defense Secretary and his numerous civilian assistants, and as professional military advice was downgraded in the policy process, "lower echelons will develop a no-decision or indecisive philosophy."⁵¹

As Chairman of the JCS, Taylor proved to be a valuable ally for McNamara and the President. He and his protégé, General Wheeler, became a major source of political support for administration policies within the military establishment. Taylor had a considerable influence over the direction of the government's Vietnam policy. Accepting without reservation the dubious thesis that the US must, for the sake of its national prestige, "win" a counterinsurgency war against the Communists in Indochina, he quickly became an unrelenting and optimistic "hawk" on Vietnam. In November, 1961, Kennedy sent Taylor to South Vietnam (SVN) to make a political-military assessment of the situation. Taylor evidently assumed that the President had committed the US to a policy designed to prevent--at a low cost to the US--a Communist takeover of SVN. He was aware of the President's anger at the "minimal price" tag the JCS had placed on a previous administration proposal to intervene in Laos--250,000 troops and tactical nuclear weapons. Taylor was a shrewd administrator who realized that if he hoped to retain his influence in White House circles, his recommendations should reflect the President's disinclination to intervene with US military forces on a large scale and his enthusiasm for low profile counterinsurgency measures that would, hopefully, handle the military problem in SVN at a minimal cost to the US. In contrast, Generals Lemnitzer and Decker were slow to comprehend Kennedy's impatience with military advice based upon the "never again club" thesis that the US should avoid any military intervention with ground forces on the Asian mainland, but if it did intervene, it should do so in a major, overwhelming manner. This had been the thrust of Ridgway's recommendations in 1954 on Indochina and Lemnitzer's in 1961

on Laos. Both had opposed as militarily untenable counter-recommendations for a very limited, piecemeal commitment of US ground forces to the Asian mainland. In setting the minimal costs of a limited US intervention at such a relatively high level, they may have overstated the military risks involved (although in light of subsequent events in SVN this does not appear to be the case), but at least they could not be accused of leading their civilian superiors down a primrose path. The politically detached and stark military prescriptions of the "never again club" constituted a salutary, cautious restraint on ill-considered policies that threatened to overcommit the US to peripheral conflicts irrelevant to American national security interests.

Taylor's 1961 report on Vietnam, however, was designed to stress those actions which he thought politically compatible with the President's thinking on the subject--keep the military costs low, the US involvement to a minimum, and prevent a Communist takeover in SVN. He avoided the mistake the JCS had made in April when they boldly advised Kennedy to either stay completely out of Laos or intervene with a large 250,000 man invasion force backed up by overwhelming air support and tactical nuclear weapons if necessary.⁵² Taylor advocated a convenient gradual, piecemeal approach which avoided confronting the President with unpleasant and impolitic alternatives suggested by the objective political and military realities, i.e., in SVN the US was faced with a rapidly deteriorating political-military situation that could be reversed only by a substantial military intervention with ground forces on a scale that was probably out of all proportion to the American strategic interests involved. Thus, Kennedy and Taylor were faced with the difficult dilemma that Eisenhower and Ridgway had confronted in the 1954 Indochina crisis. The US could avoid a political defeat only by committing itself to a major, if limited, ground war in Southeast Asia, a war, whose military and political costs were certain to be

high--potentially higher than the value of the peripheral US interests at stake.

Fortunately Eisenhower had Ridgway's unflinching, realistic assessment of the military price of intervention and the domestic political capital to accept the lesser of the two evils--the establishment of a Communist state in North Vietnam. Kennedy however had a miniscule electoral plurality of 118,000 and the ever-confident Maxwell Taylor as his chief military advisor.

I was not asked to review the objectives of this policy but only the means being pursued for their attainment. The question was how to change a losing game and begin to win, not how to call it off.⁵³

Taylor's report to the President recommended a sharp increase in the American aid effort. It also urged the immediate dispatch of 4,000 US combat troops (and gradually more as needed) to provide an emergency reserve for the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) and to serve as a symbol of America's determination to help the South Vietnamese overcome their "crisis of confidence." While he noted in passing the dangers involved in such a piecemeal military intervention (a weakening of the US strategic reserve for the sake of a relatively peripheral area, an increased commitment of American prestige to an uncertain ally, the initiation of a possibly open-ended military commitment, and a possible increase in tensions in Southeast Asia leading to further commitments), Taylor carefully played them down and emphasized the case for a low profile intervention:

The size of the US force introduced need not be great to provide the military presence necessary to produce the desired effect on national morale in SVN and international opinion...

As an area for the operations of US troops, SVN is not an excessively difficult or unpleasant place to operate...

The risks of backing into a major Asian war by way of SVN are present but not impressive. NVN is extremely vulnerable to conventional bombing, a weakness which should be exploited diplomatically in convincing Hanoi to lay off SVN. Both the DRV [North Vietnam] and the Chinese would face severe logistical difficulties in trying to maintain a strong force in the field in SEA...There is no case for

fearing a mass onslaught of Communist manpower into SVN and its neighboring states, particularly if our airpower is allowed a free hand against logistical targets. Finally, the starvation conditions in China should discourage Communist leaders there from becoming militarily venture-some for some time to come.⁵⁵ [emphasis added]

Taylor's optimistic, self-confident assessment provides a sharp contrast with the wary, skeptical attitude that characterized a similar report on a proposal for US military intervention in Indochina made by Ridgway in 1954. Notwithstanding the many different contextual variations in the two situations, one cannot ignore the tragic myopia of Taylor, the renowned "soldier-statesman," or fail to appreciate the sound judgment of Ridgway, who limited himself to straight forward military evaluations: "When Ridgway in 1954 investigated the possibility of US troops in Indochina, he maximized the risks and minimized the benefits; now Taylor was maximizing the benefits and minimizing the risks."⁵⁶

Aside from the gross errors in the political evaluations he included in his report, what is curiously odd, considering his brilliant military reputation, are the flaws in Taylor's military judgment. The Korean War vividly revealed the serious limitations of air power as the decisive weapon in an infantry war against an elusive Asian peasant army.⁵⁷ Certainly air power was helpful, but it was not a practical substitute for very large numbers of US ground forces and concentrated artillery fire. In retrospect it seems incredulous that Taylor, the last commander of the 8th Army in the Korean War, believed that the Communist forces in Indochina were "extremely vulnerable" to conventional bombing. Coming from an Air Force general, such ignorance, while deplorable, might be excusable. In Taylor's case it is not.

Kennedy was alarmed at Taylor's proposal for modest intervention with US combat troops and quickly buried that portion of the report while carefully circulating those recommendations which addressed the social and political

aspects of the Vietnam problem.⁵⁸ Taylor's prescriptions echoed the revised views of the JCS who had belatedly come to realize that a new military party line which stressed counterinsurgency, the piecemeal commitment of US military advisors to SVN, and carefully orchestrated forms of military escalation, was now in vogue. The candid, realistic military assessment of "the never again club" were politically out of tune in an administration which took great pride in its ability to "fine tune" military force requirements to the most ill-defined political objectives. From the fall of 1961 on, senior military leaders became increasingly receptive to Taylor's delusionary thesis that the US could and should defeat the Communist rebels in SVN through a relatively restricted, limited and politically inexpensive commitment of US ground and air forces. The relatively few military doubters who thought the old concepts of "the never again club" still made professional sense were accused of failing to consider the non-military factors that structured the situation.

In addition to the personal respect he enjoyed in executive councils as the most sophisticated military officer of his generation, Taylor's influence over the government's Vietnam policy was also enhanced by the personal military network he was rapidly building up. Even before he became Chairman of the JCS, Taylor's associates and former proteges began to receive the key assignments in the military bureaucracy, especially that portion oriented to the Vietnam problem. In 1962, a few months after Taylor recommended a re-organization of the US Military Mission in Vietnam, Lieutenant General Paul Harkins, a trusted friend of Taylor's, was assigned to Saigon as Chief of the new US military mission. Harkins had a undistinguished reputation as a capable, "diplomatic" staff officer. He and Taylor had been cadets together at West Point and their careers had often crossed in later years. When Taylor

was Superintendent of the Military Academy, Harkins was his Commandant of Cadets; during the Korean War he served with the 8th Army as Taylor's Chief of Staff. Harkins, with no special qualifications for the difficult task ahead other than his personal loyalty to Taylor, went off to Vietnam and served there for two disastrous years without developing any appreciation of the complex factors involved in the war.

Before Harkins was chosen, there had been some speculation that a more innovative unconventional officer like General William Yarborough or Colonel Ray Price, both of whom had considerable experience in the type of political-military warfare developing in SVN would be sent to Saigon. These men, however, were not part of the Taylor team and, unlike Harkins, they may not have parroted Taylor's optimistic views on Vietnam. If Harkins served Taylor well, he served the military profession and his country poorly,

His two main distinctions during his years of service in Vietnam would be, first, that his reporting consistently misled the President of the United States, and second that it brought him to a point of struggle with a vast number of his field officers who tried to file realistic (hence pessimistic) reports. But even here the fault was not necessarily Harkins'. In all those years he felt that he was only doing what Max Taylor wanted, and there was considerable evidence that this was true, that his optimism reflected back-channel directives from Taylor.⁵⁹

Others, such as Wheeler, Westmoreland, and Goodpaster, benefited from Taylor's influence and rose to preeminent positions in the military during the Vietnam War. Like their patron, they discounted any professional military doubts they had and became optimistic political advocates of ill-defined military policies.

Personal networks in the military profession are not, per se, undersirable. In the past, many have been quite beneficial, both for the country and the profession, e.g., Pershing's, Marshall's, Ridgway's. They have cultivated and passed on a tradition of imaginative, innovative and judicious military leadership.

What is most unfortunate about Taylor's network is that it was made up of mediocre, vacuous conformists. They were for the most part military officers who followed narrowly-prescribed career patterns and accepted without question the faddish military and political ideas of the times. Their minds were set in the ideological concrete of the Cold War. Like MacArthur, Taylor had a strong penchant for subordinates who were loyal, submissive and remarkably inept.

Taylor and his proteges helped build a military bureaucracy whose cardinal rule was to anticipate the predilection of the President and then to give him the advice he desired. Conformity became the hallmark of the Taylor network. At a critical time when the government desperately needed the counsel of independent-minded military professionals, it was saddled with a bland collection of military bureaucrats who were psychologically incapable of making the detached, critical, evaluations so essential to judicious military policies.

As Chairman of the JCS (1962-1964), Taylor adopted the advocacy administrative style of his old nemesis, Admiral Radford. Acting as the chief military agent of presidential policies, Taylor urged, and in some cases pressured, the Joint Chiefs to adapt their professional views to the perspectives of administration policies. He also came to believe that only those senior officers who were compatible with the President's way of thinking and acting should be appointed to the JCS and that, if necessary, a new President should gradually purge the JCS of those members who continued to be unsympathetic to administration policy objectives. It was clear that an informal "military party line" was being laid down and that Taylor was to be chief enforcer within the military establishment. Those officers, like Anderson, who resisted White House guidance and carried their dissents to Congress would be quietly eased out. Taylor, the celebrated "dissenter" of the Eisenhower Chiefs who had, according to the New Frontier's incorrect account, resigned

his office on a matter of professional principle in order to carry his fight to the public now became President Kennedy's military "whip." For all the criticisms that Taylor and Kennedy had made in the 1950's of Eisenhower's "intolerance" of military chiefs who declined to endorse presidential policies they believed were militarily unsound,⁶⁰ it turned out that Taylor and Kennedy also wanted yes-men on their JCS. Unlike their predecessors, however, Kennedy and Taylor eventually succeeded in getting a comparatively quiescent JCS.

Describing his apparently changed concept of the JCS's proper role in government, Taylor writes in his 1972 autobiography,

With the opportunity to observe the problems of the President at closer range, I have come to understand the importance of an intimate, easy relationship, born of friendship and mutual regard, between the President and the chiefs. The Chairman should be a true believer in the foreign policy and military strategy of the administration which he serves or, at least, feel that he and his colleagues are assured an attentive hearing on those matters for which the Joint Chiefs have a responsibility.⁶¹

Although Taylor's 1960 book, The Uncertain Trumpet, received favorable attention as a valuable if harsh critique of Eisenhower's military policies and, while it certainly enhanced Taylor's reputation as a military chief who had risked his career to make a much-needed "dissent" on a matter of professional principles, this senior military "dissenter," unlike his predecessor, Ridgway, was not unsympathetic to the idea that the Joint Chiefs, or at least the Chairman, should tailor professional judgments to the administration's official line:

A Secretary of Defense needs a strong Chairman to direct the work of the Chiefs, to keep their noses to the grindstone, and to extract from them timely advice and recommendations--preferably of a kind which can be accepted and approved without embarrassment. Advice can be unpalatable and unwelcome particularly if it runs afoul of political and economic considerations which the administration holds in great store. A Secretary will look to the Chairman to prevent this kind of

advice and to bring forth harmonious views on appropriate subjects which can be used in support of the Department's programs.⁶²

On the surface, it was an odd view coming from an officer who had bitterly criticized the Eisenhower Administration for its insistence on a monistic "military party line." It is also indicative of the paradoxical nature of this complex officer's character. It may be that Kennedy was not unaware of Taylor's views on the proper role of the Chairman--views which were distinctly different from those of Ridgway and Gavin. That being the case, it is doubtful that Kennedy was under any misapprehension that in getting Taylor to join his administration, he was getting another Ridgway. Independent military skeptics like Ridgway, Gavin and Shoup were admired--at a distance--by Kennedy. Like most presidents, he overemphasized the potential threat they posed to his political interests and undervalued the judicious contributions they could make to the policy process.

Throughout his tour as Chairman, Taylor kept the Joint Chiefs' dissents to a minimum. His testimony on Capitol Hill blunted much of the military's criticism that did surface in Congress. As one observer has noted, during Taylor's tour and thereafter,

...only those senior military officers who kept their differences "in-house" and accepted the concept of reaching decisions via military-political-economic integration got promoted.⁶³

At least Kennedy realized that he and Taylor were emasculating the JCS, for he usually treated their advice with the heavy skepticism it deserved. His successor, Lyndon Johnson, followed Kennedy's example and surrounded himself with military sycophants recruited by Taylor. Johnson, however, made the mistake of treating the Joint Chiefs' policy advice as if it carried the weight of professional detachment. Ultimately the military professionals failed the

country and the President in Vietnam because they had been guided by an assortment of promotion policies, political pressures, institutional constraints, and prescribed career patterns, to support, without reservation, administration policies and to sublimate any inclination to make a critical, independent evaluation of such policies on professional military grounds. When, as was usually the case in Vietnam, the military forces authorized by the President were incommensurate with or inappropriate to the ambiguous policy objectives established, there was no senior military officer in the government who was motivated by a sense of professional responsibility to point out to the emperor that he was not wearing any clothes.

The military's senior officers became, like their civilian superiors and counterparts, primarily concerned with maintaining the approval of their administrative superiors and organizational peers rather than with developing a critical insight to the problems at hand. In catering to Johnson's mania for policy consensus and group cohesiveness, the Joint Chiefs consciously discounted and unwisely censored their professional doubts.

Taylor left the Joint Chiefs in 1964 to become the American Ambassador to SVN and after a frustrating year returned to Washington to serve out the rest of Johnson's term as a special advisor to the President. He spent a good deal of his last years in government defending the administration's crumbling Vietnam policy before congressional and public audiences. His reputation as a brilliant soldier-statesman and judicious military advisor was ravaged. Towards the end, he began to sound like a Democratic MacArthur--railing against the "indecisive use of military power," "unheroic images," "selective and slanted reporting" which "spread defeatism among the tenderminded at home," and the need to "silence future critics of war by executive order."⁶⁴

Ironically, what Taylor thought was an important personal asset proved to be his undoing on the subject of Vietnam. In discussing his 1964 assignment to Saigon as Ambassador, Taylor viewed himself as a missionary who understood the task at hand and believed in it.

It was an enormous advantage for a missionary to be a true believer and I was. Unhappily, during the Johnson Administration, there were many supporters of the President in key positions related to Vietnam policy who were not true believers, and both the individuals and the policy suffered from the fact.⁶⁵

When Maxwell Taylor retired for the first time in 1959, William S. White in an article entitled "The End of the Old Army," viewed Taylor's departure as a radical changing of the guard that would result in "profound alterations not only in the Army, but eventually in the very way the country feels and thinks about its military establishment."⁶⁶

The "changing of the guard" was indeed an important watershed in the Army's organizational history. It marked a transition from the quasi-independent leadership style of the military professional to the more dependent leadership style of the military bureaucrat. Taylor's leadership style combined elements from both the professional and bureaucratic types although he clearly leaned towards the latter. Therefore, Ridgway's retirement in 1955, or perhaps Gavin's in 1958, marks the break between the "old" and the "new" Army. Secondly, the "profound alterations" in the Army, specifically the radical change in senior leadership models, is more properly attributed to Taylor's actions rather than his departure. In fact, Taylor is the true architect of the "new" Army. Taylor is an enigmatic and difficult officer to assess, primarily because he was the transitional figure between two opposite military leadership styles. He symbolized many of the professional traditions of the "Old Army" in which, "men were capable of free will, and therefore of a sense of sin, remorse, and compassion," a profession

"made up of generalists and, curiously, a staggering number of individualists. It valued peace more than any other service--and more than nearly any civilian--because it really understood what war was."⁶⁷ Yet at the same time he was cultivating the antithetical characteristics of the military bureaucrat--administrative identification with the President, ideological commitment, political advocacy of executive policies, the acceptance of extreme civil-military convergence, the sublimation of professional judgments, and careful deference to the values of monocratic-hierarchical loyalty.

As a member of the President's inner circle of advisors during the 1960's, Taylor became politically and personally committed to administration policies and the men he served. No doubt he enjoyed the special political prestige that accrues to White House intimates. Within his profession, Taylor's remarkable reputation as an innovative administrator, heroic battlefield commander, and military intellectual earned him widespread respect and great influence. However, his personal style, which was austere, reserved, and somewhat professional, set him apart from his colleagues. His relationship with subordinates lacked the emotive sense of comradeship traditionally characteristic of senior general officers (and frequently feigned). This cool, analytic, meticulous general was rarely described as a "soldier's soldier." He got on particularly well with the urbane, sophisticated, "action-intellectuals" that made up the New Frontier set in part because he seemed so unlike the traditional Army general. It may be that Taylor was more at home in the senior civilian political circles he gravitated to in the sixties than he had been in the ranks of the military elite. However, Taylor's actions in the 1960's, particularly his efforts to broaden the perspectives of his military subordinates, should not be written off as the cynical conduct of an overly ambitious senior official who found it personally expedient to exchange

professional for political authority. Rather, Taylor's behavior, and one might add, his errors, can be attributed to the fact that in embracing the personalities, the goals, and the problems of the presidents he served so faithfully and at such a great personal cost, Taylor abandoned, perhaps unconsciously, the professional soldier's traditional sense of detachment and skepticism. Although he was often publicly identified with the tradition of professional autonomy and political detachment epitomized by Ridgway, Taylor ultimately rejected it and was instrumental in replacing this traditional orientation with a more dependent, bureaucratic one.

General Taylor was reputed to be a very sophisticated officer who understood the subtleties and interrelationships of the most complex political-military problems. However, his performance in both the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Vietnam War are distinguished by a noticeable lack of foresight.⁶⁸ In both cases he displayed the inflexible attitude of the Cold War ideologue and the zealous confidence of the hawkish advisor who is out to vindicate treasured but ill-considered hypotheses of action. For a military professional, he had a surprisingly myopic understanding of the US's long-range strategic interests. He never advanced the argument that what happened in Southeast Asia was irrelevant to America's global military posture, or that if the US committed itself without reservation to the defense of SVN (as Taylor advised) such an involvement might lead to a dangerous misallocation of US military power and thereby indirectly threaten America's strategic interests. If he harbored such doubts, his primary concern with the political and psychological aspects of the Vietnam conflict caused him to discount them.

While he did make a valuable and critical military evaluation of the inherent illusions that flawed Eisenhower's "massive retaliation" strategy, he was incautiously sanguine about the effectiveness of a "flexible response

strategy," conventional bombing, counterinsurgency operations, or limited war to bring about desired complex political objectives. In short, Maxwell Taylor was an articulate, knowledgeable, but essentially injudicious military advisor. Unfortunately, there is a certain amount of truth in Averell Harriman's acerbic description of General Taylor, "He is a very handsome man, and a very impressive one, and he is always wrong."⁶⁹

In the bureaucratized officer corps that Taylor helped fashion, there was no room for potential Ridgways, Gavins, or Shoups. Consequently, there were no senior level military dissents against the foolish, deceptive policies that plunged the US into the Vietnam debacle and kept it there for eight ruinous years. The officers Taylor boosted were a hard-working group of self-effacing functionaries who ended up being held responsible for a gradual military escalation and piecemeal war of attrition that they never believed in and which they privately thought was professionally senseless.⁷⁰ However, because they had been trained to give "compatible advice" and to keep their professional doubts "in-house", the Joint Chiefs did not challenge the fundamental validity of these policies or reveal to Congress the full extent of their professional misgivings.

They managed the longest war in US history and for the most part their names are unknown. Their judgments and predictions were politically compromised and abysmally inaccurate. Yet in light of the desire to bureaucratize the military officer corps and adapt it to an extreme model of civil-military convergence, this is precisely the sort of professional military advice the civilian leaders in the executive deserved. As Ridgway warned, the self-subordination of the senior military advisor's professional judgment to specified political-economic guidance and the corollary political requirement that service chiefs publicly indorse military policies although they believe them to be professionally unsound, inevitably leads to a sterile form of

of administrative conformity. Part of the tragedy of the Vietnam period is that the senior military leaders' excessive administrative conformity and lack of professional autonomy was self-induced. Had they held President Johnson's feet to the fire in 1965 by forcing upon him and Congress an independent, detailed, professional analysis of what a military intervention in Southeast Asia would realistically cost, they might have, as Ridgway did in 1954, demolished the narrow, self-serving illusions that so often pave the way to political disaster. They did not of course, and for that collective failure Taylor is indirectly responsible.

CHAPTER 5

THE JOINT CHIEFS AS MILITARY BUREAUCRATS

Taylor's legacy to the military chiefs was revealed in the fateful decision the Johnson administration made in the spring of 1965 to begin a gradual introduction of US combat troops into Vietnam. General Earl Wheeler, a long-time staff officer and Taylor protégé, was the Chairman of the JCS. He had replaced Taylor the previous summer.

Wheeler had made his reputation in key staff assignments in the late fifties--Chief of Army Strategic Planning, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, and in 1960, Director of the Joint Staff. He was described as a skillful but relatively unknown officer who was on Taylor's "wave length" and who had impressed McNamara as an unusually intelligent military officer "with a feeling for facts as well as tradition."¹

Since the Tonkin Gulf incident in August 1964, the Joint Chiefs and Ambassador Taylor had been urging Johnson to expand the US military presence in Indochina and begin a major bombing campaign against NVN. The critical question of what the US should do if the bombing failed to reverse the Communists' increasing political and military successes, was studiously avoided. The gradual escalation program the US was following in SVN was based on a series of circumspect, low-profile military measures that many senior American officials were certain would lead to the defeat of the Communist insurgents in the near future. In fact, these convenient, inexpensive, military panaceas (the advisory effort, the strategic hamlet program, and the celebrated counterinsurgency operations) were remarkably ineffective. The impolitic truth remained unsaid--they were irrelevant to the objective political and military realities of the Indochina War. Their primary effect was to temporarily delay the deterioration of ^{the} administration's Vietnam policy. These measures spared the President from having to face the harsh but inevitable political

decision of choosing between two undesirable and unprofitable alternatives-- either letting North Vietnam establish hegemony over Indochina, or committing the US to a major limited war comparable in scale and cost to that of Korea in an uncertain effort to shore up the South Vietnamese and weaken if not destroy the major portion of the Communists' military power.

The carefully restricted bombing campaign against NVN that began in February 1965, was designed to be another low-key, lengthy military operation that would, the Johnson administration hoped, succeed where its predecessor had failed. Again, however, the allocated military means proved to be commensurate with the ambiguous and ambitious political objectives assigned, i.e., to demonstrate the American political commitment to safeguard SVN; to force NVN to halt its infiltration of troops into the South; and to compel the Communists, both North and South, to accept a secure non-Communist state in SVN. In other words, the American government was prepared to pay a very small military price in order to pressure the North Vietnamese into accepting a major political defeat.

This "slow squeeze", piecemeal use of air power, reflected the President's confused and equivocal approach to the war. It violated the Air Force-JCS assessment of what tempo of air strikes would be required for the bombing to have a meaningful military effect, and it did not dissuade, politically or militarily, the North from its determined commitment to unify Vietnam under a Communist regime. However, it did reflect President Johnson's desire to protect his partisan interests by keeping the domestic political costs of the bombing at a minimum. The JCS, realizing the futility of such a constrained level of bombing, pressed for less restricted air operations. However, they were careful not to suggest that the President's policy might be senseless, as it was from both a military and political perspective.²

When Johnson's "Working Group" had drawn up the plans for the proposed "sustained reprisal" bombing campaign, Wheeler had reminded the civilian advisors that US troops would be needed in SVN to provide base security for American aircraft. Significantly, this admonition was excluded from the final draft of the position paper that W. Bundy drew up for the President.³ Now with the bombing campaign under way and failing to do anything but solidify the political will of the North and cause them to increase the rate of NVA infiltration into SVN, the Joint Chiefs declined to raise the unpleasant, taboo subject of the US ground troops that would shortly be needed to protect US air bases in SVN.

As for the men who should have known better--that one step might lead to the other, that there was a Rubicon and that with the bombing they had to assume that they were crossing it--men like Taylor and the Chiefs, they were in no hurry to bring it up and make the President live with it...The entire bombing decision was complete and full as far as bombing went, and almost totally unrealistic as far as the true implications went, the implications of getting into a real war. There was an unofficial decision on the part of the principals not to look at the real darkness to protect the President from what might be considered unpleasant realities, not to ask the hard questions.⁴

A secret decision was made in March and April 1965, to introduce US combat troops into SVN in order to forestall an imminent Communist military victory in the South. The JCS had reason to believe that the slow pace of the buildup, the piecemeal character of the deployment, and the relatively limited numbers involved, would dissipate the overall military effectiveness of the US action. Yet, they quietly settled for what the President would allow and carefully kept their campaign for more troops in-house. Although the fundamental nature of the US commitment and the military's ground mission in SVN had been radically altered by the President's decision, the Joint Chiefs dutifully parroted the deceptive administration line that America's Vietnam

policy remained unchanged. There is no indication that the senior military leaders, the elite of a profession which prided itself on its special code of honor and non-partisan concept of duty to country, felt obliged by a sense of professional responsibility to advise either Congress or the public of the radically new character of US military operations in SVN, and the probable implications that this change would have for the American people.

With the gradual intervention of US ground forces, the Joint Chiefs expected that the bombing campaign would be substantially expanded. However, Johnson was reluctant to apply US conventional air power to its full extent. He was also deeply worried that the combination of American troop interventions and increased bombing would give undue public prominence, domestic and international, to the stepped-up pace of American military action in Indochina. Consequently, he refused to expand the bombing. Again the JCS refrained from pointing out to the President the illogical nature of his decision which had the contradictory effect of increasing the American military commitment while dissipating its effective strength. Only two senior government officials suggested the ominous truth--that Johnson's equivocal, confused policy of escalation would lead to disaster.

McCone, Director of Central Intelligence, expressed the view that it was inconsistent for the US to commit its ground troops to SVN without substantially increasing the tempo of the air campaign being carried out against NVN. If US combat troops hoped to defeat enemy forces in SVN, then the North, which CIA reports clearly indicated had not suffered appreciable damage from the level of bombing that had been authorized to date, should be subjected to a bombing campaign carried out with minimum restraint. Unless this was done, McCone wrote, the enemy would simply escalate its infiltration rate and increase the military pressure on US forces in South Vietnam with the result that,

we will find ourselves mired down in combat in the jungle in a military effort that we cannot win, and from which we will have extreme difficulty in extracting ourselves...

If we are unwilling to take it this kind of a decision now, we must not take the actions concerning the mission of our ground forces for the reasons I have mentioned...⁵

George Ball, on the other hand, urged the President to recognize that in Vietnam, the "US was pouring its resources down the drain in the wrong place" and therefore should cut its losses and get out.⁶

From the start of the US troop buildup, the Joint Chiefs based their plans on what they thought they could cajole out of the President, not on what their professional judgment indicated the military situation required. Moreover, the military feared that if the objective situation required a US military response that exceeded the administration's policy guidelines, the President might follow Ball's advice and throw in the towel or worse--accuse his military advisors of overestimating the military dangers for their own parochial organizational interests. Consequently, there was a concerted effort by the military bureaucracy to make the facts coming out of Vietnam conform to the administration's indicated policy. When it became clear that the President was prepared to send some troops to SVN, Westmoreland's military intelligence staff in Saigon initiated a detailed study of the North Vietnamese's reinforcement capability. Logically, if the US was to intervene with ground troops, the number of American troops sent over would be based, in part, on the expected number of enemy troops that were expected to be encountered. The conclusions of the intelligence estimate appalled the staff officers. After everything was doublechecked, it still turned out that NVN had an unusually large Army and an unexpectedly strong capability of reinforcing its forces in the South. To counter these stunningly high levels of enemy troops, the US would need to send far more soldiers than the President's guidelines contemplated. The problem was solved by simply scaling down the intelligence study's figures.⁷ On paper

at least, this made the NVA's reinforcement capacity and capability more compatible with Washington's thinking on the subject. Throughout the Vietnam War, the military bureaucracy was addicted to the convenient, if fallacious, solutions made possible by the prostitution of its own intelligence reports and professional recommendations. Both were frequently tailored to the known prejudices of administrative superiors. A speculation from the Pentagon Papers seems uncomfortably accurate:

It can be hypothesized, that from the outset of the American buildup, some military men felt that winning a meaningful victory in Vietnam would require something on the order of one million men.

Knowing that this would be unacceptable politically, it may have seemed a better bargaining strategy to ask for increased deployments incrementally...it would indicate that MACV's plan of what to do was derived from what would be available rather than the requirement for manpower derived from any clearly thought out military plan.⁸

Despite the military intervention that was slowly escalating in the spring of 1965, and the ominous jump in the weekly casualty rates, it was very important for Lyndon Johnson to maintain the political illusion that the US was not going to war in Southeast Asia. If the public profile and the budgetary costs of the military involvement became too high, congressmen unsympathetic to the President's Great Society Program would be able to use the war issue as a political rallying point. The financial and human costs of the war would then be used as an effective political excuse to vote down expensive social legislation.

For this and other political reasons--fear of alarming the electorate, a desire to avoid the impression that the military was dominating the policy process, and apprehension over the possible reactions of Russia and China--Johnson refused to call up the Reserves or mobilize the National Guard for Vietnam duty. The announcement of this negative decision in July shocked the Joint Chiefs. In a conversation with the President in June, Wheeler had

informed Johnson that the number of US troops needed in Vietnam would depend on what the administration wanted to do, e.g., 750,000-1,000,000 men in combat for seven years to drive the enemy out of SVN. Johnson quickly made it clear that this was not a politically expedient figure or one that he wanted his advisors to consider. Therefore Wheeler carefully scaled down the costs by advising the President that everything could be fine-tuned to the "different gradations and different levels" that the administration had in mind.⁹ Nevertheless, by July 1965, three divisions were in or on their way to Vietnam, which was swallowing up the military's resources at an unexpectedly rapid rate, in part because the North Vietnamese, as predicted but not reported, were escalating at a faster rate than were the US-ARVN forces.

The JCS had asked the President to issue an executive order declaring a state of national emergency and to follow it up with a request to Congress to approve a joint resolution authorizing the induction of the organized Reserve. McNamara suggested a figure of 235,000 men. Without a call-up, the Army knew it would eventually have to cannibalize the 7th Army in Germany and the National Strategic Reserve in order to meet its military requirements in Vietnam, which, from a global perspective, was a purely peripheral theater. Such a mal-proportioned commitment of US forces was a dangerous threat to national security. In every respect, the "modest" intervention in Indochina was beginning to place serious destabilizing strains upon the American armed forces. Trained manpower, which the Reserves had in abundance, was at a premium. To get this skilled manpower through the draft, the JCS believed, would take too much time in light of the swift NVA buildup and the worldwide shortages in trained manpower that were rapidly eroding the combat effectiveness of military units outside of Vietnam. In the event of another non-Vietnam military emergency, the JCS doubted that the military would be able to make an adequate response. The situation in Indochina had simply moved faster and proved to be more costly

than they had anticipated it would.¹⁰

However, the President responded to his own political fears which coincided with the influential signals from important congressional Democrats that a Reserve call-up would be extremely unpopular with their constituents. There would be no change in the government's Vietnam policy, the President announced on July 29, but in order to free more ARVN soldiers for combat, another 50,000 US soldiers would be sent to SVN to guard installations and act as an emergency reserve. To handle this modest increase, draft calls would be doubled.¹¹ Thus, mobilization and a major debate in Congress over the course, conduct and objectives of the war was carefully avoided. The President's decision was very popular with the public and most congressmen. The military chiefs knew better.

From their professional perspective, it was not difficult to see the long, drawn-out, indecisive and costly war of attrition that lay ahead. They would get more troops but as always, they would be too late, too little, too restricted and irrelevant to the exigencies of the conflict. Better than any others, the military leaders understood the futility and agony that this war would bring. There would be no clear purpose, no logical relation of military means to political ends, only another needless and frustrating stalemate that could not justify the moral, political or military costs involved.

There was some angry talk of resignations and possible discussions with friendly congressional contacts, but the Joint Chiefs had learned their lessons too well. They were bureaucrats now, devoted if chagrined servants of their Commander-in-Chief. They had nailed their colors to his cause, never pausing to consider that what was in the President's political interest might not be in the country's. The traditional values of professional integrity, political detachment, and administrative neutrality, had been ground out of these professional military officers. Sadly, they had not resisted. They disagreed

strongly with military policies they believed to be professionally unsound and yet like so many of their military colleagues, they were publicly silent.

Two days before his decision on the Reserve and Guard call-up was made public, President Johnson met with his senior advisors to inform them that he was taking the "centrist-moderate" position. The country would not go on a wartime footing. Everyone present was asked if he had any objections.

The key moment was when he came to General Wheeler and stood looking directly at him for a moment, "Do you General Wheeler, agree?" Wheeler nodded his agreement...Everyone in the room knew Wheeler objected, that the Chiefs wanted more, that they wanted a wartime footing and a call-up of the Reserves; the thing they feared most was a partial war and a partial commitment. But Wheeler was boxed in; he had the choice of opposing and displeasing his Commander-in-Chief and being overruled, anyway, or going along. He went along.¹²

There were many reasons for going along--loyalty to the President, the obligation to carry out civilian directed policies, the chance to favorably influence further actions and the strong likelihood that a public dissent would have been written off by Congress and the public as so much grandiose war-mongering--military leaders posing as latter day MacArthurs. Yet a public dissent at this time by one or all of the Joint Chiefs might have done much to restore the military's faltering ethic of professional responsibility. As Vice Admiral John T. Hayward notes, the failure of the senior military leaders to dissent from administration defense policies they believed to be professionally unsound and their compliant willingness to publicly endorse these policies before congressional and public audiences, has made the military officer corps professionally culpable for the Vietnam tragedy,

The Vietnam problem has been with us for a decade. The military today stand as responsible and accountable and cannot blame McNamara, McGeorge Bundy or any other civilian as being totally responsible.

In all these years, not one military man stood up and was heard opposing any of our actions, so silence means assent to most Americans.¹³

CONCLUSION

The cases of MacArthur, Ridgway, and Taylor illustrate three alternative conceptions of the senior professional military leader's role in the US government. They constitute a typology of senior professional military leadership models--"the heroic military partisan" (MacArthur), "the professional military manager" (Ridgway), and "the presidential military bureaucrat" (Taylor and Wheeler). These ideal types of professional military chiefs reflect contrasting leadership styles, different models of public administration, dissimilar norms of military professionalism, and critical variations in the pattern of convergence which structures senior civil-military relations in the American government.

Each suggests alternative forms of dissent against presidential defense policies which the military chief opposes. The MacArthur and Taylor examples illustrate a deleterious politicalization of the military profession, the distortion of objective professional standards, and a potential threat to the American constitutional design of balanced civil control of the military. The Ridgway type, on the other hand, maintains the traditional administrative and political neutrality of the professional officer, facilitates objective professional military standards, cultivates in the senior military leader a salutary sense of professional detachment, fosters independent professional judgments by senior military advisors, and is conducive to constitutionally balanced civil control of the military establishment.

The MacArthur case represents the "heroic military partisan" whose idiosyncratic sense of personal destiny, pronounced charismatic leadership style, and explicit long-standing identification with partisan political interests leads him to reject the traditional norms of military professionalism

and enter the domestic political process as an independent political actor. He is oriented to an extreme "Whig" model of administration and defines his governmental role in broad, grandiose terms of personal responsibility to self, destiny and the nation. In order to realize his full potential as a man of destiny and to advance his personal political beliefs, this type of senior military leader adheres to an extreme pattern of civil-military convergence which unites him with minority civilian political groups sympathetic to his ideological values and political ambitions.

As a professional soldier who has been transformed into a partisan political actor, the "heroic military partisan" dissents from presidential policies he opposes on the basis of personality. Acting under the subterfuge of his professional role, the military leader publicly attacks both the ends and the means of the government's military policies on the grounds that they violate objective professional military standards. The dissent tends to be a self-serving, politically motivated, militant repudiation of governmental policy. It is an unjustified attempt by the senior military leader, in conjunction with his civilian political allies, to usurp the President's constitutional authority. As such, it is subverse of democratic civilian control, a judicious policy process, and objective military professionalism.

Because the "heroic military partisan" type, illustrated by MacArthur's case, is dependent upon the personal character and historical accident of the charismatic hero, it cannot be institutionalized and thus it constitutes only a transitory threat to balanced civilian control and objective military professionalism.

The "professional military manager" type exemplified by Ridgway is characterized by a routinized charismatic leadership style and a sense of professional autonomy which facilitates the senior military leader's adherence

to the objective standards of the military profession. This military chief is oriented to a moderate Whig model of administration which stresses professional detachment, neutral administrative subordination, the unqualified acceptance of the civilian leader's political judgment, and the qualified acceptance of the civilian leader's administrative decision.

He strives to maintain a salutary balance between the bureaucratic and professional dimensions of his governmental role. The Ridgway type essays a non-partisan, politically neutral position (vis a vis the President and Congress) in the national policy process. Equal emphasis is placed upon professional responsibility to the President, Congress, the nation, and the objective standards of his profession. His governmental authority, derived from bureaucratic position and professional reputation, is self-consciously restricted to the formulation and the execution of military policy. He recognizes an administrative obligation to present independent professional military opinions to Congress and the President irrespective of their compatibility with administration policies or political "guidance."

In order to maintain the military's political impartiality, administrative neutrality, and professional effectiveness, the "professional military manager" advocates a limited civil-military convergence. While this pattern of convergence fosters the integration of the military's institutions and subjective values with those of the civil society, it safeguards the autonomy of the military's objective professional standards.

The military chief who acts as an administratively dependent, professionally autonomous governmental advisor in accordance with the norms of the "professional military manager," will dissent from presidential policies only on professional military grounds attributable to objective professional standards. Such a dissent will be restricted to the instrumental aspects of administration

policy. It will be discrete, non-biased, and limited to appropriate executive and congressional forums. A senior military leader's professional dissent will not be sublimated for political reasons, nor will it be designed to advance personal, partisan, or non-organizational interests.

A dissent will be based upon the military chief's conclusion that the allowed military means established by a proposed presidential policy are, in his professional opinion, incommensurate or unsuited to the stated ends of the policy. In the most extreme case, if a senior military leader's advice does not effect a change in a military policy which he believes to be unsound, then he should, after making his doubts and objections known to both Congress and the President, carry out the policy to the best of his ability, or resign or retire from office. The "professional military manager" concept of the senior military leader's role is derived from customary principles of American military professionalism and established patterns of senior civil-military relations in the US government. It constitutes both a professional and political tradition that has promoted constitutional civil control of the military establishment and objective military professionalism.

The Taylor example illustrates the radical transition in the senior officer corps from the politically neutral orientation of the "professional military manager" to the politically coopted orientation of the "presidential military bureaucrat." The latter type of military chief personifies the mechanistic leadership style of the classical bureaucrat. Having given up all claims to professional autonomy, He no longer adheres to the objective standards of the military profession. He is strongly oriented to a Jacksonian model of administration which stresses: the subordination of professional detachment, advocatory non-partisan politicalization, biased administrative dependence, and unqualified acceptance of the civilian executives' political judgments and administrative decisions.

This type of senior military leader defines his governmental role in predominantly bureaucratic terms. While he acknowledges a limited responsibility to Congress, the nation, and the objective standards of his profession, he places primary emphasis upon his administrative accountability to hierarchal superiors in the executive branch. In any conflict of obligations, his first loyalty is to the President. The "presidential military bureaucrat's" administrative authority is derived from organizational position and, to a minor extent, professional skill. This authority is carefully circumscribed by extensive organizational constraints.

If requested, he will present to his superiors in the executive a professional military opinion that is tailored to political and economic guidance and is compatible with the President's thinking. As a public, political advocate of presidential policies and an administrative agent of the Chief Executive, the Taylor type of military chief accepts a radical model of senior civil-military convergence that fosters the full integration of the military's institutional structures, subjective values, and objective professional standards with the dominant civilian sector. Under this pattern of convergence, the senior military leader abjures traditional political detachment and professional autonomy. If he believes that specific presidential policies are militarily unsound, he may within executive circles only, urge their modification. Whether they are modified or not, he is prepared at all times to endorse these policies before public and congressional audiences, to discount his professional doubts concerning them, and to follow orders rather than to exercise his independent professional skill or professional judgment. At no time will this senior military advisor dissent from presidential policies he opposes either before congressional or public forums.

The transition from the "professional military manager" epitomized by

Ridgway to the "presidential military bureaucrat" epitomized by Taylor and Wheeler, was neither inevitable nor necessary for the furtherance of the military's professional effectiveness or political responsiveness. On the contrary, this conversion has undermined both objective military professionalism and balanced civil control. It was the result of the complex interrelationships among specific contextual factors that influenced the development of the American military profession between 1950 and 1965. These factors may be subdivided into two categories--those external to the military profession and those internal. Individually and in the aggregate, they facilitated the emergence of the "presidential military bureaucrat" type as the dominant leadership model among senior American military leaders:

Factors External to the Military Profession:

- 1) The rapid expansion of presidential power and the enhancement of the "mystique of the Commander-in-Chief" between 1940 and 1965.
- 2) The corollary decline of Congress' influence over defense matters due primarily to the legislature's self-abdication of their political responsibility in this field and the continued fragmentation of the parliamentary power of the congressional committees traditionally charged with the legislative supervision of the military establishment.
- 3) The broad and increasingly intensive unification of the armed services.
- 4) The extensive centralization of departmental administrative authority in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the proliferation of Assistant Defense Secretaries.
- 5) The "civilianization" of the DOD.
- 6) Successive presidential purges of the JCS in 1953, 1955 and 1962-1963.
- 7) The political and professional fallout of the Truman-MacArthur controversy.

- 8) The alienating effects upon the senior military of the Korean War, the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the various American involvements in Indochina--actual and aborted--between 1960 and 1965.
- 9) The forced politicalization of the customary military perspective.
- 10) The partial expropriation of the senior military officers' traditional functions by the President's key civilian aides.
- 11) The increasing tendency of civilian officials to involve themselves in the detailed supervision of military operations at all levels (accelerated to some extent by the special political dilemmas posed by nuclear weapons).

Factors Internal to the Military Profession:

- 1) The decline of charismatic and routinized-charismatic leaders within the military elite.
- 2) The self-selection out of the military profession of innovative, unconventional officers.
- 3) The increasing habit of selecting senior military officers for assignment to the highest professional positions on the basis of their reputation for administrative ability rather than forceful leadership.
- 4) A sharp attenuation of innovative military career patterns as a viable avenue into the military elite.
- 5) The establishment of prescribed career patterns as the sine qua non for acceptance into the military elite.
- 6) The massive impact of the Cold War ideology on the professional outlook of senior military officers.
- 7) A gradual enhancement of the de facto administrative authority of the Chairman of the JCS.
- 8) The professional and political influence of General Maxwell Taylor.

- 9) The steady erosion of the professional preeminence and organizational authority of the JCS.

With the establishment of the "presidential military bureaucrat" as the dominant leadership type among senior military officers, the independent contribution of the professional military to a pluralistic defense policy process has been severely restricted. This, in turn, has had an extremely adverse effect upon the integrity, the quality, the quantity, and the range of professional military advice available to executive and legislative policymaking bodies. Within the contemporary American military establishment, the excessive emphasis on group cohesiveness, political commitment, administrative bias, and bureaucratic insulation has undermined the senior military leader's professional detachment and capability for critical thinking.

The most valuable senior military advisors are those professionally oriented, independent-minded officers like Ridgway who neither "go it alone" nor submissively comply with a presidential military policy they think is substantially wrong or professionally unsound. Military chiefs of this sort understand the critical distinction between their legal-administrative obligation to respect the Commander-in-Chief's authority, and their moral-professional obligation not to revere it.

Adhering to a role based upon political detachment and professional independence, such senior military advisors are able to present to the President the relevant military facts and a realistic interpretation of them. In the long run, it is the most valuable service they can render their Commander-in-Chief. As Senator Jackson has noted,

The clear-eyed executive will understand that he should be concerned about the possibility that he may, with the best of intentions, misuse his power--through some lack of sophistication, some mistake in judgment, or some shading of truth to protect his personal reputation--and that the right of his advisors to differ is a healthy check on his exercise of the powers entrusted to him.¹

Notes to pages 174-

Commencement Address to the Foreign Service Institute Senior Seminar, Department of State, June 11, 1964, quoted in Senate Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, Administration of National Security: Staff Reports and Hearings. (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 538.

2. "Cambodia: Inside Story," Newsweek, August 6, 1973, p. 32; cf "Secret '69-'70 Raids Defended by Abrams: Cambodia Bombing Probe," George Post, Army Times, August 22, 1973, pp. 1, 20.
3. Quoted in NYT, July 24, 1973.

However, the "professional military manager" can not survive in an administrative environment that is hostile to non-partisan professional policy dissents.

Senior military advisors also have a professional responsibility to inform Congress of competing military policy options, countervailing military strategies, alternative military recommendations, and professional military dissents. Otherwise, Congress will be confronted by a composite DOD package unequivocally certified by "presidential military bureaucrats."

If Congress' function in the formulation of national military policy is curtailed by a lack of relevant advice from politically unbiased professional military officers, then the legislature will be relegated to a passive, instrumental role in which it can give only a yes or no response to executive defense policies. Unable to generate alternative policy proposals due to its lack of access to professional expertise, Congress may assume an increasingly negative attitude towards the military establishment and the problems of national defense.

Unfortunately, the rapid deterioration of the congressional-military nexus in the Vietnam period has reinforced the professional military's identification with and political commitment to the executive branch of government. Recent evidence indicates that contemporary senior military officers may not recognize a legal, professional, or moral responsibility to respond fully and truthfully to serious congressional inquiries or military policies. In the course of congressional hearings conducted in 1973 on the secret, presidentially-ordered bombing of Cambodia during 1969-1970, both General Wheeler and Admiral Moorer stated that if they were ordered by the President to withhold information from or lie to any government official in order to

maintain the secrecy of a specific military operation, they would readily do so. Under orders from Secretary of Defense Laird, General Wheeler had the Joint Staff set up a double bookkeeping system whereby the targets that were secretly bombed in Cambodia were "covered" by phony targets in Vietnam. Outside of those few senior officials in the executive who had "a need to know," the real targets were not reported in official records. When the Senate requested the official records on US bombing in Indochina, they were forwarded the false set of data. In explanation of this careful deception of Congress by the Pentagon, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger described it as an unfortunate "bureaucratic glitch."²

Air Force Chief of Staff Brown (currently the Chairman of the JCS) stated in a letter to the Senate Armed Service's Committee why it was not illegal for the senior military officers to deceive Congress under certain conditions.

For falsification to constitute an offense, there must be proof of "intent to deceive." This is a legally prescribed element of the offense and is negated when the report is submitted in conformity with orders from a higher authority in possession of the true facts.³

The Cambodian hearings reveal a disturbing inclination on the part of senior military leaders to view Congress as a hostile, if not quasi-illegitimate branch of government, and to view the military as the exclusive agent of the President. It is a natural outgrowth of the "presidential military bureaucrat's" conception of his proper governmental role.

While the contemporary politicalization of the government's senior military leaders has been institutional rather than partisan in nature, it nevertheless poses a subtle threat to the constitutional design of civilian control of the armed forces and it clearly distorts the senior military officer's commitment to objective professional standards.

Hopefully, in the aftermath of Watergate and the termination of the

Vietnam War, the leaders of the American military profession will be encouraged to return to the more judicious role essayed by the "professional military manager," i.e., a governmental role which avoids both the partisan arrogance of a MacArthur and the administrative acquiescence of a Taylor. It is epitomized by the moderate course Ridgway followed in which the professional soldier is responsible not only to a President or an executive policy, but also to Congress, the Constitution, the nation, and his professional integrity. Such a senior military leader realizes that it is not enough to be just a good soldier, dutifully and unquestioningly carrying out the civilian executive's orders and policies. Nor does he think it sensible to stifle professional disgruntlement with an internal immigration or use it as a pretext for immoderate partisan attacks on elected civilian officials.

The national government, the country and the military profession benefit from constructive criticism, competing viewpoints, alternative strategies, and uncompromised professional dissents voiced by politically neutral and professionally responsible senior military officers in appropriate executive, congressional, and--to a limited extent--public forums. However, so long as the military bureaucracy continues to triumph over the military profession, then self-criticism--the right to dissent--which is a fundamental strength of any sound organization, will be suppressed, and the military will become increasingly static and stagnant. As the current self-perpetuating chain of conformity continues to characterize the administrative environment of the military bureaucracy, future generations of careful, quiescent military yes-men will continue to carry out, without question or doubt, ill-considered, incautious military policies. As before, it will again prove to be a formula for political and professional disaster.

Appendix A

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

<u>Officer</u>	<u>Prior Assignment</u>	<u>Dates as CJCS</u>	<u>Pres. Admin.</u>	<u>Succeeding Assignment</u>
Bradley, O. N.	Army CoS	Aug. 49-Aug. 53	T, E	
Radford, A. W.	CO Phillipines Formosa Area	Aug. 53-Jul. 57	E	
Twining, N. F.	Air Force CoS	Jul. 57-Aug. 60	E	
Lennitzer, L. L.	Army CoS	Sept. 60-Oct. 62	E, K	CinC Europe (1962-1969)
Taylor, M. D.	Pres. Asst.	Oct. 62-July 64	K, J	Amb. to S. Viet. (1964-1965) Spl. Counsul to Pres. (1965-1969)
Wheeler, E. G.	Army CoS	July 64-July 70	J, N	
Moorer, T. H.	CNO	July 70-July 74	N	
Brown, G. S.	Air Force CoS	July 74-	N, F	

Appendix B

Chief of Staff US Army

<u>General</u>	<u>Prior Assign.</u>	<u>Dates as CoS</u>	<u>Pres. Admin.</u>	<u>Succeeding assign.</u>
Bradley, O. N.	Administrator VA	Feb. 48-Aug. 49	T	Chmn. JCS(1949-1953)
Collins, J. L.	Dep. and Vice CoS US Army	Aug. 49-Aug. 53	T, E	NATO rep. and Amb. to Vietnam (1953-1956)
Ridgway, M. B.	Supreme CO Allied Powers Europe	Aug. 53-Jun. 55	E	
Taylor, M.D.	CO US/UN Forces Far East	Jun. 55-Jun. 59	E	Pres. Asst.(1961-62) Chmn. JCS (1962-64) Amb. to S. Vietnam (1964-65) Spl. Counsul to Pres. (1965-69)
Lemnitzer, L. L.	Vice CoS US Army	Jun. 59-Sep. 60	E	Chmn. JCS (1960-62) Supreme Allied CO Europe (1962-69)
Decker, G. H.	Vice CoS US Army	Sep. 60-Oct. 62	E, K	
Wheeler, E. G.	Dep. CinC Eur. Command	Oct. 62-Jul. 64	K, J	Chmn. JCS (1964-70)
Johnson, H. K.	Dep. CoS Mil. Opns.	Jul. 64-Jul. 68	J	
Westmoreland, W. C.	CG MACV	Jul. 68-Jul. 72	J, N	
Abrams, C. W.	CG MACV	Jul. 72-Sept. 74	N, F.	(died, Sep. 74)
Weyand, F. C.	Vice CoS US Army	Oct. 74-	F.	

Appendix C

Chief of Staff US Air Force

<u>General</u>	<u>Prior Assign.</u>	<u>Dates as CoS</u>	<u>Pres. Admin.</u>	<u>Succeeding Assignment</u>
Vandenburg, H. S.	Vice CoS USAF	Aug. 48-Jun. 53	T, E.	
Twining, N. F.	Vice CoS USAF	Jun. 53-Jul 57	E	Chmn. JCS (1957-60)
White, T. D.	Vice CoS USAF.	Jul. 57-Jun. 61	E, K	
Lemay, C. E.	Vice CoS USAF	Jun. 61-Feb. 65	K, J	
McConnel, J. P.	Dep. CinC US Eur. Command	Feb. 65-Aug. 69	J, N.	
Ryan, J. D.	Vice CoS USAF	Aug. 69-Jun. 73	N	
Brown, G. S.	CO Systems Command USAF	Jun. 73-Jul 74	N	Chmn. JCS (1974-)
Jones, D. J.		Aug. 74-	F	

Appendix D

<u>Admiral</u>	<u>Prior Assign.</u>	<u>Dates as CNO</u>	<u>Pres. Admin.</u>	<u>Succeeding Assignment</u>
Sherman, F. P.	CO 6th Task Fleet	Nov. 49-Aug. 51	T	
Fechteler, W. M.	Dep. CNO for Personnel	Aug. 51-Aug. 53	T, E	CinC Allied Forces So. Eur. (1953-57)
Carney, R. B.	CinC Allied Forces So. Europe	Aug. 53-Aug. 55	E	
Burke, A.	CO Atlantic Fleet	Aug. 55-Aug. 61	E, K	
Anderson, G.	CO 6th Fleet	Aug. 61-Aug. 63	K, J	Amb. to Portugal (1963-66)
McDonald, D. L.	CO 6th Fleet	Aug. 63-Aug. 67	K, J	
Moorer, T. H.	Supreme Allied CO Atlantic	Aug. 67-Jul 70	J, N	Chmn. JCS (1970-74)
Zumwalt, E. R.	CO USN Vietnam	Jul. 70-Jul. 74	N	
Holloway, J. L.		Aug. 74-	F	

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. Lt. Col. Roger H. Nye, "George A. Lincoln: Architect in National Security," Issues of National Security in the 1970's, ed. Col. Amos A. Jordon, Jr., (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1967), pp. 3-20.
2. Senate Subcommittee on National Security Staffing, Staff Reports and Hearings, "Administration of National Security," 88th Cong., 2nd Sess. June 25, 1964, Testimony of Col. George A. Lincoln, pp. 537-599. (Henceforth cited as Jackson National Security Subcommittee Report.)
3. Jackson National Security Subcommittee Report, p. 545.
4. Jackson National Security Subcommittee Report, p. 564.
5. Jackson National Security Subcommittee Report, p. 565.
The then current controversy over the need for the professional military officer to fully understand the complex interrelationship of politico-military factors tended, Lincoln said, to obscure the historical evidence which clearly showed that many military officers had been well versed in these matters. Among those he cited who had displayed particular expertise in handling politico-military problems were: Alexander Hamilton, Tasker Bliss-founder of the Council of Foreign Relations, General Embick, and Admiral Sims.
6. Jackson National Security Subcommittee Report, p. 565.

1

THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

1. Louis Smith, American Democracy and Military Power. (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 21.
2. Samuel P. Huntington, "Civil Control and the Constitution," American Political Science Review, Vol. L (September, 1956), p. 680.
3. Hans Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), pp. 214-27. The view that Prussia was simply an army with a state and thus dominated by a professional military clique, discounts the fact that the vast majority of the Prussian officers were nobles first and soldiers second. The rapid deterioration that set in the Prussian Army after Frederick's death in 1786, was caused in part by the officer corps' subordination of military to aristocratic interests.
4. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State. (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), p. 165.
5. George Washington, "Sentiments on a Peace Establishment," May 2, 1783, in The American Military: Readings in the History of the Military in American Society. Ed. by Russell F. Weigley (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1969), p. 6.

6. Smith, American Democracy and Military Power, p. 23.
7. Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism. (New York: The Free Press, 1957); pp. 101-3.
8. Huntington, Solder and the State, p. 168.
9. Smith, American Democracy, p. 7.
10. Edward A. Kolodzeij, The Uncommon Defense and Congress, 1945-1963. (Columbus: Ohio State University, 1966), p. 6; Smith, American Democracy, p. 25; Huntington, "Civil Control," p. 682.
11. Edward S. Corwin, The Constitution and What it Means Today. (New York: Atheneum, 1969), pp. 65-72, 100-5, 290-309.
12. Kolodzeij, The Uncommon Defense, p. 16.
13. Smith, American Democracy, p. 6.
14. Kolodzeij, The Uncommon Defense, p. 15.
15. Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army. (New York: Macmillan Co., 1967), p. 87.
16. Local militia were totally ineffecutal against Cromwell's New Model Army. Alexander Hamilton's bitter but accurate appraisal of the militia's performance in the American Revolution is expressed in the Federalist Papers, #25, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, intro. by Clinton Rossiter, (New York: New American Library, 1961), pp. 162-68.
17. Smith, American Democracy, p. 34.
18. Weigley, US Army, pp. 566-69.
19. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier. (New York: Free Press, 1966), p. 204; Walter Millis, Arms and Men: A study in American Military History. (New York: New American Library, 1956), p. 37.
20. Vagts, History of Militarism, p. 103.
21. It is interesting to note that most of the senior professional military officers who flirted with the idea of seeking the Presidency or who actually did campaign for it while still on active duty were despised by influential segments of their military peer group, e.g., Winfield Scott, Zachary Taylor, George McClellan, Nelson Miles, Leonard Wood, and Douglas MacArthur.
22. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State. (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), p. 170; Weigley, US Army, pp. 118-20, 125-26, 131-32.
23. Huntington, Soldier and the State, p. 171.

24. Weigley, US Army, pp. 320-24.
25. Millis, Arms and Men, p. 121.
26. Huntington, Soldier and the State, p. 175.
27. Weigley, US Army, pp. 508-13.
28. David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest. (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 503; Weigley, US Army, pp. 532-34.
29. Huntington, "Civil Control," p. 690.
30. Huntington, Soldier and the State, pp. 184-85.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 691.
32. *Ibid.*
33. Smith, American Democracy, p. 43.
34. Huntington, "Civil Control," p. 699.
35. Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers. (New York: New York University Press, 1968), pp. 21-22, 82-100; Leonard D. White, The Jacksonians. (New York: Macmillan, 1956), pp. 78, 318, 324, 552, 562-66; Herbert Storing, Lectures on "Presidential Management," University of Chicago, April-May, 1974; Andrew Jackson, "Protest," April 15 and 21, 1837, Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, III, 69ff; Veto of the Bank Bill, July 10, 1832; *Ibid.*, II, 567ff; Removal of the Public Deposits, September 18, 1833; *Ibid.*, III, 5ff.
36. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations, ed. by Talcott Parsons (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 337-41.
37. Daniel Webster, A speech delivered in the US Senate on the President's power to remove executive officials from office, February 16, 1835, Works (6th ed., 1835), vol. IV, pp. 183-84. (Henceforth cited as Webster, "Removal Speech"); see also Daniel Webster, "The Presidential Protest," Speech delivered in the Senate, May 7, 1835, *Ibid.*, Vol. IV, pp. 122-46.
38. Webster, "Removal Speech," pp. 177-78.
39. *Ibid.*
40. Weber, Social and Economic Organizations, pp. 329-37.
41. President's Committee on Administrative Management, Report. (US Government Printing Office, 1937), p. 33.
42. Herbert J. Sairo, Responsibility in Government. (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1969), pp. 82-83.

43. Herman Finer, "Administrative Responsibility in Democratic Government," in Public Administration and Policy: Selected Essays, ed. by Peter Woll (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), p. 273.
44. Finer, "Administrative Responsibility," p. 255; also Herman Finer, "Better Government Personnel," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 51 (1936) p. 569; and Herman Finer, The Theory and Practice of Modern Government. (New York: Henry Holt, 1949).
45. Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy. (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1950), Chap. 19, "Responsible Government Service"; Norton Long, "Power and Administration," in Woll, Public Administration and Policy, pp. 50-57.
46. Carl J. Friedrich, "Responsible Government Service Under the American Constitution," in Problems of the American Public Service. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1935), p. 36; Peter Woll, American Bureaucracy. (New York: Norton Co., 1963), pp. 4-5, 45, 51-3.
47. Carl J. Friedrich, "Public Policy and the Nature of Administrative Responsibility," in Woll, Public Administration and Policy, p. 244.
48. Talcott Parsons, Politics and Social Structure. (New York: Macmillan, 1969), Chap. 1, "The Concept of Society: The Components and their Interrelations," pp. 5-34.
49. Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and Lloyd I. Rudolph, "Parochialism and Cosmopolitanism in University Government: The Environment of Baroda University," Chap. 11, pp. 207-72, in Rudolph and Rudolph, Education and Politics in India: Studies in Organization, Society and Policy. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972); Lloyd I. Rudolph, Lectures on "The Sociology and Politics of Organizational Politics and Performance," University of Chicago, November, 1974.
50. Friedrich, "Responsible Government Service Under the American Constitution," p. 37; Arthur D. Larson, "Military Professionalism and Civil Control: A Comparative Analysis of Two Interpretations," Journal of Military and Political Sociology, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring, 1974), p. 65.
51. Larson, "Military Professionalism and Civil Control," p. 59.
52. Ibid., pp. 57-73. In this excellent article Larson provides an incisive analysis of the contrasting theses of civil-military convergence and the problems of military professionalism contained in Huntington's, Soldier and the State, and Janowitz's Professional Soldier. Larson is clearly sympathetic to Janowitz's position that the professional military ought to be a politically sensitive profession fully integrated with the civilian social and political system it serves.
53. Huntington, Soldier and the State, pp. 59-80, 243-63; Janowitz, Professional Soldier, pp. 233-57; Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1955); for a different interpretation which recognizes liberalism as the dominant current in American society, but stresses the importance of the conservative tradition in the formulation of the liberal society, see Clinton Rossiter, Conservatism in America: The Thankless Persuasion. (New York: Vintage Books, 1962).

54. Huntington, Soldier and the State, pp. 350-61, 456-69; Janowitz, Professional Soldier, pp. 8-16.
55. Harold Lasswell, "The Garrison State and Specialists on Violence," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. XLVI (January, 1941), pp. 433-440; C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), Chap. 9, "The military Ascendancy," pp. 190-224; Kenneth Frewin and Alan Stone, The Ruling Elites, (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), pp. 99-107.
56. Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism: Civilian and Military, (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 11-32. "The military way is marked by a primary concentration of men and materials on winning specific objectives of power with the utmost efficiency, that is, with the least expenditure of blood and treasure. It is limited in scope, confined to one function, and scientific in its essential qualities. Militarism, on the other hand, presents a vast array of customs, interests, prestige, actions, and thought associated with armies and wars and yet transcending true military purposes. Indeed, militarism is so constituted that it may hamper and defeat the purposes of the military way." p. 13.
57. Adam Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment, (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 25-27; James Clotfelter, The Military in American Politics, (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), pp. 148-235; Stephen Ambrose, "The Military and American Society" and "The Military Impact on Foreign Policy," in The Military and American Society, ed. by Stephen Ambrose and James A. Barber (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), pp. 140-235, and pp. 121-136.
58. Huntington, Soldier and the State, Chap. 6, "The Ideological Conflict: Liberal Society vs. Military Professionalism," pp. 143-63.
59. Gene Lyons, "The New Civil-Military Relations," American Political Science Review, Vol. 55, No. 1 (March, 1961): 53-63.
60. Larson, "Military Professionalism and Civil Control," p. 67.
61. Janowitz, Professional Soldier, pp. 8-14; Morris Janowitz and Roger W. Little, Sociology and the Military Establishment, (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1965), pp. 17-24.
62. Janowitz, Professional Soldier, pp. 418-19; Larson, "Military Professionalism and Civil Control," pp. 65-66.
63. Janowitz, Professional Soldier, p. 423; Robert K. Merton, "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality," in Reader in Bureaucracy, ed. by Robert K. Merton, et al. (Glencoe: Free Press, 1952), pp. 304-71.
64. Janowitz, Professional Soldier, pp. 424-440.
65. Morris Janowitz, "Toward a Redefinition of Military Strategy in International Relations," World Politics, Vol. XXVI (July, 1974), p. 495, fn. 44.

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MILITARY CHIEFS AND PRESIDENTIAL POLICY: THE PROBLEM OF DISSENT--ETC(U)
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
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GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR

1. Hamilton, Federalist Papers, #8, p. 68.
2. Morton Kaplan, William Reitzel, and Constance G. Coblenz, United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1955. (Washington, D. C.: Brookings, 1957), pp. 1-140; Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957), pp. 43-45, 61, 63, 67, 74-83.
3. Lawrence J. Korb, "The Secretary of Defense and the JCS: Relationship in the Budgetary Process," paper prepared for delivery at the 1971 annual meeting of the InterUniversity Seminar of the Armed Forces and Society, University of Chicago, November 18, 1971, pp. 1-6; Clark R. Mollenhoff, The Pentagon. (New York: Pinnacle Books, 1971), pp. 570-75.
4. Lawrence J. Korb, "Congressional Impact on Defense Spending, 1962-1973; The Programmatic and Fiscal Hypotheses," paper prepared for delivery at the 1973 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, September 4-5, pp. 7, 11.
5. Janowitz, Professional Soldier, pp. 21-32.
6. Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences: Autobiography. (New York: Crest Books, 1965), p. 460.
7. There is a tendency in much of the literature on American civil-military relations to classify all senior officers who sought the presidency in one amorphous group. Such a gross classification ignores critical distinctions. A more informative classification would be:

1. Senior non-professional military officers who campaigned for the presidency as civilians.

<u>Name of Officer</u>	<u>Year Resigned or Retired from Military</u>	<u>Year Ran for Political Office</u>
G. Washington	1783	1789
A. Jackson	1821	1822
F. Pierce	1848	1852
A. Johnson	1864	1864
R. Hayes	1865	1877
J. Garfield	1863	1880
B. Harrison	1865	1888

2. Senior professional military officers who campaigned for the presidency or became publicly involved with a partisan political party while still on active duty:

<u>Name of Officer</u>	<u>Year Resigned or Retired from Military</u>	<u>Year Ran for Political Office</u>
W. Scott	1861	1840, 1844, 1852
G. McClellan	1862	1864
W. S. Hancock	1881	1868, 1880
L. Wood	1920	1916, 1920
D. MacArthur	1951	1948, 1952

3. Senior professional military officers who campaigned for the presidency after their departure from the military and who were not identified with partisan political interests while on active duty:

W. H. Harrison	1814	1840
Z. Taylor	1847	1848
U. Grant	1868	1868
D. Eisenhower	1952	1952

8. Walter Millis, Arms and the State. (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), pp. 266-72.
9. New York Times (Henceforth cited as NYT), April 29, 1951, p. 10.
10. "One Needless Facet of the Controversy," Arthur Krock, NYT, April 17, 1951, p. 1; NYT, May 4, 1951, p. 26.
11. Lawrence S. Wittner, ed., MacArthur. (Englewood Cliffs. Prentice-Hall, 1971), p. 17.
12. Janowitz, Professional Soldier, p. 152.
13. Huntington, Soldier and the State, pp. 367-73.
14. Sydney L. Mayer, MacArthur. (New York: Ballantine Books, 1971), pp. 12-15; MacArthur, Reminiscences, pp. 8-10, 40-41.
15. MacArthur, Reminiscences, pp. 40-41.
16. Sydney L. Mayer, MacArthur in Japan. (New York: Ballantine Books, 1973), p. 141.
17. Janowitz, Professional Soldier, pp. 3-17, 21-37; Huntington, Soldier and the State, pp. 7-19.
18. Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations. (New York: Free Press, 1961), pp. 51-53, 201-62.
19. Janowitz, Professional Soldier, p. 7.
20. Janowitz, Professional Soldier, pp. 125-175, 291-301.

21. David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest. (New York: Random House, 1972), pp. 180-81, 200-05, 475-85, 541-48, 556-59; Robert L. Van Nice, "Perpetuation of a Quagmire," paper prepared for the California Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar, February, 1974, pp. 6-11; Maxwell Taylor, Swords and Plowshares. (New York: Norton, 1972), pp. 197, 315.
22. Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway. As told to Harold H. Martin, (New York: Harper & Bros., 1956), p. 28.
23. Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Education of a General. (New York: Viking Press, 1963), p. 189.
24. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Education of a General, pp. 283-333; Janowitz, Professional Soldier, pp. 296-97.
25. MacArthur, Reminiscences, pp. 46-49; Mason, MacArthur, p. 23.
26. Huntington, Soldier and the State, pp. 280-82; Janowitz, Professional Soldier, pp. 152-53. Although still on active duty following his tour as Chief of Staff (1910-14), General Wood continued to be a leading spokesman for the Roosevelt wing of the Republican Party. Between 1913 and 1917, he lobbied extensively for universal military training and a preparedness program that went far beyond anything President Wilson contemplated. During the early war period while Wilson was trying to maintain a precarious neutrality, Wood was continually making bitter partisan speeches in which he lambasted the President and his "timid pacificism." In 1916, Wood's name was mentioned for the Republican presidential nomination. When nothing came of it and the US entered the war, Wood decided that martial triumphs in the Great War would propell him toward the Republican nomination in 1920. Like his patron, Theodore Roosevelt, Wood was stopped cold by Pershing's sensible desire not to have ambitious "political" generals leading US troops in France. Wilson readily concurred with Pershing, in part, because he was naturally disinclined to advance the political interests of his partisan opponents. Wood sat out the war ably supervising training camps in the US. He did manage to make it to the front lines on a short inspection tour. There he received a slight wound for his efforts, however the longed-for publicity was not forthcoming. In 1920, Wood was a major contender for the Republican presidential nomination. He received 391 1/2 votes on the first ballot before his political friends deserted him in the precipitous rush to the uncontroversial Harding. Seven years later, the old soldier died, an embittered, abandoned, and forgotten relic of the "Neo-Hamiltonian Age."
27. D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, Vol. I (1880-1941), (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970), pp. 259-64.
28. Ibid., p. 284.
29. Mayer, MacArthur, p. 35.
30. Huntington, Soldier and the State, p. 369.

31. Ibid.
32. John Wilson, "The Quaker and the Sword: Herbert Hoover's Relations with the Military," Military Affairs, Vol. XXXVIII No. 2 (April, 1974), pp. 41-47; Pogue, Marshall: Education of a General, P. 294.
33. Wilson, "Quaker and the Sword," p. 45.
34. Ibid., p. 46.
35. Mayer, MacArthur, pp. 43-48.
36. Weigley, US Army, p. 568.
37. MacArthur, Reminiscences, p. 109.
38. Mayer, MacArthur, p. 119.
39. Arthur H. Vandenberg, The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, ed. by A. H. Vandenberg, Jr. with the collaboration of Joe Alex Morris, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), p. 76; Mayer, MacArthur, p. 109; Pogue, George C. Marshall: ordeal and Hope 1939-1942. (New York: Viking Press, 1967), pp. 373-5; Jack Raymond, Power at the Pentagon. (New York: Harper & Row, 1964, p. 172.
40. Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory 1943-1945. (New York: Viking Press, 1973), pp. 176-78; MacArthur, Reminiscences, pp. 200-201.
41. Wittner, MacArthur, p. 11; MacArthur, Reminiscences, p. 200-201.
42. Pogue, Marshall: Organizer of Victory, pp. 176-78.
43. Mayer, MacArthur in Japan, pp. 20-23.
44. Wittner, MacArthur, p. 11.
45. NYT, March 28, 1951-May 12, 1951; John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War. (New York: Norton, 1965), pp. 221-79; Mayer, MacArthur in Japan, pp. 140-41; Huntington, Soldier and the State, pp. 367-73; MacArthur, Reminiscences, pp. 428-70.
46. Weigley, History of the United States Army, p. 513.
47. Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War. (New York, Popular Library, 1967), pp. 145-158.
48. Bernard Brodie, War and Politics. (New York, Macmillan Company, 1973), pp. 85-86.
49. Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, p. 73. The scope of just one of MacArthur's frequent press campaigns during the Korean War is revealing, Spanier writes,

...his hypersensitvity to criticism led him to equate criticism with disloyalty and to allay responsibility for his predicaments and failures upon his civilian and military superiors in Washington.

It was against the latter that MacArthur, in late November and early December, released his verbal barrage. On November 28 he issued a special communique and sent a telegram to Ray Henle of Star Extra newscast; on November 30 he sent a reply to message he had received on the previous day from Arthur Krock of New York Times; on December 1 he gave an interview to Hugh Baillie, president of the United Press. Other interviews and messages were given or sent to Ward Price of the London Daily Mail; to Barry Faris, managing editor of the International News Service; and to the Tokyo press corps. p. 149;

cf. NYT, December 2, 1950, pp. 1, 4, December 3, 1950, pp. 7, 9; Mayer MacArthur in Japan, pp. 120-3; MacArthur, Reminiscences, pp. 439-43; Millis, Arms and the State, pp. 266-72.

50. Huntington, Soldier and the State, p. 370.
51. Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans. and ed. by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 245; Weber, Theory of Social and Economic Organizations, pp. 358-9; "Interview of John Gunther, author of The Riddle of MacArthur," Harvey Breit, NYT, January 26, 1951, p. 21.
52. Aside from his father, Theodore Roosevelt, and Leonard Wood, MacArthur may have had other historic personages as his personal models, "Once he said to an interviewer (perhaps with tongue in cheek) that his major advisors were Washington and Lincoln!", John Gunther, The Riddle of MacArthur, (New York: Harper & Row, 1951), p. 209.
53. Weber, From Max Weber, pp. 246-50; Weber, Theory of Social and Economic Organizations, pp. 360-1.
54. Dwight D. Eisenhower, At Ease: Stories I Tell to Friends, (Garden City: Doubleday, 1967), pp. 312-315, 223-26; Janowitz, Professional Soldier, p. 295; Mayer, MacArthur, pp. 55, 96, 155.
55. Janowitz, Professional Soldier, pp. 294-301. Pershing had drawn Patton, Marshall, and Mitchell into his circle. Marshall's network included Eisenhower, Bradley, Collins, Hodges, Ridgway, Gruenther, Taylor, Arnold, and Devers. MacArthur's included less prominent names--Willoughby, Whitney, Fellers, Kenney, Almond, Stratemeyer, and Wedemeyer. A number of field commanders in Korea (Van Fleet, Turner Joy, Radford and Clark) and some senior Air Force officers (LeMay, Twining, White and Powers) shared MacArthur's strategic concepts of absolute total war and his frustration over the political restraints imposed on the US military during the Korean War. See Huntington, Soldier and the State, p. 390.
56. Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, p. 276 and Huntington, Soldier and the State, pp. 59-60, are very instructive on this point.

Notes to pages 69-78

57. Quoted in Wittner, MacArthur, pp. 105-6; Ridgway, Soldier, pp. 220-2; cf. Bernard Brodie, War and Politics, (New York: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 89-91.
58. "MacArthur-I, II, III," Hanson Baldwin, NYT, March 28-30, 1951, p. 4.
59. Huntington, Soldier and the State, p. 352.
60. Statements of Sen. Homer Ferguson, Mich (R) and Rep. Joseph Martin, Mass. (R) quoted in NYT, April 9, 1951, pp. 1, 8.
61. "The MacArthur Ouster," Hanson Baldwin, NYT, April 12, 1951, pp. 12, 18; "Role of the Joint Chiefs Major Issue in the Debate," Anthony Leviero, NYT, April 29, 1951, sec. iv, p. 3; Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War, (New York: Popular Library, 1967), pp. 146-7; MacArthur, Reminiscences, pp. 433, 437, 446; Mayer, MacArthur in Japan, pp. 135, 147; Wittner, MacArthur, pp. 13-14.
62. Huntington, Soldier and the State, pp. 374-87; Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, pp. 272-3.
63. Lawrence B. Tatum, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defense Policy Formulation," in The Military and American Society, pp. 121-37; Millis, Arms and the State, p. 402.

3

GENERAL MATTHEW RIDGWAY

1. NYT, May 13, 1953, p. 1.
2. Millis, Arms and the State, pp. 403-5; Huntington, Soldier and the State, pp. 394-95.
3. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change. (New York: Signet Book, 1965) 391-99; Kolodziej, Congress and the Uncommon Defense, pp. 200-25; Weigley, US Army, p. 526.
4. Donald J. Mrozek, "A New Look at 'Balanced Forces'; Defense Continuities from Truman to Eisenhower," Military Affairs, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 4 (December, 1974), pp. 145-51; C. W. Borklund, The Department of Defense. (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 64-5; Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War. (New York: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 400-7.
5. Kolodziej, Congress and the Uncommon Defense, pp. 198-99.
6. Weigley, US Army, p. 569.
7. Kolodziej, Congress and the Uncommon Defense, pp. 198-99.
8. NYT, January 16, 1950, p. 3; Ridgway, Soldier, p. 190.
9. NYT, January 16, 1950, p. 3.

10. Ridgway, Soldier, pp. 28, 98.
11. Ridgway, Soldier, p. 191; See also Roy E. Appleman, US Army in the Korean War: South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu. (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1961).
12. Maureen Mylander, The Generals. (New York: Dial Press, 1974), p. 194.
13. Ridgway, Soldier, pp. 296-7.
14. NYT, June 14, 1953, p. 28; June 18, 1953, p. 23; June 19, 1953, pp. 14, 27.
15. Admiral Radford had been a key figure in the 1949 "Admiral's Revolt" in which senior officers in the Navy conducted a vigorous public and congressional campaign against the Truman administration's "massive retaliation" defense budget for FY 50. The budget made sharp cuts in the Navy's carrier program in order to build up the Air Force's B-36 intercontinental bomber program. Admiral Louis Denfield, Chief of Naval Operations, authorized an intensive lobby effort, selective "leaks" to the news media, and critical anti-administration testimony before Congress by naval officers. The Admirals hoped that their actions would generate political pressure that would force the President to restore the deleted Navy funds. A congressional inquiry was initiated to investigate the Navy's charges that the administration was placing excessive reliance on the B-36 as the ultimate solution to America's defense problems and foolishly stripping the Navy of its prime offensive weapon. Following the hearings, the "Revolt" was suppressed, the Admirals involved (with the exception of Radford and Arleigh Burke) "retired." A month later, Denfield was dismissed from the JCS and retired. See NYT, January 13, 1950, p. 6; Mollenhoff, The Pentagon, pp. 168-176; Weigley, American Way of War, pp. 376-79.
16. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, pp. 535-45; NYT, January 24, 1956, p. 11; Kolodziej, Congress and the Uncommon Defense, pp. 187-89.
17. Ridgway, Soldier, p. 273.
18. Ibid., pp. 286-87.
19. Ibid., p. 288.
20. "Ridgway vs. Eisenhower," Hanson Baldwin, NYT, January 24, 1956, p. 11; Matthew B. Ridgway, "My Battles in War and Peace," six-part serial appearing in the Saturday Evening Post, Vol. CCXXVIII, January 21-February 25, 1956.
21. See Reinhard Bendix, "Bureaucracy," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 2nd ed., Vol. 2, pp. 206-211 for a discussion of the classic conflict in bureaucracies between administrative subordination and professional discretion.
22. Gene Lyons, "The New Civil-Military Relations," in Components of Defense Policy. ed. by Davis B. Bobrow, (Chicago, Rand McNally, 1965), p. 112.

23. Transcripts of three interviews between Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway and Lt. Col. John M. Blair, November 24, 1971-Marcy 24, 1972 (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: US Army War College Senior Officer Debriefing Program, Tape 3, pp. 41-9, quoted in Mylander, The Generals, p. 220 and fn. 13, p. 372.
24. Frederick C. Mosher, "Decision-Making in Defense," Public Administration Review, (Summer 1958), p. 172.
25. Ibid. , p. 173.
26. Huntington, Soldier and the State, pp. 374-5.
27. Norton Long, "Public Policy and Administration: Goals of Rationality and Responsibility," Public Administration Review, (Winter 1954), pp. 28-9.
28. Unidentified congressmen quoted by Lewis Anthony Dexter, "Congressmen and the Making of Military Policy, " in Components of Defense Policy. ed. by Davis B. Bobrow, p. 105.
29. House Armed Services Committee (HASC), "Unification and strategy," House Document no. 600, 81st cong., 2nd sess. (1950), pp. 49-56.
30. Huntington, "Civil Control and the Constitution," p. 693.
31. NYT, November 17, 1954, p. 1.
32. Mylander, The Generals, p. 210.
33. HASC, Subcommittee on Army Appropriations, Hearing on DOD Appropriations for FY 55, 83rd cong., 2nd sess., (1954), p. 54.
34. Ridgway, Soldier, pp. 296-7.
35. Ibid., pp. 93-4.
36. Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), Hearings on DOD Appropriations for FY 55, 83rd cong., 2nd sess., (1954), p. 476.
37. Huntington, Soldier and the State, pp. 396-7.
38. Ridgway, Soldier, pp. 271-2.
39. Ridgway, Soldier, pp. 77-83; Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, pp. 60-4; Janowitz, Professional Soldier, pp. 163-4.
40. Ridgway, Soldier, p. 82.
41. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, p. 64.
42. James Cavin, "Crisis Now", in The Military and American Society. ed. by

James A. Barber Jr., p. 143.

43. Huntington, Soldier and the State, pp. 68-9.
44. Halberstam, Best and the Brightest, pp. 140-1; Herbert S. Parmet,
45. Chalmers Roberts, "The Day We Didn't Go to War," The Reporter, September 14, 1956; Halberstam, Best and the Brightest, pp. 140-1; Herbert S. Parmet, Eisenhower and the American Crusades. (New York: Macmillan, 1972), pp. 362-70.
46. Gavin, "Crisis Now", pp. 147-8; Ridgway, Soldier, pp. 276-7; Halberstam, Best and the Brightest, pp. 142-4.
47. Gavin, "Crisis Now", p. 148.
48. Halberstam, Best and the Brightest, p. 144.
49. Ridgway, Soldier, Appendix 1, "A Letter from General Ridgway to the Secretary of Defense," dated 27 Jun 55, pp. 330-1.
50. "Joint Chiefs-Fulcrum of the Islands Debate," Hanson Baldwin, NYT, April 10, 1955, sec iv, p. 3.
51. Ridgway, Soldier, p. 279.
52. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 554.
53. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, pp. 542-3; Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 87; Mollenhoff, The Pentagon, p. 570.
54. Senate Subcommittee on DOD Appropriations, Hearings on the DOD Appropriations for FY 56, 84th cong., 1st sess., (April 4, 1955), pp. 184-98, 206.
55. Ibid., p. 206.
56. Ibid., p. 211.
57. Ibid., p. 212.
58. Ibid., p. 214.
59. Ibid., p. 215.
60. Ibid., p. 217.
61. Ibid., p. 219.
62. Weber, Theories of Social and Economic Organizations, pp. 217-19, 363-73; cf. Etzioni, Complex Organizations, p. 206, for his interesting modification of Weber's view of routinized charisma:
 It therefore seems that a modification of a widely accepted theorem is called for: personal charisma may be achieved in office. Actors may have only personal charisma (natural leaders, or informal leaders in organizations) or only office charisma ("unimpressive" kings, presidents, doctors, or

professors), but they also may have both office and personal charisma ("outstanding" personally influential officeholders).

Ridgway would seem to belong to the latter category.

63. Janowitz, Professional Soldier, p. 164.
64. "Ridgway-Three Views of a Soldier," Gertrude Samuels, NYT, April 22, 1951, sec vi, p. 59.
65. NYT, July 15, 1955, p. 1; Ridgway, Soldier, pp. 317-31; Weigley, American Way of War, pp. 418-19; Halberstam, Best and the Brightest, p. 472.
66. "Changes in the Joint Chiefs", Hanson Baldwin, NYT, June 1, 1955, p. 16.

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GENERAL MAXWELL TAYLOR

1. Halberstam, Best and the Brightest, p. 472.
2. In The Best and the Brightest, (pp. 471-77), Halberstam gives the most detailed, anecdotal account of the incident. However, his sources are private and informal. A series of articles written by Anthony Leviero (in 1956 he was the New York Times Pentagon correspondent) which appeared almost daily in the NYT between May 5 and May 24, 1956, and two press conferences held that same month (one by Secretary of Defense Wilson and the other by President Eisenhower), confirm in general detail the accuracy of Halberstam's account. Taylor does not mention the "Colonels' Revolt" in his autobiography, Swords and Plowshares.
3. Halberstam, Best and the Brightest, p. 474.
4. "Ridgway Bids US Define Its Aims or Face Ever-Expanding War," NYT, March 22, 1966, p. 6; cf. Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War, Chap. 7, "Lessons Learned and Unlearned," pp. 237-44. In this chapter, Ridgway makes the case that the US is wasting its manpower and resources in Southeast Asia which is, in terms of American national interests, an irrelevant area.

For the present I believe there is no higher duty than preservation of our freedom. That requires us to husband our strength, not squander it, for use when we face the supreme test. But the mere statement of purpose is valueless. It must be translated into concrete and pragmatic political objective that, as I have noted before, should conform to our vital national interests and be subordinated to them.

I am frankly doubtful that we are in Southeast Asia, setting our objectives within this frame...we should ask ourselves now if we are not, in this open-ended conflict,

so impairing our strength through overdrawing on our resources--political, economic and military--as to find ourselves unduly weakened when we need to meet new challenges in other more vital areas of the world. For there surely will be threats that bear more closely on our true national interests. (pp. 243-4)

This was a rather blunt rejection of arguments advanced by Taylor at this time:

In South Vietnam we have indeed taken sides and shall be obliged to take sides until we have exposed the myth of the invincibility of the "War of Liberation" and have assured the independence of South Vietnam...To fail would inevitably set in train a disastrous series of events, starting perhaps among the neighboring countries of Southeast Asia but surely extending over much of the underdeveloped world. Even the presently detached European nations would feel the shock. ,

Maxwell Taylor, Responsibility and Response. (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), p. 16; cf. James Gavin, "A Communication on Vietnam," Harper's Magazine, January 17, 1966, p. 16. This was a letter to the editor setting forth what came to be known in the 1966 Fullbright Hearings on Vietnam as Gavin's "Enclave Strategy". Taylor and other military representatives of the Johnson administration denounced Gavin's plan as an inadequate strategy which according to Taylor, would ultimately lead to a US withdrawal from SVN, an action which, "would amount to a crushing defeat of international proportions for the US." Furthermore Taylor said, he knew of no active officer who supported Gavin's "illusory strategy", NYT, January 23, 1966, p. 2 and February 4, 1966, p. 1; cf. Matthew Ridgway, "Letter to the editor", Harper's Magazine, March 6, 1966,

I read with absorbing interest General James M. Gavin's [letter of January 17, 1966] and my own views accord completely with his.

General Gavin's penetrating analysis of our major military problems and policies, which he has made over the past decade and a half have been conspicuous for fertile and creative thinking and far-reaching vision in the military field.

According to Halberstam, in 1965 Taylor had favored (as the lesser of two evils) an enclave strategy in opposition to Westmoreland's plan to deploy major Army units into the interior of SVN to conduct large scale search and destroy operations,

Taylor opposed using a division for either purpose at the moment he told Washington and General Johnson, but if he had to come to a choice, he favored the coastal enclave theory as simpler, safer, and less costly. (A year later, when Taylor's old Airborne rival, Jim Gavin, who had opposed the war, surfaced with the idea of winding down the war by moving to an enclave strategy, the Administration chose Taylor as the weapon with which to knock Gavin down, which Taylor did, Gavin and the general public never knowing that Taylor had proposed roughly

the same strategy.

The Best and the Brightest, p. 564.

5. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, pp. 377, 388-97; Best and the Brightest, p. 191; Halberstam, Best and the Brightest, p. 161.
6. Halberstam, Best and the Brightest, p. 161.
7. Ridgway, "My Battles in War and Peace," Harvard Magazine, 1956.
8. HASC, Hearings on DOD Appropriations for FY 57, 84th cong., 2nd sess., (1956), p. 230.
9. Huntington, Common Defense, p. 93.
10. "Taylor Returns to the Front," Jack Raymond, NYT, May 1, 1956, p. 1 (background biographical article); Weigley, Harvard Magazine, 1956.
11. Kolodzeij, Congress and the Uncommon Defense, p. 234.
12. SASC, Subcommittee on the Air Force, Hearings held on a "Study of Airpower," 84th cong., 2nd sess., (April 1956); NYT, April 25, 1956, p. 1; Mollenhoff, The Pentagon, pp. 264-76; Kolodzeij, Harvard Magazine, 1956, p. 235.
13. Halberstam, Best and the Brightest, p. 475.
14. Raymond, Power at the Pentagon, p. 200.
15. Halberstam, Best and the Brightest, p. 476.
16. "President Backs Defense Budget", Anthony Levins, NYT, May 18, 1956, p. 1.
17. "Military Forces Split by Conflicts on Arms Policies," Anthony Levins, NYT, May 19, 1956, p. 1.
18. Ibid.
19. "Wilson Promises to Study Rivalry," NYT, May 20, 1956, p. 1; Halberstam, Best and the Brightest, p. 476.
20. "Wilson Reaction," NYT, May 20, 1956, pp. 1, 12.
21. "Comments Divided on Service Fight," Alan Drury, NYT, May 21, 1956, p. 1.
22. "Wilson Marshals Service Chiefs to Decry Rivalry," NYT, May 21, 1956, pp. 1, 15.
23. Ibid.
24. Halberstam, Best and the Brightest, p. 476.
25. Raymond, "Taylor Returns to the Front," NYT, p. 1.
26. "The Military Rivalry," James Weston, NYT, May 21, 1956, p. 1.

27. Kolodzeij, Congress and the Uncommon Defense, p. 240.
28. NYT, December 14 and 15, 1957, p. 1.
29. "Gavin Fears US Faces Another Korea," NYT, January 12, 1958, p. 1.
30. Ibid.
31. James Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age. (New York: Harper, 1958); Weigley, American Way of War, pp. 422-4.
32. SASC, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, Hearings held on the FY 60 DOD Appropriations and the Berlin Situation, Part I, 86th cong., 1st sess., (March 1959).
33. "4 Military Chiefs List Objections to Budget Limits," NYT, March 9, 1959, pp. 1, 14; "Senate Testimony Contrasts with President's Stress on Nuclear Battle," NYT, March 15, 1959, p. 1, 4; NYT, March 30, 1959, p. 1.
34. "JCS Attacked by Congressman Mahon," NYT, March 31, 1959, p. 12.
35. Ibid.; Kolodezji, Congress and the Uncommon Defense, pp. 299-311.
36. Korb, "Secretary of Defense and the JCS," pp. 19-24.
37. Carl W. Borklund, Men of the Pentagon. (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 206-36; Raymond, Power at the Pentagon, Chap. XVI, "The McNamara Monarchy," pp. 277-94.
38. Herbert J. Storing, "The Crucial Link: Public Administration, Responsibility, and the Public Interest," Public Administration Review, (March 1964), pp. 39-64. In this article Storing discusses an earlier and perhaps parallel change in the values, opinions, conventions, and professional orientations which characterize the American civil servant. During this period both the civil and the military public servant were being drawn back from their "highest public duties"-the protection of the public interest. The training, education, and institutional biases of the contemporary permanent public servant emphasize narrow technical competence and political responsibility to the democratic regime's popular will. Consequently as Storing notes, the public administrator's traditional sense of professional responsibility or "duty" is eroded and thus his concern with the public interest is diminished.
39. Arthur M. Schlesinger., A Thousand Days. (Greenwich: Fawcett Crest, 1965), pp. 237-78.
40. Raymond, Power at the Pentagon, p. 284.
41. NYT, May 27, 1961, p. 1; cf "Kennedy Shapes Pentagon Team," Hanson Baldwin, NYT, July 5, 1961.
42. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 310; Halberstam, Best and the Brightest, p. 89.
43. Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment, p. 31.

44. Kolodziej, The Uncommon Defense and Congress, p. 352; cf Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, p. 189; Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy. (New York: Bantam, 1966), p. 682.
45. MacArthur believed that American foreign policy should, for the most part, reflect the views of the Republican Party, particularly the Party's right wing which shared MacArthur's obsession with Asia. During the Korean War, MacArthur disingenuously claimed that he was simply advocating that the government formulate its military and foreign policies with a realistic consideration of the requirements of military necessity. Underneath the verbiage and posturing, MacArthur's true concerns were usually political not military.
46. Robert N. Ginsburg, "The Challenge to Military Professionalism," Foreign Affairs, vol 42 (January 1964), pp. 255-68; Mollenhoff, The Pentagon, p. 41.
47. Mollenhoff, The Pentagon, pp. 374-402.
48. NYT, May 18, 1963, p. 18; Raymond, Power at the Pentagon, pp. 286-7.
49. "Anderson Criticizes McNamara," Speech before the National Press Club, NYT, September 5, 1963, pp. 1, 16.
50. Mollenhoff, The Pentagon, p. 49.
51. "McNamara Policies Deplored by Vinson," NYT, August 16, 1962, p. 31.
52. Halberstam, Best and the Brightest, pp. 89-90; Weigley, American Way of War, pp. 451-2; Sorensen, Kennedy, pp. 721-31; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pp. 310-15. (Schlesinger states that the JCS recommended only a 60,000 man force.)
53. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, pp. 225-6.
54. Neil Sheehan, et. al. The Pentagon Papers as Published in the New York Times. paperback edition (New York: Bantam, 1971), pp. 141-8; Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, p. 245; Halberstam, Best and the Brightest, pp. 164-73; Brodie, War and Politics, pp. 133-6.
55. "Cable from Taylor to Kennedy on Introduction of US Troops," Sheehan, Pentagon Papers, pp. 142-3.
56. Halberstam, Best and the Brightest, p. 172.
57. Ridgway, The Korean War, p. 238.
58. Halberstam, Best and the Brightest, p. 177.
59. Ibid., p. 180.
60. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 290.
61. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, pp. 251-2.
62. Maxwell Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet. (New York: Harper, 1960), pp. 109-10.

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63. Kolodziej, The Uncommon Defense and Congress, pp. 355-6.
64. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, pp. 402-16; cf Taylor, Responsibility and Response; "Taylor Rejects Gavin's Plan," NYT, February 4, 1966, pp. 1-6; Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings on Administration Policies in Southeast Asia, 89th cong., 2nd sess., (January and February 1966); NYT, February 18, 1966, pp. 1, 12.
65. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, p. 316.
66. William S. White, "The End of the 'Old Army'," Harper's, June, 1959, 82.
67. Ibid., p. 84.
68. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, pp. 261-9; Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining The Cuban Missile Crisis. (Boston: Little Brown, 1971), pp. 199, 205-10; cf Halberstam, Best and the Brightest, p. 66. Of all the Joint Chiefs, the USMC Commandant, General Shoup gave the most judicious advice.
69. Halberstam, Best and the Brightest, p. 478.
70. Sheehan, Pentagon Papers, pp. 274-7, 330, 354-4, 498, 511, 520, 530-1, 552-3, 560, 595; Halberstam, Best and the Brightest, p. 647.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS AS MILITARY BUREAUCRATS

1. NYT, June 24, 1964, p. 1.
2. Sheehan, Pentagon Papers, pp. 329, 365-7, 373-8; Halberstam, Best and the Brightest, pp. 507-10; Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point. (New York: Popular Library, 1971), pp. 126-8.
3. Sheehan, Pentagon Papers, pp. 324-9.
4. Halberstam, Best and the Brightest, p. 508.
5. Quoted in Sheehan, Pentagon Papers, pp. 386-7, 441.
6. Quoted in Sheehan, Pentagon Papers, pp. 387, 440-54.
7. Halberstam, Best and the Brightest, p. 546; For a recent, first hand account of the intense inter-organizational struggle between the military and the CIA over official intelligence estimates of the strength levels of Communist forces in Indochina during the Vietnam War, see Sam Adams, "Vietnam Cover-up: Playing With Numbers," Harper's, May 1975, pp. 41-66. According to Adams who was a CIA analyst responsible for charting Communist strength levels in Indochina, the CIA estimate which placed enemy strength at 600,000, conflicted with the military's intelligence estimate which

placed enemy strength at 250,000-300,000. Until the Tet Offensive of February 1968 validated the accuracy of the higher CIA estimate, the military command refused to accept the 600,000 man figure despite evidence from its own intelligence people which corroborated the CIA estimate. As Adams explains it, his own experience and the admissions made to him by senior military intelligence officers that they had been directed to make their enemy strength estimates conform to "command guidelines", convinced him that General Westmoreland's staff (at his direction) "cooked the numbers", i.e., they played politics with the official military intelligence estimates in order to satisfy the administration's perceived inclination to avoid either a massive escalation in Vietnam or a withdrawal:

...the scale of the Tet Offensive was the biggest surprise to American intelligence since Pearl Harbor... There was just no way they the Communists could have pulled it off with only 248,000 men, and the cables were beginning to show which units had taken part. Many had never been in the order of battle at all; others had been taken out or scaled down.

....All along I had wondered whether the White House had anything to do with fixing the estimates. The military wanted to keep them low in order to display the "light at the end of the tunnel," but it had long since occurred to me that maybe the generals were under pressure from the politicians... I don't know whether Walt Rostow ordered the falsification, or whether he was merely reluctant to face unpleasant facts. Accepting the higher numbers forced the same old decision: pack up or send a lot more troops.

(pp. 66, 68)

8. Quoted in Sheehan, Pentagon Papers, pp. 467-8.
9. Halberstam, Best and the Brightest, p. 596.
10. NYT, July 12, 1965, p. 1; Halberstam, Best and the Brightest, pp. 598-9.
11. NYT, July 29, 1965, pp. 1, 11; NYT, August 3, 1965, p. 1
12. Johnson, Vantage Point, pp. 148-9; Halberstam, Best and the Brightest, pp. 599-600.
13. Quoted in "Why Did 'Nam Dissenters 'Stifle'?", Gene Famiglietti, Army Times, April 4, 1973, p. 13.

CONCLUSION

1. Senator Henry M. Jackson, "Executives, Experts, and National Security,"

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Commencement Address to the Foreign Service Institute Senior Seminar, Department of State, June 11, 1964, quoted in Senate Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, Administration of National Security: Staff Reports and Hearings. (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 538.

2. "Cambodia: Inside Story," Newsweek, August 6, 1973, p. 32; cf "Secret '69-'70 Raids Defended by Abrams: Cambodia Bombing Probe," George Post, Army Times, August 22, 1973, pp. 1, 20.
3. Quoted in NYT, July 24, 1973.